The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 11

by Unknown

But who will invite the Congress to treat with England? The King cannot, since the First Article excludes him from the negotiation. This task then can only be executed by the mediators themselves; all that the King can do, and that he will do with zeal and fidelity, is to invite the Americans to the peace, and to facilitate it by every means that they believe compatible with their essential interests. But that the King may take this step with safety, and the hopes of success, and with the certainty of not rendering himself suspected by the Americans, it is necessary that he should first know the determination of the mediators upon the observations now made to them, and that this determination should be such as to secure to the American States their political existence.

The two high mediators and their Ministers are too enlightened not to perceive, that without this preliminary measure the Congress will send no person to Vienna, and that the King can make no attempts to engage them thereto, without incurring the danger of involving himself, by means whereof, and for the reasons already urged, the mediation will be stopped at its first outset. These reflections appear to merit the most serious attention of the two mediating Courts.

"Article ii. This separate peace cannot, however, be signed, except conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers whose interests shall be treated by the mediating Courts. Although neither peace, notwithstanding they are treated separately, shall be concluded without the other, yet care shall be taken to inform the mediators constantly of the progress of that, which regards Great Britain and the Colonies, to the end, that the mediation may be able to regulate the measures intrusted to it according to the state of the negotiation relating to the Colonies, and both of the pacifications, which shall have been separately concluded at the same time, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediating Courts, and by every other neutral power, whose guarantee the belligerent powers may think proper to claim."

When the United States shall have been duly called to the Congress at Vienna, and shall have commenced their separate negotiation with England, this Article will make no difficulty with his Majesty.

"Article iii. To render the negotiations of peace independent of events of war, always uncertain, which may arrest, or at least retard their progress, there shall be a general armistice between the two parties, during the term of one year, reckoning from —— of the month of —— of the present year, or reckoning from the month of —— of the year 1782. Should it happen, that a general peace should not be re-established during the first term, or whilst the duration of either of these terms continues, everything shall remain in the same state, in which it shall be found at the signing of these preliminaries."

This Article includes two objects equally important; an armistice and a statu quo. The mediators have already acknowledged, that without this preliminary basis, they cannot enter upon a serious negotiation for a peace; and, for still stronger reason, these preliminaries should be established before a truce can be spoken of.

The two mediating Courts are themselves of this opinion, since they do not propose the armistice, but in consequence of the acceptation of the first and second Preliminary Articles. The King thinks, that before they can agree to an armistice, it is necessary that the belligerent parties should have established preliminaries; and it cannot be denied, that the basis, which the high mediators have proposed, may lead to a delay of those preliminaries, which should serve as the pledge and security for the re-establishment of peace, when, in fact, they really afford none.

But when these preliminaries shall be invariably established, it may be of consequence to determine what duration should be given to the suspension of arms. The plan of the mediators proposes one year; but this term appears too short not to be illusory. In fact, it should be observed, that the fire of war being kindled in the four quarters of the world, one part of the year will have revolved before the orders can be received by the respective commanders; so that tranquillity will be established in Europe, while hostilities continue in America and in the Indies. Besides, all the powers remaining armed, the slightest circumstance may occasion a violation of the truce.

In fine, it is in vain to flatter ourselves with the hope of concluding a definitive peace in the short space of one year; as, exclusive of the variety of subjects, that must necessarily be discussed, the two mediating Courts are at a great distance from each other; nor is there less between the belligerent powers; and we should deceive ourselves, if we supposed, that all the propositions, which will be made on the one part, and on the other, will not give room for much debate and altercation; or, that they will not, consequently, consume much time.

To these considerations we ought to add, that an armistice for one year would be very burdensome, because the powers at war will be obliged to remain in arms, to their manifest loss, as it will be impracticable to disarm, as well from the dispersion of the troops, as from the enormous expense, if, (which is highly probable) it should become necessary to renew hostilities. If, then, the mediators wish sincerely to establish the peace they propose, they should prefer a truce of many years to a simple armistice for one year. This expedient is better adapted to consolidate their work, than a suspension of arms for a short time. But a truce will have the same inconveniences, and be equally dangerous with an armistice, if the belligerent powers remain under arms. Thus it seems necessary to agree at the same time reciprocally to disarm.