The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 09

by Unknown

"1. That considering the diffused population of these States, the composition and temper of a part of its inhabitants, the want of a sufficient stock of national wealth as a foundation for credit, and the almost extinction of commerce, the attempts we have been compelled to make for carrying on the war, have exceeded the national abilities of this country, and by degrees brought it to a crisis, which render immediate assistance and efficacious succor from abroad indispensable to its safety.

"2. That notwithstanding from the confusion always attendant on a revolution, from our having had governments to frame, and every species of civil and military institution to create, from that inexperience in affairs necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, some errors may have been committed in the administration of our finances, to which a part of our embarrassments are to be attributed; yet they are principally to be attributed to our essential want of means; to the want of a sufficient stock of wealth as mentioned in the first article, which, continuing to operate, will make it impossible, by any merely interior exertions, to extricate ourselves from these embarrassments, restore public credit, and furnish the funds requisite for the support of the war.

"3. That experience has demonstrated the impracticability of maintaining a paper credit, without funds for its redemption; the depreciation of our currency was in the main a necessary effect of the want of those funds, and its restoration is impossible for the same reasons, to which the general diffidence, that had taken place among the people, is an additional, and in the present state of things, an insuperable obstacle.

"4. That the mode, which for want of money has been substituted for supplying the army, by assessing a proportion of the productions of the earth, has hitherto been found ineffectual, has frequently exposed the army to the most calamitous distress, and from its novelty and incompatibility with ancient habits, is regarded by the people as burthensome and oppressive, has excited serious discontents, and, in some places, alarming symptoms of opposition. This mode has besides many particular inconveniences, which contribute to make it inadequate to our wants, and ineligible but as an auxiliary.

"5. That from the best estimates of the annual revenues, which these States are capable of affording, there is a balance to be supplied by credit. The resource of domestic loans is inconsiderable, because there are, properly speaking, few monied men, and the few there are can employ their money more profitably otherwise; added to which, the instability of the currency and the deficiency of funds have impaired the public credit.

"6. That the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, their wants carried to an extremity, which has recently had very disagreeable consequences, and demonstrate, the absolute necessity of speedy relief, a relief not within the compass of our means. You are too well acquainted with all their sufferings, for want of clothing, for want of provisions, for want of pay.

"7. That the people being dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, there is danger to apprehend, that evils actually felt in prosecuting it may weaken the cause which began it, evils founded not on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future sufferings from the loss of their liberties; there is danger that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another.

"8. That from all the foregoing considerations result, 1st, the absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor of money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations. 2dly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on this continent the ensuing campaign, to effectuate once for all the great object of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these United States. Without the former, we may make a feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our opposition; with it we should be in a condition to continue the war as long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The first is essential; both combined, would bring the contest to a glorious issue, crown the obligations which America already feels to the magnanimity and generosity of her ally, and render the union perpetual by all the ties of gratitude and affection, as well as mutual interest, which alone render it solid and indissoluble.

"9. That next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority is the most interesting; this would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult, defensive war, and by removing all prospects of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting it. Indeed, it is not to be conceived, how they could subsist a large force in this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid of money, would enable us to convert the contest into a vigorous offensive war. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how much it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of the sea. No nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind, which we possess for commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and prosperity, and a certainty (its independence being established) of redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts, it may have occasion to contract. Notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes among the people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the country equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable of activity and energy in measures of which a powerful succor of money must be the basis.

"The people are discontented, but it is with the feeble, oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself; they are not unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do it in a way that renders private property precarious, a necessary consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a re-union with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France. But this disposition can ill supply the means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes, that attend the want of them."