The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 11

by Unknown

When I had the honor of a visit from you on the subject of my interview with Congress, it was agreed that I should make out and deliver you a list of the several officers concerned in the expenditure of public money, over whom I judged it necessary for the Superintendent of Finance to have the uncontrolled power of dismission. But on reflection I found it was not in my power to render such a list, because I do not know the several degrees of officers now in employment, and even if I did, such a list would not answer the end, because others may hereafter be created, who should also be subjected to the power of the Financier, and it would be very troublesome for Congress on every such appointment to pass a resolution for the purpose. There will also be appointments made occasionally by the Commander in Chief, the Heads of Department, and by other officers, in which the expenditure of public moneys will be involved, and of course such appointments must also be subject to the same authority. For these reasons, it seems proper that the power of the Minister of Finance, with respect to the control and dismission from office of all persons concerned in the expenditure of public property, should be defined in one Act of Congress, vesting him with that authority.

To me it appears absolutely necessary, that this power should be vested in the Financier to enable him to remedy and prevent public abuses; and the extent should be measured by the necessity and the use. As to myself, I am far from desiring power for the sake of power. Indeed I think it is generally more dangerous to the possessor than to the objects of it. Consequently I cannot have a wish to extend it beyond the necessity and utility mentioned.

The whole business of finance may be described in two short but comprehensive sentences, if I have proper notions on the subject. It is to raise the public revenues, by such modes as may be most easy and most equal to the people; and to expend them in the most frugal, fair, and honest manner. In our case the first part must ever be the business of Congress, and the Legislatures of the respective States; because the powers of taxation cannot be delegated. The second I take to be the most essential part of the duty of the Superintendent of Finance. He must ever have it in view to reduce the expenditures as nearly as possible to what in justice and in reason they ought to be; and to do this, he must be vested with power to dismiss from employment those officers he shall find unnecessary, unequal to their stations, inattentive to their duty, or dishonest in the exercise of it.

In a monarchy this power need not be officially vested in a Minister, because he can have constant intercourse with the Sovereign, and by that means he is in the daily exercise of it. Where the sovereignty is vested in a public body of men, such an intercourse is impracticable; and I am persuaded that a Minister who would venture to execute the duties of his office with vigor, without possessing uncontrolled the power of dismission, would in a few months put it out of his power to proceed in his business, and Congress would have full employment to hear and determine between him and suspended officers. On the contrary, if a dismissed officer can have no appeal but to the laws of the land, Congress will not be troubled, business may be conducted with decision, and the very knowledge that such a power exists, will have a tendency to prevent the frequent exercise of it, after the first reforms are effected.

I have been told, that some gentlemen considered the expressions in my letter to Congress on this subject so general as that they might be construed to comprehend the Commander in Chief, Heads of Department, &c. But this cannot be. The Commander in Chief is not concerned himself, but employs others in the expenditure of public money, to whom he grants warrants or drafts on the military chest; and the persons so employed ought to be accountable, and subject to dismission. I suppose officers of the army may frequently be so employed, and in that case it cannot be supposed, that the power of the Financier extends to the military commission, for it certainly must be confined to the money matters. There is one exception with respect to what I have said of the Commander in Chief, and that is the expenditures for secret service, and in this respect I think he should be responsible to the Sovereign only.

The Quarter Master General, having a military as well as a civil duty, he cannot be under the control of the Financier, for the first, although he certainly ought to be the last, which has great connexion with heavy expense, and perhaps it would be best, that he should execute all the business of expenditures by one or more deputies, which would exonerate him from that power, which they must be subjected to. The Commissary General, and every person employed under him, are the immediate objects of this power. The Paymaster General, may be considered as a channel of conveyance, through which money passes from the treasury to the army, and as he is subjected to the law military, the Minister of Finance needs no other authority over him and his officers, than the power of putting under arrest and suspending for mal-conduct in office.

All persons employed as Commissaries of military stores, of clothing, or any other denomination, wherein the expenditure of public money or property is connected, ought to be subjected to this authority. The expenses in the medical department are said to have exceeded those of the like kind in any other country. It is, therefore, evident that the Purveyors, Commissaries, &c. in this department should be subject to the same immediate control as others; and although the Financier cannot judge of the medical skill of the Director General and his officers, yet if any waste or misapplication of public property in their department should come to his knowledge, he should have authority to bring offenders to a Court Martial.

There is no possibility of introducing public economy without the frequent adjustment of accounts; and the more various these may be, the greater is the necessity of constant attention to liquidate them speedily and well. The Financier ought, therefore, to have the power of removing any of the officers, whose business it is to examine and settle the public accounts, that so he may be enabled to obtain a proper and early settlement, and prevent the dangerous effects of inattention or corruption on one hand, or of delay, insolence, and tyranny to individuals concerned in such accounts, on the other. And on account of this power the Financier should have no accounts with the public himself, but wherever expenditures are necessary in his department, he should employ proper persons therein, subject to the same powers and modes of accounting with every other person employed in expending public property; or if of necessity he shall at any time have accounts with the public, Congress can appoint a committee, or special board, to examine and settle his accounts.

From what I have already said, I think it is evident, that the power I have stipulated for is absolutely necessary; and although it is not possible to enumerate every object of that power, yet the general lines within which they may be comprehended can be drawn from the observations I have made, although I have said our foreign departments, as these may be brought into consideration hereafter when it shall appear necessary.

Whoever contemplates the extent of the United States, and the vast amount of their present expenses, while at the same time all our operations languish, must certainly be convinced that some immediate remedy ought to be applied. The office of Superintendent of Finance I suppose is meant as one means of restoring economy and vigor; and nothing will keep up in the minds of the public servants such a constant sense of their duty, as a knowledge of the power to remove them in the hands of a person of vigilant and decisive character. Whether I shall have sufficient courage and perseverance to act up to that character, and whether my small abilities, supported by application and attention, will enable me to render essential service in the execution of this office, is become an object of great consideration, that fills my mind with much apprehension, and induces me to wish I had declined this arduous undertaking in the first instance.