That the Minister communicated some parts of a despatch, which he had received from the Count de Vergennes, dated the 9th of March, 1781. That the resolves of Congress, which had been adopted on the association of the neutral powers, were found very wise by the Council of the King, and that it was thought they might be of service in the course of the negotiation. The French Ministry did not doubt but they would be very agreeable to the Empress of Russia. But they were not of the same opinion with respect to the appointment of Mr Dana, as a Minister to the Court of Petersburg. The reason is, that Catharine the Second has made it a point until now to profess the greatest impartiality between the belligerent powers. The conduct she pursues on this occasion is a consequence of the expectation she has, that peace maybe re-established by her mediation; therefore, she could by no means take any step, which might show on her side the least propension in favor of the Americans, and expose her to the suspicion of partiality towards America, and of course exclude her from the mediation. The appointment of Mr Dana, therefore, appears to be at least premature, and the opinion of the Council is, that this deputy ought not to make any use of his powers at this moment. In case he applies to the Count de Vergennes for advice, he shall be desired to delay making any use of his powers. The Count observes, it would be disagreeable to Congress that their Plenipotentiary should meet with a refusal, that their dignity would be offended, and that such a satisfaction ought not to be given to the Court of London, especially when negotiations of a greater moment are about to commence. However, the French Minister had orders to assure the committee, that his Court would use all their endeavors in proper time, to facilitate the admissions of the Plenipotentiary of Congress.
The Minister communicated to the committee several observations respecting the conduct of Mr Adams; and in doing justice to his patriotic character, he gave notice to the committee, of several circumstances, which proved it necessary that Congress should draw a line of conduct to that Minister, of which he might not be allowed to lose sight. The Minister dwelt especially on a circumstance already known to Congress, namely, the use which Mr Adams thought he had a right to make of his powers to treat with Great Britain. The Minister concluded on this subject, that if Congress put any confidence in the King's friendship and benevolence; if they were persuaded of his inviolable attachment to the principle of the alliance, and of his firm resolution constantly to support the cause of the United States, they would be impressed with the necessity of prescribing to their Plenipotentiary a perfect and open confidence in the French Ministers, and a thorough reliance on the King, and would direct him to take no step without the approbation of his Majesty; and after giving him, in his instructions, the principal and most important outlines for his conduct, they would order him, with respect to the manner of carrying them into execution, to receive his directions from the Count de Vergennes, or from the person who might be charged with the negotiation in the name of the King.
The Minister observed, that this matter is the more important, because, being allied with the United States, it is the business of the King to support their cause with those powers with whom Congress have no connexion, and can have none, until their independence is in a fair train to be acknowledged. That the King would make it a point of prudence and justice to support the Minister of Congress; but in case this Minister, by aiming at impossible things, forming exorbitant demands, which disinterested mediators might think ill-founded, or perhaps by misconstruing his instructions, should put the French negotiators under the necessity of proceeding in the course of the negotiation without a constant connexion with him, this would give rise to an unbecoming contradiction between France and the Thirteen United States, which could not but be of very bad effect in the course of the negotiation.
In making these observations, the Minister remarked, that it was always to be taken for granted, that the most perfect independency is to be the foundation of the instructions to be given to Mr Adams, and that without this there would be no treaty at all. The Count de Vergennes observes, that it is of great importance that the instructions aforesaid be given as soon as possible to Mr Adams. And the Minister desired the committee to press Congress to have this done with all possible despatch.
He communicated to the committee the following particulars, as a proof that this matter admits of no delay, and that it is probable the negotiation will very soon be opened. He told the committee that the English Ministry, in the false supposition that they might prevail on the Court of Madrid to sign a separate peace, had begun a secret negotiation with that Court, by the means of Mr Cumberland, but without any success. That the Court of Spain had constantly founded her answer on her engagements with his Most Christian Majesty. That on the other side, the King of France had declared to the King, his cousin, that the independence of the United States, either in fact, or acknowledged by a solemn treaty, should be the only foundation of the negotiations of the Court of France with that of London. That the British Court not seeming to be disposed to grant the independency, it appeared the negotiation of Mr Cumberland was superfluous. However, this English emissary continued, and still continues, his residence at Madrid, although he cannot have any expectation of obtaining the object of his commission. That this direct negotiation was known to all Europe, and that it seemed to render every mediation useless. That, however, the Empress of Russia, excited by motives of friendship to the belligerent powers, and in consequence of the share, which the association of the neutral powers had given her in the general emergency, has invited the king of France and the Court of London to require her mediation. That the Court of London has accepted the invitation with a kind of eagerness, and at the same time desired the Emperor of Germany to take a part in it. That the answer of the King of France to the overtures of the Court of Petersburg was, that he should be glad to restore peace by the mediation of Catharine, but that it was not in his power immediately to accept her offers, as he had allies whose consent was necessary for that purpose.
To the same application made by the Court of Petersburg to that of Madrid, this Court answered, that having entered into a direct negotiation with the Court of London, by the means of Mr Cumberland, it thought proper to wait the issue of it before it had recourse to a mediation. The Emperor, as has already been observed, having been desired by the Court of London to take part in the mediation, immediately informed the King of France, as well as his Catholic Majesty, of this circumstance, offering his co-mediation to both the allied Monarchs. To this, the King of France gave the same answer, which he had given to the Empress of Russia. As to the King of Spain, he again expressed his surprise at the English Ministry's requesting a mediation, after having entered into a direct negotiation; and he declared, that unless this negotiation should be broken off by the English themselves, it would be impossible for him to listen to a mediation, which, in any other circumstance, would be infinitely agreeable to him.
These answers, though of a dilatory nature, may be looked upon as an eventual acceptation of the mediation. The Minister observed, that it will be, in effect, difficult to avoid it. That a refusal will not be consistent with the dignity of the two powers, that had offered their interposition. That the King is obliged, from friendship and good policy, to treat them with attention. He further observed, that the demands of the King of France will be so just and so moderate, that they might be proposed to any tribunal whatever. That the only reason the King could have to suspend a formal acceptation is, that, at the time the offer was made, he was not acquainted with the intentions of his allies, namely, Spain and the United States.
The Minister observed to the committee, that in his opinion this conduct must afford Congress a new proof of the perseverance of the King in the principles of the alliance, and of his scrupulous attention to observe his obligations; he added, that, however, it is not without inconveniency, that this dilatory plan has been adopted. The distance between the allied powers of France and the United States, has obliged the Court of Versailles to adopt that plan, though liable to inconveniences, in order to conform to the engagements made by the treaties, to determine nothing into a negotiation without the participation of Congress. Besides, several States being invaded by the enemy, the French Council thought it inconvenient to begin a negotiation under these unfavorable circumstances. And being in hopes that the diversions made by the King's arms, will prevent the British from making very great exertions against the Thirteen United States, the French Ministry expected, that during the course of the present campaign they might be enabled to present the situation of their allies in a more favorable light to the Congress, that might assemble for peace. These delays, however, cannot with propriety take place for any long time, and it was the opinion of the French Ministry, that it would be contrary to decency, prudence, and the laws of sound policy, again to refuse listening to the propositions of peace made by friendly powers; for which reason, the Chevalier de la Luzerne was directed to lay all these facts confidentially before Congress.
The Minister informed the committee, that it was necessary, that the King should know the intentions of the United States with regard to the proposed mediation, and that his Majesty should be authorised by Congress to give notice of their dispositions to all the powers, who would take part in the negotiation for a pacification. The Minister delivered his own opinion, that he saw no inconveniency arising from the Congress imitating the example of the King, by showing themselves disposed to accept peace from the hands of the Emperor of Germany and the Empress of Russia. He added, that Congress should rely on the justice and wisdom of those two Sovereigns; and at the same time, he renewed the assurances, that his Majesty will defend the cause of the United States as zealously as the interests of his own Crown.
He informed the committee, that according to all accounts, the British Ministry were removing as far as possible, in this negotiation, every idea of acknowledging the independence of what they call their Thirteen Colonies; and he said, that Congress would judge by themselves, that the Court of London would debate with the greatest energy and obstinacy the articles relating to America. He availed himself of this reflection to impress the committee with the necessity Congress are under, of securing in their favor the benevolence and good will of the mediating powers, by presenting their demands with the greatest moderation and reserve, save independence, which will not admit of any modification. He further observed, that it was possible the difficulty of making a definitive peace might engage the mediators to propose a truce; and that it was necessary, therefore, to authorise eventually the Plenipotentiary of the United States to declare their intention thereon.