The Minister of France informed the Committee, that he had it in command from his King to impress upon the minds of Congress, that the British Cabinet have an almost insuperable reluctance to admit the idea of the independence of these United States, and will use every possible endeavor to prevent it. That they have filled several of the Courts of Europe with negotiations, in order to excite them to a war against France, or to obtain succors; and are employing the most strenuous endeavors to persuade the several powers, that the United States are disposed to enter into treaties of accommodation. That many persons in Europe are actually employed in bringing such treaties to perfection; and that they have no doubt of their success. That the objects which the British Cabinet hope for from those measures are, to destroy the superiority, which France has now at sea, by diverting her powers and resources from naval to land operations, and by engaging her in a land war, where she must risk very important interests, while England would risk nothing but money; or to break, or weaken the alliance, by destroying the confidence, which the allies ought to have in each other.
That his Most Christian Majesty gives no credit to the suggestions of Britain, relative to the disposition of the United States; and it is necessary, that measures be taken for the preventing of other powers from being deceived into a belief of them. That the negotiations of Britain, as far as could yet be learned, had not succeeded. That the dispositions of all the European powers are, as far as can be known, very friendly to France; but some of them may be engaged in secret treaties with Britain, which may oblige them, in some event, to assist her with troops even against their inclinations. That such event may arise, and if it should, it is probable it will produce an armed mediation, the consequences of which would be, that the allies must accept of the terms proposed by the mediator, or continue the war under the disadvantage of having the forces of the mediator united with those of their enemies. That in such event, it is possible the terms proposed will be such as Spain offered, and Britain rejected, in the last proposed mediation.
That, though the powers who may be under such engagements by treaty to Great Britain, from their friendly disposition towards his Most Christian Majesty, may be very unwilling to give assistance to his enemies, yet they may find it indispensably necessary in compliance with their engagements; but it is not improbable that their reluctance, or the distance of their dominions, may delay such assistance, if granted at all, so as to be too late for the next campaign. That should the enemy be in possession of any part of the United States at the close of the next campaign, it will be extremely difficult to bring Great Britain to acknowledge their independence; and if a mediator should be offered, while the enemy is in possession of any part, an impartial mediator could not easily refute the arguments, which might be used for its retaining such possessions. And, probably, a mediator well disposed towards Great Britain might insist on her holding them; and if not agreed to, the hostility of such a mediator would be the necessary consequence. That should Great Britain form such alliances, or procure such aids, as are the objects of her present negotiations, there will be every reason to fear a long and an obstinate war, whereof the final event may be doubtful.
That this view of affairs plainly points out the necessity for the greatest possible vigor in the operations of the next campaign, in order to dispossess the enemy of every part of the United States, and to put them in condition to treat of peace, and accept of a mediation with the greatest advantage; and the preparations for it ought to be as speedy and as effectual as possible. That France and Spain are prepared to make a very powerful diversion, and will exert themselves most strenuously for preserving and improving their naval superiority, and for employing the powers of the enemy in Europe and the West Indies. The Minister declared, as from himself, that he doubted not his Most Christian Majesty will spare some ships to the United States, if it can be done without endangering his superiority at sea; and that an application made to the Minister informally is more eligible than to the King, because it would give his Majesty great pain to refuse the request, though he might be in no condition to grant it. That at all events, supplies should be prepared on a supposition that the ships will be granted; and such supplies should be put into the hands of the Agent for the Marine of France, and considered as the King's property.
He desires to be informed, as far as Congress may deem proper, what force the United States can bring into the field next campaign? On what resources they rely for their maintenance and necessary appointments? And what shall be the general plan of the campaign, on supposition either of having, or not having the aid of ships of war? He gives it as his opinion, that an application for clothing may be made to his Most Christian Majesty with prospect of success; and although measures have been taken for sending arms and warlike stores to America, yet it would be prudent in Congress not to neglect any other means for procuring those supplies, or supplies of clothing.
FOOTNOTE:
[32] These extracts were the same as had been sent to General Washington, and are printed above, in connexion with M. de la Luzerne's letter to him, dated January 23d, 1780.
ANSWER OF CONGRESS TO THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MINISTER.
In Congress, January 31st, 1780.
Congress taking into consideration the communications of the French Minister, as reported by the committee on the 28th instant,