It will, therefore, devolve upon the powers who signed the Paris treaty of 1856 to discuss and define those sentences which were left open and indefinite there, and to come to an agreement with Russia, if this is possible, as I hope it may be.

Then there follow "The Independence of Montenegro * * * also of
Roumania and Servia;" and directions concerning Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whose reforms "should be analogous."

None of these things, I am convinced, touches the interests of Germany to such an extent that we should be justified in jeopardizing for its sake our relations with our neighbors—our friends. We may accept one or the other definition without loss in our spheres of interest.

Then there follows, under paragraph five, a stipulation concerning the indemnity of war, which leaves the question open, whether "it should be pecuniary or territorial." This is a matter which concerns the belligerents in so far as it may be pecuniary, and the signers of the Paris treaty of peace in so far as it may be territorial, and will have to be settled by their consent.

Then there follows the provision concerning the Dardanelles. This, I believe, has given cause for much more anxiety in the world than is justified by the actual possibilities of any probable outcome. "His Majesty the Sultan declares his willingness to come to an agreement with His Majesty the Emperor of Russia with a view of safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."

The question of the Dardanelles is freighted with importance when it means placing the control there—the key of the Bosphorus—in other hands than heretofore, and deciding whether Russia shall be able to close and to open the Dardanelles at will. All other stipulations can have reference only to times of peace, for in the more important times of war the question will always hinge on whether the possessor of the key to the Dardanelles is in alliance with or dependent on those living outside or inside the Dardanelles, on Russia or on the opponents of Russia. In case of war, I believe no stipulation which may be made will have the importance which people fear, provided the Dardanelles are in times of peace in the possession of people who are fully independent of Russia. It may be of interest for the people on the shores of the Mediterranean to know whether the Russian Black Sea fleet shall be permitted in times of peace to sail through the Dardanelles and to show itself on their shores. If, however, it shows itself there, I should infer Peace, like good weather from the barometer; when it withdraws and carefully secludes itself, then it is time to suspect that clouds are gathering. The question, therefore, whether men-of-war shall be permitted to pass the Dardanelles in times of peace, although by no means unimportant, is to my way of thinking not sufficiently important to inflame Europe.

The question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall be shifted to other owners is entirely different. It constitutes, however, a conjectural eventuality which the present situation does not contemplate, I believe, and on which I shall, therefore, express no opinion. My only concern at present is to give an approximate definition, as best I can, of those weighty interests which may lead to another war after the Russian-Turkish war has been actually concluded. For this reason I deem it important to affirm that the stipulations of peace concerning the Dardanelles mean less for the men-of-war than for the merchant marine. The preëminent German interest in the Orient demands that the waterways, the straits as well as the Danube from the Black Sea upward, shall continue as free and open to us as they have been until now. I rather infer that we shall surely obtain this, for as a matter of fact it has never even been questioned. An official communication on this point which I have received from St. Petersburg simply refers to the existing stipulations of the treaty of Paris. Nothing is jeopardized; our position can be no worse and no better than it has been.

The interest which we have in a better government of a Christian nation and in the safeguards against those acts of violence which have occurred at times, under Turkish rule, is taken care of by the agreements mentioned above. And this is the second interest which Germany has in this whole affair. It is less direct, but is dictated by humanity.

The rest of the preliminary stipulations consists—I will not say of phrases, for it is an official paper—but it has no bearing on our present discussion.

With these explanations I have answered to the best of my ability the first part of the interpellation concerning the present state of affairs in the Orient, and I fear, gentlemen, that I have said nothing new to any one of you.