After my first interview with the Count de Vergennes, I presented, in form of a memorial, a copy of which has been transmitted to Congress, an extract of a letter from General Washington, written in consequence of my conference with him by order of Congress, making such small additions as were suggested by the state of the business. The advantage of the General's credit in Europe made me prefer his letter to any common form of memorial, especially as he had treated the principal objects of my mission in a manner no less full and explicit than conformable to the ideas of Congress.
I accompanied it with the estimate of the Board of War, after making a deduction of many articles, the demand of which I apprehended would throw an unfavorable cast on the whole business. A translated duplicate of the complete estimate had been long since delivered by Dr Franklin. The Count de Vergennes exclaimed vehemently against the exorbitance of the demand, to which the strength of our army was so disproportioned, adding, that duplicate cargoes of such value could not be afforded, and that the articles demanded would exhaust all our money; for he refused to understand as I did, the intention of Congress to solicit the supplies in addition to the loan.
Argument and expostulation on this subject were fruitless. In pursuance of his definitive request, I formed a reduced list accompanied by a letter, a copy of which has been transmitted. An allowance was made for the Lafayette's cargo, as well as a very imperfect sketch of it could enable me. This list was immediately referred to the War Department. In all my interviews with the Ministers, I endeavored to represent in their strongest light the following important articles. That notwithstanding the unalterable determination of the United States to support their independence, notwithstanding the virtue and firmness of the citizens in general, the immense pecuniary resources of Great Britain, and her constant naval superiority were advantages too decisive to be counterbalanced by any interior exertions on the part of the United States. That these must infallibly impose a term to the efforts of a nation, whose extended maritime and inland frontier rendered her obnoxious to sudden descents and incursions on all sides; whose army was consequently exposed to excessive marches, attended with insupportable expense of money and waste of soldiers, that the exhausted state of their finances reduced Congress to the impossibility of calling the natural resources of the country into activity; that the aggravated calamities of a war, which in its principles had been precautionary, began now to produce dangerous uneasinesses and discontents; that we had concealed enemies to contend against; that the British left no measures unattempted either of open force or secret intrigue; and finally, unless instant succor were afforded as solicited by Congress, that France was in danger of losing all the fruits of the part she had hitherto taken in the contest; that if instead of being actuated by a generous and enlightened policy, the Court of France had systematically protracted the war, in order that Britain and America might mutually exhaust themselves, while she had reserved her power to decide only in the last extremity, this period with respect to America had arrived; that the importance of the objects of the war on one hand, and the mischiefs of suffering Great Britain to re-annex to herself the resources of America, demanded the greatest exertions; that the honor of the King, as well as the national interest, was engaged, and that, considering the flourishing state of the French marine and finances, the succor solicited was as easy as, considering our situation, it was indispensable.
I endeavored, above all, to hasten their determinations. The general language held by the Ministry was, that the demands of Congress were excessive; that to induce succor from their ally, there should be greater exertions on the part of the United States; that the King had the greatest good will towards them, but that the expenditures of the war were immense; the necessity of supporting a maritime war in different quarters, and the indispensable defence of his own colonies, limited his power of giving assistance; that the public credit of France, however good, had its limits, which it were dangerous to exceed; that the administration of the American finances was not calculated to inspire confidence; that a dangerous wound had been given to our public credit by the resolution of the 18th of March, 1780, a measure, which, however judicious it might have been in time of peace, was exceedingly pernicious in time of war; that the application of Congress was tardy, and by its suddenness excluded expedients which might otherwise have been employed for our relief; that with regard to the national interest and honor, France had been a great kingdom, and the King a powerful monarch, when America was composed of feeble colonies.
To this kind of discourse I answered, by enlarging on the natural and political disadvantages of America in the present contest, the fertile resources of the British, their power and activity; the impossibility of our supporting a paper credit without a foundation of specie, adding, that the continental currency must have died a natural death if it had not been checked at a late stage of depreciation, by the act of Congress in question; that persons, who had clamored most on this subject, had been instrumental in hastening the discredit of our paper, by various commercial speculations, but that the downfall of the currency must be attributed principally to a want of funds for its support; for this object Congress were renewing their application in the most pressing terms; that the King of France's glory could not but suffer if the British triumphed in the present dispute, as his consideration in Europe would be lessened by it; that his interests besides, and those of his kingdom, would certainly be deeply wounded by a re-accession of America to Great Britain, and that the same fleet and army, which should prove decisive there, would be at hand to possess themselves of the French islands.
The Marquis de Castries, Minister for the Marine Department, being absent, and a vacation produced some delay, I waited on this Minister immediately on his return to Court, and observed to him that the most important decisions relative to the common cause of France and America had been suspended on account of his absence; urged him particularly on the great point of a naval superiority, reminding him, that the British Marine was the principal instrument of their power; that the efforts of the allies to reduce this force could nowhere be made with such a prospect of success as on the American coast; that it would be very easy after a decisive campaign in America, in which his personal glory was so much interested, to transport a sufficient force from the continent to reduce any British island; that in the mean time the French islands would be in the most perfect security. He repeated nearly what he had said at our first interview, with stronger assurances of his prospect of a naval superiority the ensuing campaign.
In a word I used every argument of national interest, and added such personal motives as I thought applicable to the different Ministers.
On the 8th of April Count de Vergennes communicated to me his Most Christian Majesty's determination to become security for a loan of ten millions of livres, to be opened on account of the United States in Holland; that he had immediately despatched a courier extraordinary to M. de la Vauguyon with a letter relative to this business; that I had reason to be satisfied with this in addition to the donation of six millions, and four millions that had been appropriated to the payment of bills drawn on Mr Franklin. I pressed him by many arguments to leave an opening for the remaining five millions; exposed the false policy of incomplete succors; observed that Congress had solicited no more than was necessary; that there should be no other limits to the present succor than the invincible bounds of possibility; that it was not the condition on which the money was obtained, but the sum and opportuneness of remitting it, that were above all important; that in this point of view I would prefer converting the donation into a loan, if it would make the advance more convenient to the French finances, and facilitate the augmentation of the total sum, destined for the United States. I repeated the same thing to the Director-General of Finance, but their answer was, the King had passed his word and could not retract.
I entreated both M. de Vergennes and M. Necker not to abandon the United States to the operation of a loan, but to secure us from the finances of France the sum in question, and above all, to make immediate arrangements for the remittance of it.
In the mean time I pressed the Minister of Marine on the subject of ships, but I found that it was far from the intention of the Court to furnish the means for remitting any considerable sum immediately. Count de Vergennes urged the imprudence of exposing such precious succors to a simultaneous risk, and the necessity of dividing the danger by successive remittances, adding besides, that as permission had been given to draw, an allowance was to be made on this account, and a provisional sum for payment retained; that pursuant to those ideas it had been solemnly determined to send no more than two millions in a frigate with me. I observed, that the first difficulty would be obviated by proportioning the escort to the value of the specie; with regard to the other objection, I gave it as my opinion, that no bills would be drawn in consequence of the mode for touching the donation of six millions. The Count said, that I was not sufficiently impressed with what had been already done on our account, and appealed to our Minister Plenipotentiary. In addition to the warmest verbal remonstrances on the subject, I presented the Memorial, a copy of which was forwarded to Congress.