2dly. That he has made no other engagements than those expressed in the stipulations of the treaty.
3dly. That the United States have neither title nor right to require anything more, and that if they wish to persuade him to further engagements, it can only be voluntary on his part, and by uniting reciprocal counsels, conformably to the expression of Article 1st of the treaty, and as is proper for good and faithful allies. Even in this case, it is impossible to foresee the state of things and minds in Europe, or to judge what measures the important care of maintaining his reputation, and the system of equity and moderation, which he has made the fundamental principle of his reign, may require on his Majesty's part. These considerations seem particularly due to an ally, when he has contracted gratuitous obligations without any reciprocal advantages.
4thly. By uniting the expressions of Articles 11th and 12th, it will be seen, that the success of the war being alone able to fix the fate of empires, it has been found impossible on concluding the treaty of alliance to determine the possessions that the United States may obtain on making peace; that consequently, the engagement of France can only be conditional and eventual on this subject; that she is not now held to any particular engagement, in relation to these possessions, whether real or pretended; and that this obligation will not commence till the time in which the possessions of the United States shall be fixed by the cessation of the war.
5thly. In fine, it is indispensable to add to these considerations, that when any doubt arises as to the expressions, the extent and the application of the stipulations of a treaty, the laws of reason, and of universal justice, as well as the rules of a good and faithful alliance, decide, that an ally has no right to interpret it arbitrarily and partially; that the attempt would at the same time offend the dignity, and destroy the confidence of his ally; that neither of them can in fact arrogate to himself the superiority in connexions, which ought to be equal and reciprocal; that it is only by a friendly explanation, by a formal agreement, that these doubts can be removed, and the exact meaning of treaties determined; that in short, this method would become still more indispensable, if it should happen, that the pretensions of one of the parties were founded only upon farfetched inductions, subject to discussion and contradiction, and would tend to alter the essential and fundamental system of an alliance.
The Minister Plenipotentiary of France is fully confident, that the Congress of the United States, knowing the laws of proceedings, and the respect which Sovereigns mutually owe to each other, will observe them in their conduct towards his Most Christian Majesty; but the important, critical, and pressing juncture, in which the affairs of the alliance stand at the present moment, imposes on the undersigned Minister the sacred duty of contributing, as much as lies in his power, to hasten the resolutions of Congress, to prevent all mistakes and every subject of misunderstanding, to preserve the most perfect harmony and uniformity of views and sentiments, concerning the accomplishment of the advantageous stipulations of the alliance, and thus to deceive the expectation of the common enemy, who henceforth founds his principal hopes on the divisions, which he is intent upon fomenting. In fine, one of the objects of this Memorial is, to prove, solemnly, the faithful and friendly conduct of the King in this juncture, his Majesty hoping, that the knowledge of this conduct will confirm the governments and people of America in the sentiments of confidence, which the proceedings of his said Majesty have already inspired. It is only by thus placing before the eyes of Congress the indubitable principles expressed above, that the Minister Plenipotentiary of France thought that he could fulfil his duties to the King, his master, and to the alliance, and protect from all reproach his zeal for the common cause between France and America.
If he has deceived himself in his conjectures, as to the immediate and apparent utility of his mode of proceeding, he begs Congress to accept his excuses for having consumed time of so much value, and he flatters himself, that knowing his attachment to the alliance, and to the United States, it will attribute his conduct to these sentiments alone.
GERARD.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Translation.
Philadelphia, May 24th, 1779.