CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Office of Finance, February 15th, 1782.
Sir,
In the circular letter, which I did myself the honor to transmit on the 19th day of October last, I stated our situation as clearly and explicitly as I could, so that you might be in a capacity to form a solid judgment as to what would be proper. I am now to inform you, that the most recent and authentic information from Europe, contains the reiterated determination on the part of France, to grant us no further pecuniary aid. Spain appears to have neither the inclination nor the ability to afford any, and in Holland it can only be obtained from individuals, who will always require security, and of consequence will not lend to the United States, who as you well know have no security to give. The want of proper funds has so reduced domestic credit, that we can draw no resources from thence, and until domestic credit is established, foreign credit cannot exist, for it is absurd to expect, that foreigners will confide in a government, which has not the confidence of its own citizens.
It is hardly possible to describe the consequences, which have followed on a loss of credit. We have seen the people diffident, jealous, and unhappy, nor have they yet recovered, even where the removal of undue restrictions has given them time to breathe from the load of oppression. But the public is, if possible, in a still worse situation. No persons will trust the public from a deep apprehension of ruin if they should, and consequently our operations must be bounded by the taxes, which can be collected, while at the same time we must contend for our very existence as a free country at an expense, which we cannot limit because we cannot limit the efforts made against us. Whenever proper methods shall have been taken to restore credit, the benefits arising from it will be as evident to all, as the want is now, to those who are intrusted with the administration. Our expense at this moment is greater than it ought to be, though less than it was, and I cannot retrench, because I have not sufficient means in my power, and have not at this moment any certain reliance on sufficient aid from the several States.
I am much inclined to believe, that individuals in the several Legislatures are unacquainted with the real state of affairs, or flatter themselves that they are better than they really are, even after information. If gentlemen would consider seriously the situation of the public servants, they would at least not suspect them of describing our dangers as greater than they are. They could not, for instance suppose, that I would give a high coloring to the disorders of our finances, because they must see, that on the contrary, I should derive a degree of credit from the general belief, that such disorders do not exist. And when I declare my apprehensions, I injure so far my own operations. My reason for describing our situation in its true light is, that the States may be excited to grant us relief. I might by an appearance of wealth extend my operations for a little while, but in the end they would fail, and how we should then be extricated, no man can tell. At present I must bear the evils, which result from the want of resources, and limit my views accordingly, but it would be madness to inculcate an opinion, that things are worse than they are, because then I could not derive the full benefit of those resources which we have. You must, therefore, be convinced, that I give you no exaggerated account, and I trust, Sir, that your Legislature will give due weight to assertions, which they have every reason to believe, and which if neglected, they will be convinced of by a melancholy and perhaps fatal experience.
Many people flatter themselves with the hope of peace. But on what is it founded? Has the enemy given the slightest evidence of a desire for it? Instead of suing for peace, they talk only of war; they prepare only for war; and when they might have got rid of one enemy by a word, they disdained it. Although Holland offered a separate peace, England refused to accept it; nor have we heard that she has agreed even to negotiate for, much less to conclude, a general peace. She enjoys full credit, and therefore she can carry on the war; and the object of it on her part is so great, that therefore she will carry on the war. Hitherto she has carried it on alone and unsupported. Years have elapsed since it was pretended, that she could not find resources for another campaign, and yet campaigns have succeeded each other with increasing expense, and are still likely to go on. With a credit like hers, there can be no want of the means, and therefore we have no reason to expect that she will be deprived of them while that credit exists. How soon she may find associates, or how soon we may lose them, no man can say. While the mutability of all human affairs continues to be the theme of common and daily observation, no wise man will rely on the frailty of human opinion, and yet opinion may in a moment sway the politics of different powers, so as totally to change all present appearances. While the war continues England has hope. The times and chances which happen to all may favor her, and at worst she can conclude a peace, which cannot be much more pernicious than the loss of these States. We ought therefore to expect that Great Britain will continue the war, and we ought even to expect that she will find allies to assist her in it. We ought therefore to prepare ourselves for increasing efforts of opposition.
But admitting that negotiations were opened, and in a train of effect, what then would be our situation? Are we in capacity to insist on useful and honorable terms? There is hardly a State in the Union but has an interest in objects, which under our present circumstances are unattainable. While the enemy continue in possession of New York and Charleston, we cannot expect such a peace as every good American ought to desire. Nor shall we obtain that security, without which peace is no longer a blessing.
The successes of the last campaign will undoubtedly derange the plans of the enemy for a time, but whether or not those successes will prove decisive must depend upon ourselves. If we indolently lie still until the enemy can obtain reinforcements, our prospects at the close of next campaign may be as gloomy as at the opening of the last. If we exert ourselves to strike the enemy before he can receive aid, we may perhaps drive him entirely away, and then indeed we shall have reason to expect peace. It has been the common trick of the enemy to pretend at every success we have obtained, nay during every winter of the war, that it would immediately cease, and they have had emissaries among us to inculcate that idea. The consequences have been, that we have never been in a state of preparation as soon as they have, notwithstanding the Atlantic ocean lies between the two countries, and places them at least three months asunder as to all military operations.