After the full conversation with which we were honored on the 12th instant, it is unnecessary to enter at large into those reasons, or to urge the pressing necessity of economising our affairs so as to make our revenues in a great degree meet our expenses. Your Excellency must be equally sensible with us of the necessity, and we are perfectly convinced that you are disposed to assist in every measure tending to promote so desirable an object. You are also sensible of the impolicy of calling on the States for men or money, in numbers or quantities so extensive as to excite among even the zealous and considerate, ideas of the impracticability of carrying on the war on such terms. Demands of this nature, instead of animating to exertions, are only productive of hopeless languor. Your mortifying experience of the inadequate compliance of the States heretofore, with your former requisitions, will explain the motives inducing to the expediency of moderating those demands, so as to render them productive, and in case of failure to leave the delinquent State without excuse. Your Excellency has no doubt considered that the class of men who are willing to become soldiers is much diminished by the war, and therefore the difficulties of raising an army equal to former establishments has increased, and will continue to increase, and embarrass the States in their measures for filling up their quotas, should the mode of recruiting the army be continued in the present line. You will also have considered, that the enemy proportionably debilitated by war, is incapable of opposing to us the force we originally had to encounter; and, therefore, the necessity of such extensive levies as we formerly raised, seems to be in some measure superseded.
In what degree the forces of these States should be decreased, we do not pretend to determine, leaving this to your Excellency's better judgment. But from past experience it appears, that the States are incapable of bringing into the field an army equal to that called for by the last arrangement; or, if all the demands of Congress on the States become merely pecuniary it does not seem probable that they can or will furnish money for raising, equipping, and supporting such an army.
We wish we were capable, from any information we are possessed of, to assist your Excellency in the investigation of the subject with respect to the probable designs or force of the enemy the next campaign. This must in its nature depend upon contingencies at present even beyond conjecture. At this time, therefore, in our apprehension, the only solid grounds of procedure is to consider what force these States are capable of producing.
Having thus, in general, mentioned the ideas which have arisen on the subject, we beg to leave the matter to your consideration, and take the liberty of proposing the following queries, after further stating that it has been thought that it would be expedient, in case of a reform, to lessen the number of regiments so as to make fewer commissioned officers and privates in the regiments. It has been supposed that a considerable saving would arise from this measure, by not having so many officers in full pay, with their horses, servants, baggage, and other consequent expenses in the field. Or if they remain in quarters from want of commands, they are in a situation disagreeable to their own feelings, and uselessly expensive to the public. We presume that gentlemen qualified for staff officers, and that artificers and other persons employed by the staff department, should not come into the calculation, as the officers at the head of those departments should be enabled to carry on their business without taking men from the line, a practice introduced from necessity, very prejudicial to discipline, and productive of pernicious consequences by lessening the effective force of the army.
Quere 1. Is a reduction of the number of the officers and men, as fixed by the last arrangement, expedient or proper?
2. How can the reduction be brought about, consistently with the good of the service? and what arrangement should be made in consequence of this resolution?
The answer to the above queries will no doubt include the number of men necessary for the next campaign, and the organization of them so as to designate the numbers of regiments, and the numbers in those regiments, both of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates, as well regimentally as by companies. The expediency of having fewer regiments of artillery and horse, and of consolidating the independent corps, will also, we presume, come into your Excellency's consideration.
3. What periods of enlistment, under present circumstances, are most proper to be adopted?
4. What regulation can be made to modify the practice of taking servants from the line by officers? and, on this head we beg leave to submit to your opinion a copy of a motion made in Congress on this subject.
5. What is to be done with officers by brevet, or those who have no particular commands? Can they not be placed in the regiments, or retire on half pay?