It should be observed, that whether England treats of the affairs of the United States with the Court of Versailles, or whether she opens a direct communication with the United States, she cannot avoid treating with the American negotiators sent by Congress. In either case she will be under the necessity of acknowledging that body.
The conduct of his Majesty on this occasion being strictly conformable to justice and his engagements, his Minister confines himself to a simple communication of it to Mr Livingston. He confides also to him, that the Count de Vergennes, in declaring to the English Agent, that his Majesty could not listen to any negotiations of peace if the Court of London did not treat at the same time with his allies, added verbally, that the King did not attend to his own satisfaction till that of his allies was procured.
Besides this, the effects of these steps taken by the Court of London, have been to engage France to pursue, with redoubled vigor, the measures that have given birth to these appearances of peace, but which would certainly not terminate in it, if England perceived that her enemies relaxed their efforts in any manner. It is above all things indispensable, that the United States should, in the course of this campaign, be in a situation to co-operate in vigorous enterprises, which may be formed. It appears that the design of the Court of London, pointed out by the debates in Parliament, is to reduce, by a defensive war, their operations upon this continent. The Minister of his Most Christian Majesty has at present no information relative to the plans of the approaching campaign. But whatever they may be, it would be useful to be enabled to inform his Court, that the United States will not adopt an inactivity, which would be equivalent to the truce required. But that their design is to trouble the repose, that the enemy wish to deliver themselves to, and that the operations, whether combined or separately undertaken by the United States, will be pushed with activity during the ensuing campaign.
As to the place of the negotiations, Congress knew in 1779, when they named a Plenipotentiary, and in 1781, when they gave him three Colleagues, that it could only be in Europe, and that this was the most effectual means of preventing delays and jealousy, and of maintaining the confidence and harmony, which has so happily subsisted hitherto between the allies. It would be important, that the Minister of his Majesty could inform his Court, that Congress persists in these dispositions; and, that in case Commissaries offer to treat upon this continent, they should be referred to the Ministers of the United States, who are provided with instructions on this subject in Europe; that the Court of London should address itself to them; and that it is impossible that the seat of negotiation should be in America. When these overtures were made to the Court of Versailles, the agent made no mention of those that were to be made in America, or to the American Ministers in Europe. It is obvious, that the design of this conduct is to inspire reciprocal distrust; and the Chevalier de la Luzerne conceives it can in no way more effectually be prevented, than by a full communication of every circumstance, which shall relate to the pacification and to the interests of the alliance, which shall come to his knowledge.
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO M. DE LA LUZERNE.
Head Quarters, June 5th, 1782.
Sir,
I have the honor of conveying to your Excellency the enclosed address of the officers of the American army under my immediate command, on the auspicious event of the birth of a Dauphin.
Happy in this opportunity of presenting to you this united testimony of respect and veneration for your royal Master, I pray you to believe, that I enjoy the highest satisfaction in having such an occasion of manifesting to your Excellency the very particular pleasure I feel in every event, which affects the happiness of his Most Christian Majesty, especially in one which is so interesting and important to his domestic felicity and that of his people.
I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.