The armistice ceased with their return; but the Athenians, pretending the violation of certain conditions, refused to give up the Spartan vessels, which was an entirely gratuitous breach of faith since the ships were no longer of any use to the Spartans. Famine was the greatest danger the besieged had to fear; the island, thickly wooded as it was, offering peril to the enemy that would attempt to take it by force. Freedom was promised each helot who would carry provisions through the blockade, and many attempting and succeeding, the four hundred and twenty were enabled to hold out till the approach of winter.
The Athenians at Pylos had also to fear for themselves the difficulty of obtaining provisions through the severe season. The army already suffered, and this fact became known at Athens. Cleon, who had rejected the overtures of the Lacedæmonians, laid the blame on the generals. It was because of their lack of resolution, he said, that hostilities were so prolonged. In this he was right, the Athenians at Pylos numbering ten thousand men as against four hundred and twenty Spartans. Nicias, in a constant state of alarm, believed success even with their superior force impossible, and to silence the demagogue proposed to him to go himself to Sphacteria.
Cleon hesitated, but the impatient people took the general at his word, and Cleon was obliged to go; promising that in twenty days all trouble would be at an end. In truth this was time enough to effect his purpose when he once seriously set to work. He first prudently requested that Demosthenes co-operate with him, and was wise enough to take counsel of this able man at every step. Shortly after his arrival at Pylos a fire lighted on Sphacteria to cook food and imperfectly extinguished, was fanned by a violent wind into a blaze that destroyed the whole forest. This accident removed the principal obstacle in the way of an attack. Demosthenes made the preparations aided by Cleon, and one night they fell upon the island with their entire force. Having among their troops many that were lightly armed, they were able to reach the highest points and from there sorely harass the Lacedæmonians who were unused to the methods of attack of an enemy that uttered wild cries and fled as soon as they had struck. The ashes of the recently consumed forest rose into the air and blinded the besieged men, and unable longer to distinguish objects they stood motionless in one place and received from every side projectiles that their felt cuirasses were ill-fitted to turn aside. To render the combat a little less unequal they retired in a body to an elevated fort at the extremity of the island. This position gave them a decided advantage, and they were beginning to repulse their assailants when there appeared upon the rocks above them a corps of Messenians who had outflanked them.
They saw the necessity of surrendering, but named a condition: that they be allowed to consult with the Lacedæmonians who were stationed on the neighbouring coast. Their compatriots replied: “You are free to act as you think best provided you incur no dishonour.” At this they laid down their arms and surrendered; the course wherein dishonour formerly lay for Sparta apparently containing it no more. One hundred and twenty-eight were killed in the engagement: of the two hundred and ninety-two survivors one hundred and twenty belonged to the noblest families of Sparta. Some one praised in the hearing of one of the prisoners the courage of those of his companions who had been slain: “It would be impossible,” he said, “to esteem the darts too highly if they are capable of distinguishing a brave man from a coward.” This retort was, for a Spartan, very Athenian in spirit. The blockade had lasted fifty-two days.
His victory at Sphacteria raised Cleon high in the estimation of the people. A decree gave him the right to live in the Prytaneum at the cost of the republic, and to perpetuate the memory of his success a statue of Victory was erected on the Acropolis. Aristophanes in revenge presented six months later his comedy of the Knights, in which Cleon as the “Paphlagonian,” the slave who ingratiates himself with Demos for the purpose of robbing him, causes blows to rain upon the faithful servants Nicias and Demosthenes, and finally serves up to his master the cake of Pylos that Demosthenes alone has prepared. We will only say in conclusion that though all the honour of the affair may go to Demosthenes, Cleon manifested in it an energy that was not without effect; that even in the account of Thucydides he does not appear to have borne himself discreditably as captain or soldier; and lastly, that all that he promised he performed.
The balance of power was now disturbed, fortune leaned to the side of the Athenians. Nevertheless, while the Lacedæmonians were taking their land-forces economically over into Attica from Laconia, Athens was ruining herself by maintaining fleets in all the seas of Greece, recruiting at heavy cost the rowers to man them. Her annual expenses amounted to twenty-five hundred talents. In 425 the reserved funds amassed by Pericles being exhausted, it became necessary to increase both the tribute paid her by her allies and the tax laid upon the revenues of her citizens. One of these measures was to cause disaffection later, and the other, that which weighed upon the rich, was to give rise to plots against the popular government, germs of disaster that the future was to bring to fruition.
FURTHER ATHENIAN SUCCESSES
[425-424 B.C.]
The Athenians had as yet no forebodings, but applied rare vigour to the following up of their success. Nicias, at the head of a considerable armament, landed on the isthmus and defeated the Corinthians, then he proceeded to the capture of Methone between Trœzen and Epidaurus on the peninsula, and extending towards Ægina. A garrison was left behind a wall that closed the isthmus, and from this post which communicated by fire signals with Piræus the Athenians made frequent raids into Argolis (425). The following year Nicias took the island of Cythera which, situated near the southern coast of the Peloponnesus, offered great facility for making raids into that district and for waylaying ships bound there. It commanded, moreover, the seas of Crete and Sicily in both of which Athens had stationed fleets for the support of the cities at war with Syracuse.