I have also heard it suggested, that the public debts ought to be divided among the several States, and each be called to provide for its proportion. This measure would be sufficient to destroy the credit of any country. The creditors trust the Union, and there can be no right to alter the pledge which they have accepted for any other, even for a better one, without their free consent. But this is not all; there is in it a principle of disunion implied, which must be ruinous. Even at this late period, the States might singly be subjugated. Their strength is derived from their union. Everything, therefore, which injures that union, must impair the strength which is dependent upon it.
I shall not encroach longer upon your Excellency's patience by adducing farther arguments. Everything for and against the proposition, has doubtless been considered by the United States in Congress assembled, with that attention which is due to the importance of those objects on which they deliberate. I think, however, it may fairly be concluded, that those who wish to re-establish the credit and confirm the union of these States, will comply with this requisition. As I do not doubt that this is the sentiment of that State over which you preside, I shall believe that the Legislature at their next session, will pass the proper laws, and I shall at present only entreat that it may be done as speedily as possible.
I take the liberty, however, on this occasion, to make an observation, which applies indeed to many others. Those who have the public weal very seriously at heart, cannot but lament that the acts passed by many States on the requisitions of Congress, have been fettered with restrictions, as to their operation and effect, very inconsistent with that confidence which is due to the integrity of the United States in Congress assembled. Nothing can be more pernicious than the jealousy which dictates clauses restraining the operation of laws, until similar laws shall have been passed by the other States, or confining the revenue or supplies to partial or particular objects, not within the design of Congress, or short of their intentions; or any other clauses, which show a distrust of the States in the sovereign representative of America, or in each other. Such jealousies must prove highly detrimental, if not ruinous. And surely there can be no ground to entertain them, for the Congress is composed of Representatives freely chosen, and is of consequence under the control of those by whom they were appointed. Nothing, therefore, ought to prevent the free and generous communication of all necessary powers to Congress; and I am confident that such a communication will more effectually dishearten the enemy, encourage our friends, and promote the general and unanimous efforts of the whole community, than any other circumstance which could possibly happen. It is a truth, that the enemy does not even pretend to hope anything except from sowing discord among us, and it is but too true, that while the whigs of America are daily more firm and united in the cause of independence, there has been too little attention paid to give to that union of sentiment a proper political form and consistency. I am not, however, the less confident that in this, as in everything else, the enemy will, to their cost, discover that their hopes have been extremely fallacious.
With every sentiment of respect, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] For a very interesting letter from the President of Congress to the Governor of Rhode Island, on the matter of duties to be levied by the States, reported by a Committee, of which Hamilton was Chairman, see the Public Journals of Congress, under the date of April 29th, 1783.
TO JOHN JAY, MINISTER IN SPAIN.
Philadelphia, July 29th, 1781.
Sir,