The first was dated 9th April last. It expressed the opinion of the Count de Vergennes, that the Court of St James had formed a design to make a separate peace with one or more of the powers at war with it. That France was perfectly easy with respect to the disposition of Congress; and that the uniformity and steadfastness of their conduct did not leave the least doubt with regard to the part they would take in this circumstance. That the steps the King had taken on a similar occasion, and the disappointment of several British emissaries, was already known to Congress. That they had met with the same reception at Madrid; and there was the greatest probability, that their intrigues would not be more successful at the Hague. The Minister of France observed, that the glory and honor of the present confederacy, of which his Majesty was the centre, would be their having been inaccessible to artifice; and this extraordinary instance would be crowned with success, if the four powers persisted invariably in a firm attachment to their union, and if, on the one hand, making the greatest exertions to procure the completest satisfaction, they, on the other hand, confined themselves within such bounds of moderation as would give no umbrage to any one of the powers at war with Great Britain.
That the King had, in different circumstances, taken the proper measures to deprive the enemy of all hopes, which they might have formed of introducing dissensions between his Majesty and his allies. That it was to be wished, that the Court of London was fully convinced of the impossibility of treating separately with America. That this had always been the chimerical and favorite idea of England; and that so long as it subsisted, there would perhaps be no possibility of treating seriously about the conditions of a peace. That their negotiations would only be an artifice to scatter divisions among the allies, and retard their exertions for continuing the war. That the shortest way to put a stop to their intrigues, would be to let it be known publicly in the most explicit manner, that the United States neither can nor will make any peace without the concurrence of their ally; and that if England has any overtures of peace to make to them, the American Plenipotentiaries are sufficiently empowered to receive them, and to negotiate a peace, if those overtures are admissible.
That this peremptory language would free Congress from all the embarrassments, which the English Ministers could throw in the way; that it would bring them to a sincere disposition to make peace; put an end forever to their machinations with the mediating powers; deprive them of the means of feeding the Parliament and people of England with the hopes of a separate peace; and finally save the Americans from all the difficulties, which would infallibly take place if England were allowed to negotiate in America. It would convince England, that the United States are not less attached to their engagements with their ally than sensible of the respect due to the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, whose mediation Congress have accepted.
The Minister added, that though the situation of the belligerent powers, the distance of America, and the slowness and difficulty of communication made it advantageous that the seat of negotiation should be in Europe, and that the enemy should be informed of this resolution, yet Congress had the fullest liberty to follow the system which France had pointed out in her answer to the mediating powers, in consequence of which the American Ministers might negotiate immediately and directly, conformably to the instructions they had received from Congress; but the negotiations of France and America would be carried on in an equal progression, a continual and reciprocal communication would be given, and the two treaties signed at the same time, and one be ineffectual without the other.
The Count de Vergennes in the same despatch, gave information of the Dutch having acknowledged the independence of America, of which Congress are already informed.
The letters of May 2d and June 28th, urged the same point of referring the British negotiators in America to the American Plenipotentiaries in Europe, with this addition in the letter of May 2d, that it was now evidently the object of Great Britain to lessen their exertions on this continent as much as in their power, and to adopt a defensive mode of carrying on the war; that being unable to support a double war by land and by sea, she proposed to suspend the one in order to carry on the other more effectually; and in case of success, to return against the United States with redoubled efforts.
The Minister mentioned the attempts, that had been alternately made at the Court of Versailles, and with the American Plenipotentiaries, for a separate peace, and said, that Dr Franklin had communicated his and Mr Adams's answers, to the British emissaries; that the King thought them firm and consistent with the principles of the alliance, and wished that Congress might be informed of the satisfaction they afforded him. That to remove forever such expectations, it behooved the wisdom of Congress to declare, that no peace but a general one would be attended to; that when negotiations are entered into with sincerity, the King would most readily employ his good offices in support of the United States, in all points relating to their prosperity; that Congress were themselves sensible of the distinction between the conditions of justice and rigor, and those of convenience and compliance, which depended on the good or bad situation of affairs; that though the circumstances of the allies were very promising, such events might happen as might make it advisable to adopt the part of moderation.
But the best way to obtain every possible advantage, was to preserve a perfect connexion, and to let them know, that the United States would not only reject a separate peace, but that they would continue the war against the common enemy by all manner of ways, until their allies should also conclude a peace; that this declaration would convince the British Ministers, that they would not get rid of the Americans by merely acknowledging their independence; and that though they removed their troops from the continent, they would be attacked wherever found.
The despatch of the 28th of June dwelt chiefly on the negotiation; and contained details, which the Count de Vergennes directed the Minister to make to Congress, but which have in a great measure been already transmitted to them by their Ministers in Europe. These details related to the emissaries sent to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams, and their satisfactory answers. Mr Oswald, in an interview with the Count de Vergennes, hinted to him the desire of the Court of London, and the necessity it was under to make peace; and received for answer, that the King was equally disposed to make an honorable and solid peace. Mr Oswald went to London to carry this information; returned soon, and was immediately followed by Mr Grenville, the intimate friend of Mr Fox.
Mr Oswald repeated to Dr Franklin the assurances of the disposition of the Cabinet of St James; and Mr Grenville, in answer to his overtures to the Count de Vergennes respecting the disposition of the King of Great Britain, was informed by the express order of the King, that his Majesty was disposed to negotiate for peace, provided it was a general one, and the allies and friends of his Majesty were satisfied. This answer was just given when the news of the action of the 12th of April reached Europe. Nevertheless, the King of Great Britain sent full powers to Mr Grenville to negotiate the peace with his Majesty. In communicating them the English Agent declared, that the King of England, in order to facilitate peace, was disposed to treat of the independence of the United States with his Majesty, provided all other matters were put upon the footing of the treaty of 1763.