And this leads to the second point, viz. that the demand was beyond the necessities of the service. Before this position is assumed it must be considered, not only what expense was actually paid, but also what was probable when the demand was made, and what of the expense incurred still remains due. And first, as to what was paid; we shall find that the military collections in the Southern States went to a considerable sum, which is not yet brought into the public accounts, as there was no money to defray it, owing to the noncompliance of the States. Secondly, the probable expense was far beyond the actual, because of the misfortunes of our allies, which rendered it necessary lay aside the proposed offensive measures, and which could not, if not laid aside, have been carried into effect, by reason of the lamentable deficiencies of the public revenue. And thirdly, a very considerable part of the expense of 1782 is necessarily paid in 1783, and a far more considerable part remains unpaid. For instance, almost the whole amount of the pay of the army; an army by no means so numerous as that which the General had called for, and Congress resolved on. And it would have been indeed very strange, if Congress had asked only five millions from the States, including therein every other article, but the pay of the army on whose exertions everything depended.
Having said thus much on what has been assumed with respect to these estimates, and which I can defend the more hardily, as by accident they did not pass through my office, I proceed now to state the objections against remitting them. And first, let it always be kept in view, that the States not having granted the funds necessary for securing to our army the interest of their dues, that army has a just right to insist that the requisition for the principal be not relinquished, until such grants be made. Secondly, it must be remembered, that Congress have not yet any standard for making a final apportionment, and therefore it must be very useless now, to touch requisitions which must speedily be retouched again. Thirdly, the States which have complied more fully than others, would undoubtedly, in such cases, relax from, and perhaps totally withhold their efforts; from the conviction that deficient States would always be able to obtain from Congress a vote favorable to themselves, and consequently unfavorable to others; which idea, grounded too much on past experience, is one great cause of that inattention which led us to the brink of ruin. Fourthly, this mischief would not only arise among the States, but it would exist also amidst and within them, for a relaxation of the whole quota would naturally render new interior apportionments necessary. Not to mention the delays and disputes thereby occasioned, the remainder of what would then be to pay would be thrown of course upon remote counties, where the powers of government are weak, the collections languid, and the revenue in every respect feeble and unproductive. Great deficiencies would arise from these causes, both in the periods and the amount of payments, and either would be sufficient to cause another national bankruptcy. But, fifthly, there can be no reason for the measure proposed; because it is much more simple to leave the present demands for ten millions of dollars upon their present footing, until the apportionment of that whole sum can be made finally to pay (from whatever is brought in) the amount of all existing engagements, to go on (should collections be sufficient) and pay off a part of our debts, and finally to make no new requisitions, until these be completely complied with. By that period Congress will be able to deride with accuracy on the sums necessary for annual service; they will be able to apportion their demands accordingly, and, what is of infinite importance, they will have set an example of persisting regularly in a measure, until a full and final compliance.
I am, Sir, respectfully, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO ROBERT MORRIS.
Rocky Hill, August 30th, 1783.
Sir,
I take the earliest opportunity of informing you, that Baron Steuben has returned from Canada, without being able to accomplish any part of the business he had in charge. In consequence of which, and of the late season of the year, I have judged it impossible to take possession of the western posts this fall, and have ordered a stop to be put to the movement of troops and stores, and to the preparations which were making for that purpose; of which I have given notice to the Quarter Master General, and to the contractors, and have taken every other precaution in my power to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary expenses.