As Carthage had tried in Italy,—Rome being on the point of taking Rhegium and Tarentum,—to acquire these cities for herself, her purpose being frustrated by a mere accident, so Rome now saw in Sicily an opportunity of bringing Messana into her symmachy; should this design fail, the city could not hope to remain independent or turn Syracusan, she would be thrown into the arms of Phœnicia. Would it be justifiable to let an opportunity, that would certainly never return, escape, of taking possession of the natural bridge-head between Sicily and Italy and by securing it to themselves by a firm and, for very good reasons, reliable occupation; was it also justifiable to sacrifice, in renouncing all hopes of Messana, dominion over the last free passage between the eastern and western seas and Italy’s free trade? Other objections than those of sentiment and justice arose to the occupation of Messana. That it must lead to a war with Carthage was the least among them, Rome having nothing to fear from such a war, however serious it might be. It was far more important that she should, by the crossing of the sea, depart from the purely Italian and continental policy she had formerly pursued; so the system founded by the authors of Rome’s greatness was relinquished for another, the consequences of which no one could foresee. It was one of those moments when reflection and calculation cease, and faith in a personal star and that of the fatherland alone gives courage to grasp the hand that beckons out of the future, and follow wherever it may lead. Long and earnestly the Senate deliberated upon the offer of the councillors to send the legions to the assistance of the Mamertines, yet came to no decision. But among the citizens to whom the matter was finally referred, there was alive that consciousness of strength of a power that has come to greatness through its own efforts. The conquest of Italy gave to the Romans, as that of Macedonia had given to the Greeks, courage to blaze a new political path for themselves; support of the Mamertines was warranted by the power of protection claimed by Rome over various Italian states. The Italians from over seas were taken into the Italian confederation, and on the proposition of the citizens’ council it was decided to send them aid (264).
ROME AND CARTHAGE
[264-241 B.C.]
Let us compare the powers of Rome and Carthage. Both were agricultural and commercial states with no other claim to greatness; the subordinate and eminently practical position held by the arts and sciences was in both virtually the same, the balance being perhaps a trifle in favour of Carthage. But in Carthage commercial industries led those of agriculture, while in Rome they occupied second place, so that at a time when the Carthaginian farmers were leaving their fields to become large slave and property owners the great mass of the Roman citizens were still at the plough. In Carthage was to be seen the opulence peculiar to great commercial centres, but Rome still displayed in her customs and police regulations old-fashioned strictness and economy.
When the Carthaginian envoys returned from Rome they represented the parsimony of the Roman councillors as exceeding all accounts, alleging that a single silver service did duty for the entire council, and confronted its members anew in every house to which they were invited. In all else the systems of both states were alike, the judges of Carthage and the senators of Rome rendering decision according to the same code. The strict dependence in which the Carthaginian governing bodies held their officials, their orders to the citizens not to learn the Greek language and to hold no intercourse with any Greek save through the medium of an interpreter, reveal the same spirit as that that inspired the Roman laws, but in contrast to the cruel and stupid severity of these Carthaginian regulations, the Roman fines and censure laws appear mild and reasonable. The Roman Senate which opened its doors to the highest ability worthily represented the nation and had no reason to fear her or her officials. The Carthaginian Senate, on the contrary, represented only the aristocratic families and was held under the most jealous governmental control; an institution founded on mistrust above and below it could be sure neither of the support of the people nor of security from usurpation by officials. To their freedom from these defects may be ascribed the steadily onward course of Roman politics that never retreated a step because of disaster, and did not forfeit fortune’s favour through indolence or irresolution. Carthage on the other hand would frequently retire from the contest that one last rally might have won, and weary or unmindful of her great national undertakings would let the structure she had half erected tumble to the ground only to commence her work anew after a little time. Between the capable Roman official and the governing board existed a perfect understanding, whereas at Carthage these two classes were at constant war, the officials often being forced to take stand against their superiors and make common cause with their political opponents.
Both Carthage and Rome had dominion over people of many races besides their own. Rome admitted to citizenship district after district of these aliens, even leaving a legal way of entrance open to the Latins themselves; whereas Carthage shut herself off entirely from all her dependencies, extending to them not the slightest hope that she would ever admit them to such equality. Rome permitted the communities that were of kindred race to have a share in the spoils of war, and sought by specially favouring the rich and influential of tributary states to reconcile them to Roman dominion. Carthage not only kept for herself all the fruits of victory, but deprived tributary cities of their most useful privilege—free trade. Rome never entirely denied independence to even the weakest of her subject states, and never burdened them with heavy taxes; Carthage sent representatives far and wide and laid even the ancient Phœnician cities under exorbitant toll, treating their inhabitants little better than they would slaves. In the African-Carthaginian alliance there was thus not a single commonalty, with the exception of Utica, which did not aspire to bettering its political and material condition through the fall of Carthage, whereas in the Roman-Italian alliance there was not one which by rebelling against a rule that promoted its material welfare, without directly challenging the political opposition party, would not have lost more than it gained. When the Carthaginian statesmen thought to have linked to Carthage Phœnician dependencies by arousing their fear of a Libyan revolt, and the dominant states by the payment of oracle money to their temple, they were carrying mercantile practices over into a field where these did not belong. Experience showed that the Roman symmachy, despite the less solid front it opposed to Pyrrhus, held together like a wall of rock; while that of Carthage fell apart like a spider-web as soon as a hostile power set foot on the soil of Africa. This was evidenced at the landing of Agathocles and Regulus, and also in the war against the mercenaries, while the spirit that prevailed in Africa is shown by the fact that the Libyan women voluntarily sacrificed their jewels to the mercenaries to carry on the war against Carthage. In Sicily she appears to have acted with greater moderation, hence to have obtained better results. Her dependencies there were allowed relative freedom in their trade with other lands, using metal money exclusively from the first in their domestic commerce, and enjoying in every respect greater liberty of action than was accorded to Sardinians and Libyans. Had Syracuse fallen into her hands, all this would have soon been changed; but no such thing occurred, and under the wise moderation of Carthaginian rule, favoured by the unfortunate disarray of the Sicilian Greeks, a distinctly Phœnician party arose in Sicily; Philinus of Acragas, for example, writing the history of the great war after the loss of the island to the Romans entirely from a Phœnician point of view. Still, on the whole, the Sicilians, as subjects and as Hellenes, must have borne an aversion to their Phœnician masters equal to that shown by the Tarentians and the Samnitians towards Rome.
The revenues of Carthage undoubtedly exceeded those of Rome, but this was offset by the greater likelihood of her sources of supply, tributes, and toll, running dry at the moment when she needed them most, and by the far greater expense entailed by her system of warfare. From a military point of view the resources of both states, though differing in kind, were fairly equal. At the conquest of Carthage her population (including women and children) numbered seven hundred thousand, and must have remained about the same up to the end of the fifth century of Rome. At this time Carthage could, in case of necessity, place a force of forty thousand hoplites in the field. But, desirable as it seemed to her that the great body of her citizens should be trained to military service, she could not bestow upon artisans and factory-workers the rugged physical strength of the countryman, nor could she overcome in the Phœnician his inborn aversion to the work of war. In the fifth century of Rome there fought in the Sicilian army a general’s guard or “sacred body” of twenty-five hundred Carthaginians; a century later with the exception of the officers there was to be found in all the Carthaginian forces, notably in her Spanish army, not a single Carthaginian. The main body of the Carthaginian army was formed of Libyans, this people furnishing recruits, who, in the hands of capable officers, developed into unequalled foot-soldiers and light cavalry-men. To these were added soldiers from all the dependent states of Libya and Spain, the celebrated sling-shooters of the Balearic Isles who seemed to have occupied a position between that of allied troops and mercenaries, and lastly the soldiery gathered in, in case of necessity, from other lands. Such a military force could be increased to almost any strength, and in courage, skill in handling weapons, and in the ability of its officers could compare favourably with that of the Romans. But when mercenaries had to be employed, a long time must elapse before it could be got in readiness, whereas the Roman militia could at any moment be sent into the field. There was further nothing to hold the Carthaginians together but the hope of gain and loyalty to the flag, in contrast to the Romans who were united by all the ties that bound them to the fatherland. To the Carthaginian officer of the usual type, the hired troops fighting under him, yes, even the Libyan peasants, were of no more account than are cannon balls in our day; hence shameful deeds were committed, as for example the betrayal of the Libyan troops by their commander Himilco, which had for result a serious Libyan revolt. The term “Punic faith” as used thereafter in connection with the Carthaginians came to be a standing reproach that injured them not a little. All in all, Carthage experienced every ill that fellah and mercenary armies can bring into a land, finding on more than one occasion that paid allies were more dangerous than sworn foes.
The faults of such a military system could not be overlooked by the Carthaginian rulers who were constantly trying to amend them; treasuries were kept filled and arsenals stocked that more mercenaries might be hired at any moment; and particular attention was given that branch of the service that corresponded in ancient times to our modern artillery—war-machines in the use of which Carthaginians were more expert than the Siceliotes, and elephants there having superseded the ancient war-chariots. But the chief bulwark of the nation, the navy, was the object of special pride and care. In the construction, as in the navigation of ships, the Carthaginians far surpassed the Greeks. In Carthage were built the first ships having three banks of oars, and the rigging of their sailing ships mostly quinqueremes rendered them as a rule swifter than those of the Greeks; the rowers, slaves belonging to the state, who never left the galleys, were admirably drilled, and the captains were skilled and fearless. In this respect Carthage was decidedly superior to Rome, who with her own few ships and those of allied Greece could not think of measuring forces on the open sea with a power that at that time ruled supreme over the western Mediterranean. If we summarise the knowledge gained by a close comparison of the resources of the two great powers, we find that at the beginning of their conflict they stood on very nearly equal ground. To this, however, we feel obliged to add that Carthage, though exerting all her powers of genius and wealth to provide herself with artificial means of offence and defence, could not yet make good her lack of native troops, or compensate the need of an independent alliance. That Rome could be endangered only in Italy, Carthage only in Libya, was not to be denied, and equally undeniable was it that Carthage could not long escape such a peril.[d]
[241-195 B.C.]
The inevitable conflict between such neighbouring rivals as Rome and Carthage, came soon and lasted long. It brought forth great figures and impressive events on both sides.[9] In the first Punic war the Carthaginians, after the defeat of their fleet in the Ægates, lost their possessions in Sicily, and the groups of islands belonging to it, and were obliged to pledge themselves to the payment of thirty-two hundred talents. Immediately afterwards the bloody war, of more than four years’ duration (241-237), against the rebellious mercenaries broke out, in which the Libyan cities also took part, and in which Hamilcar’s generalship finally won the victory over the mutineers. In the meantime the Romans had taken possession of Sardinia, and the Carthaginians, who did not yet feel strong enough for a fresh war, had not only to relinquish formally the possession of that island, but also to pay an additional tribute of twelve hundred talents. Corsica was also snatched from them at the same time with Sardinia. After the suppression of the revolt Hamilcar crossed to Gades (Cadiz) with the army, to begin a war of conquest on the Pyrenæan peninsula. For nine years he fought successfully against the Spanish tribes, until in 229 he met death in battle. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, who succeeded him, was able by peaceful means, rather than by war, to extend further the bounds of Carthaginian sovereignty. In 221, when Hasdrubal had fallen by the hand of a Gaul, the army chose Hamilcar’s famous son Hannibal commander-in-chief, a choice no one in Carthage dared oppose.