It was in his relations with Roumania that Daneff's diplomacy was most stupid. M. Take Jonescu, one of Roumanians ablest statesmen, was sent by the Government to the first Peace Conference at London to secure pledges from Dr. Daneff in regard to the Roumanian demand. He could get no answer. Daneff used every device to gain time in the hope that a settlement with Turkey would relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of giving anything. When the peace negotiations failed and the war between the allies and Turkey recommenced, the relations between Roumania and Bulgaria became very critical. However, at the Czar's suggestion, both countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg. Dr. Daneff, who represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to yield on any point. As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French ambassador, M. Delcassé, in reconciling the divergent views of the great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M. Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.
Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions. The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The great coup had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to fight their combined forces.
Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on June 29th the word went forth from Bulgarian headquarters for a general attack upon the Servian line which, taken by surprise, yielded.
In the mean time public opinion at Bucharest became almost uncontrollable in its demand for the mobilization of the troops, and the government was outraged at the continued prohibition by Russia of a forward movement. The Roumanian Government had already appealed to Count Berchtold for Austro-Hungarian support against Russian interference, but Austria-Hungary, like every other great power, expected Bulgaria to win, and she intended that Bulgaria should take the place vacated by Turkey as a counterpoise to Russia in the Balkans. Hence Count Berchtold informed Roumania that she could not rely upon Austro-Hungarian support, were she to ignore the Russian veto. But in the mean time an exaggerated report of the Servian defeat had reached St. Petersburg on July 1st, and to save Servia, Russia lifted the embargo on Roumanian action.
Forty-eight hours later Europe knew that the Greeks had fought the fearful battle of Kilchis, resulting in the utter rout of the Bulgarians, who were in full retreat to defend the Balkan passes into their home territory. Russia at once recalled her permission for Roumanian mobilization, but it was too late. The army was on the march.
The situation of Bulgaria was now truly desperate. Not only had her coup against the Servians failed, but her troops were fleeing before the victorious Greeks up the Struma valley. On July 5th war was officially recognized by the withdrawal of the representatives of Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, from Sofia. On the same day Turkey requested the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops east of the Enos-Midia line. In the bloody battles which continued to be fought against Greeks and Servians, the Bulgarians were nearly everywhere defeated, and on July 10th Bulgaria placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Russia with a view to a cessation of hostilities.
This did not, however, prevent the forward movement of all her enemies. On July 15th, Turkey, "moved by the unnatural war" existing in the Balkan Peninsula, dispatched Enver Bey with an army to Adrianople, which he reoccupied July 20th. By that time the Roumanians were within twenty miles of Sofia, and the guns of the Servians and Greeks could be heard in the Bulgarian capital. The next day King Ferdinand telegraphed to King Charles of Roumania, asking him to intercede with the kings of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. He did so, and all the belligerents agreed to send peace delegates to Bucharest. They assembled there on July 29th and at once concluded an armistice.
Each of the belligerent States sent its best man to the peace conference. Greece was represented by M. Venezelos, Servia by M. Pashitch, Roumania by M. Jonescu, Montenegro by M. Melanovitch, and Bulgaria chiefly by General Fitcheff, who had opposed the surprise attack upon the Servians. The policy of Bulgaria at the conference was to satisfy the demands of Roumania at once, sign a separate treaty which would rid her territory of Roumanian troops, and then treat with Greece and Servia. But M. Jonescu, who controlled the situation, insisted that peace must be restored by one treaty, not by several. At the same time he let it be known that Roumania would not uphold extravagant claims on the part of Greece and Servia which they could never have advanced were her troops not at the gates of Sofia. The moderate Roumanian demands were easily settled. Her southern boundary was to run from Turtukai via Dobritch to Baltchik on the Black Sea. She also secured cultural privileges for the Kutzovlachs in Bulgaria. The Servians, who before the second Balkan war would have been satisfied with the Vardar river as a boundary, now insisted upon the possession of the important towns of Kotchana, Ishtib, Radovishta, and Strumnitza, to the east of the Vardar. With the assistance of Roumania, Bulgaria was permitted to retain Strumnitza. The Greeks were the most unyielding. Before the war they would have been perfectly satisfied to have secured the Struma river as their eastern boundary. Now they demanded much more of the Aegean seacoast, including the important port of Kavala. The Bulgarian representatives refused to sign without the possession of Kavala, but under pressure from Roumania they had to consent. But they would yield on nothing else. The money indemnity demanded by Greece and Servia and the all-around grant of religious privileges suggested by Roumania had to be dropped. The treaty was signed August 6, 1913.
In the mean time the Powers had not been passive onlookers. Austria-Hungary insisted that Balkan affairs are European affairs and that the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as merely provisional, to be made definitive by the great Powers. On this proposition the members of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente divided. Austria and Italy in the one, and Russia in the other, favored a revision. Austria fears a strong Servia, and Italy dislikes the growth of Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean. These two States and Russia favored a whittling-down of the gains of Greece and Servia and insisted upon Kavala and a bigger slice of the Aegean seaboard for Bulgaria. But France, England, and Germany insisted upon letting well-enough alone. King Charles of Roumania, who demanded that the peace should be considered definitive, sent a telegram to Emperor William containing the following sentence: "Peace is assured, and thanks to you, will remain definitive." This gave great umbrage at Vienna; but in the divided condition of the European Concert, no State wanted to act alone. So the treaty stands.
The condition of Bulgaria was indeed pitiable, but her cup was not yet full. Immediately after occupying Adrianople on July 20th, the Turks had made advances to the Bulgarian government looking to the settlement of a new boundary. But Bulgaria, relying upon the intervention of the Powers, had refused to treat at all. On August 7th the representatives of the great Powers at Constantinople called collectively upon the Porte to demand that it respect the Treaty of London. But the Porte had seen Europe so frequently flouted by the little Balkan States during the previous year, that it had slight respect for Europe as a collective entity. In fact, Europe's prestige at Constantinople had disappeared. J'y suis, j'y reste was the answer of the Turks to the demand to evacuate Adrianople. The recapture of that city had been a godsend to the Young Turk party. The Treaty of London had destroyed what little influence it had retained after the defeat of the armies, and it grasped at the seizure of Adrianople as a means of awakening enthusiasm and keeping office. As the days passed by, it became evident that further delay would cost Bulgaria dear. On August 15th the Turkish troops crossed the Maritza river and occupied western Thrace, though the Porte had hitherto been willing to accept the Maritza as the boundary. The Bulgarian hope of a European intervention began to fade. The Turks were soon able to convince the Bulgarian Government that most of the great Powers were willing to acquiesce in the retention of Adrianople by the Turks in return for economic and political concessions to themselves. There was nothing for Bulgaria to do but yield, and on September 3d General Savoff and M. Tontcheff started for Constantinople to treat with the Turkish government for a new boundary line. They pleaded for the Maritza as the boundary between the two States, the possession of the west bank being essential for railway connection between Bulgaria and Dedeagatch, her only port on the Aegean. But this plea came in conflict with the determination of the Turks to keep a sufficient strategic area around Adrianople. Hence the Turks demanded and secured a considerable district on the west bank, including the important town of Dimotika. By the preliminary agreement signed on September 18th the boundary starts at the mouth of the Maritza river, goes up the river to Mandra, then west around Dimotika almost to Mustafa Pasha. On the north the line starts at Sveti Stefan and runs west so that Kirk Kilesseh is retained by Turkey.