On the third, that it is probable that the King of Spain will conquer the Floridas during the course of the present war; and in such event, every cause of dispute relative thereto between Spain and these United States ought to be removed.
On the fourth, that the lands lying on the east side of the Mississippi, whereon the settlements were prohibited by the aforesaid proclamation, are possessions of the Crown of Great Britain, and proper objects against which the arms of Spain may be employed, for the purpose of making a permanent conquest for the Spanish Crown. That such conquest may, probably, be made during the present war. That, therefore, it would be advisable to restrain the Southern States from making any settlements or conquests in those territories. That the Council of Madrid consider the United States as having no claims to those territories, either as not having had possession of them before the present war, or not having any foundation for a claim in the right of the sovereignty of Great Britain, whose dominion they have abjured.
That his Most Christian Majesty, united to the Catholic King by blood and by the strictest alliances, and united with these States in treaties of alliance, and feeling towards them dispositions of the most perfect friendship, is exceedingly desirous of conciliating between his Catholic Majesty and these United States, the most happy and lasting friendship.
That the United States may repose the utmost confidence in his good will to their interests, and in the justice and liberality of his Catholic Majesty; and that he cannot deem the revolution, which has set up the independence of these United States, as past all danger of unfavorable events, until his Catholic Majesty and the United States shall be established on those terms of confidence and amity, which are the objects of his Most Christian Majesty's very earnest wishes.
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO M. DE LA LUZERNE.
Head Quarters, Morristown, February 4th, 1780.
Sir,
Major Galvan delivered me the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write to me on the 23d of January, to which I have paid all the attention the importance of its contents demands. I am much flattered by this commencement of a correspondence, from which I have everything to gain, and equally indebted for the interesting communications it affords.
It is a happy circumstance, that the efforts made by the British Court for obtaining troops in Germany are attended with so little success. This will naturally increase their exertions for procuring men in this country, and will, no doubt, make them more solicitous for effecting the exchange or release in some way or other, of their prisoners in our hands. It will be well, if in the negotiations on this subject, we can extract concessions favorable to those, which may take place in Europe, and you may depend the experiment shall be fully tried. But from the aspect of the late propositions on the part of the enemy, I should not entertain any sanguine hopes of the success of this experiment. The reinforcement they would derive from a full compliance with their proposals is not calculated at more than ten or eleven hundred private men; and this seems hardly to be an object of sufficient magnitude to induce them to concede to points of the nature, which your Excellency's information supposes; especially, as you emphatically express it, "after having sought with so much affectation to make the Thirteen States be considered as subjected to the English domination." The offers made through Major General Phillips are far more moderate, than any that have hitherto come from them, and appear, in a great measure, to have been influenced by his personal solicitations, dictated by an extreme anxiety to be released from captivity. But notwithstanding the matter in its present form wears to me the appearance I have mentioned, I shall not neglect any measure, which it may be in my power to take, to improve the intimation your Excellency has given, and entreat you to be assured, that I shall endeavor to make the event confirm the opinion you do me the honor to entertain, that nothing will be done derogatory to the magnanimous part your Court has acted, or the honor or interest of the United States.
The inconsistency of the Court of London, so well delineated by that of Madrid in the extract you had the goodness to annex, would appear extraordinary, if their whole conduct in the course of the war did not exhibit many similar examples. But it is evident, that their refusing to consider these States as independent in fact, during a negotiation, was a mere pretext to cover their unwillingness to concur in the pacific views of His Catholic Majesty; and the Memorial from the British Ambassador shows, that they were artfully aiming to effect a separation of interests between France and these States, the better to prosecute their hostile designs against either or both.