This was wholly confined to matters of finance, and contained in substance nothing more than Congress have already seen in the letter, written by the Minister of France to Mr Morris. He then read to Mr Livingston a letter of the 22d of November, which related to the satisfaction the King, his master, had received in the testimony the United States had given of their friendship, in presenting to him the ship America. The substance of this letter has been inserted in the note sent to Congress the 28th instant.
The Minister also read to Mr Livingston, a letter of the 19th of December, from the Count de Vergennes, in which he informs him, that their treaty was not so forward as that of the Americans. Though if his Majesty had wished it, he could have signed before the American Plenipotentiaries, as no essential difference existed between France and Great Britain. But that the King's delicacy induced him to wish, that all his allies should be first satisfied, and he had accordingly resolved to continue the war, whatever advantages might be offered him, if Great Britain should bear hard upon any of them. That it still remained to reconcile the interest of Spain, and those of Holland. That he had reason to believe with relation to the first, that they would soon be fully settled. That the foundation was already laid, and that nothing now remained but to settle forms. That he was of opinion, that it was for the interest of the United States to facilitate a connexion with this power, which will be their neighbor.
That it would become the wisdom of Congress to discover moderation with respect to them. That he is persuaded England will see with pleasure, divisions introduced between the United States and the Court of Madrid, and that it is probable, that they will even endeavor to animate them one against the other. That British emissaries have been employed to inspire Spain with apprehensions as to the ambitious views of America. But they will now avail themselves of this intimacy with the American Ministers, to render them suspicious of Spain, and even to excite their resentments against her. Congress will defeat this design by removing the difficulties, which now oppose themselves to a union with his Catholic Majesty. That the King wishes so much to see his allies enjoy a solid and durable peace, that in exciting the Americans on one side to discover a more conciliatory spirit, he will spare nothing on the other to remove the difficulties, which may be raised by the Court of Spain. That he apprehends delays and embarrassments from Holland. That the British Administration appear very unfavorable to them.
The Minister of France then read to Mr Livingston another letter from the Count de Vergennes, of the 20th of December, 1782, which contained in substance; that peace was not yet concluded; that it was anxiously desired by the King. That his Majesty's obligations to his allies had not yet permitted him to pronounce with certainty as to the termination of the war. That expecting peace, prudence required, that the allies should act as if the war was to continue. That Congress will judge of the manner in which they can most effectually contribute to distress the common enemy. That in the present state of things it would not be prudent to invite the Americans to form any direct enterprise against the common enemy. That the Provisional Articles would, when executed, at the general peace, put New York into the hands of the Americans, and that Congress could judge better than they could what part it would be expedient for them to take in the then state of things. That proposing nothing they leave everything to their discretion. That the Minister should however inform them, that he could not yet determine whether they were at the eve of the war or if another campaign must be opened. That in the latter case there were two essential objects, on which the Minister of France should impart to Congress the opinion of his Court, and the desires of his Majesty.
That though if their towns were evacuated the Americans could not take an active part, yet they can compel the enemy to wish for peace, by excluding them from all connexion with them and prohibiting under very severe penalties, the consumption or importation of British manufactures. That a considerable party among the British wish to form commercial connexion with the United States. That when they shall be convinced, that they can reap no benefit therefrom, but by a solid definitive peace, conformable to the treaty already agreed upon, they will become more tractable, and conclude the definitive treaty, which will give force and vigor to the provisional articles, and set the seal to the independence of America. That it would also be proper to state to Congress the necessity of providing means to prevent the sending provisions into New York, by which the British armaments are amply supplied with fresh provisions of every kind.
That the King persuades himself, that the Legislatures of the respective States will concur in measures for this salutary purpose, when they shall be informed of the injury occasioned to their ally by the want of the necessary precautions on this subject. That these precautions will not be unnecessary if the enemy are about to abandon New York, without which the enemy will carry with them the means of supplying the places to which they transport their troops.
That he persuades himself, that Congress will perceive, that they are indebted to the harmony, that has subsisted between the King and them for the present happy state of their affairs. But that nothing being yet concluded, the present moment is precisely that in which it is of most importance to preserve the same system.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.