Marboduus, chief of the Marcomanni, a powerful tribe belonging to the Suevian confederation, which was entrusted with the charge of the frontier southwards from the Main, was sprung of a noble race and possessed a strong frame and a bold spirit. As a young man he had won the favour of Augustus during a two years’ stay in Rome, and had so thoroughly assimilated foreign culture “that the Romans could scarcely recognise the barbarian in him.” About the time that Drusus bore the Roman eagles to the Elbe Marboduus returned to his native land, well versed in Roman strategy and politics.
At the head of his own people he conceived the bold plan of leading the Marcomanni away from their settlements on the Rhine in the perilous neighbourhood of Rome, and winning a safe home for them farther east. By force or treaty he gained possession of the mountain-girt land of the Boii (Bojenheim or Bohemia), and made this “mighty stronghold of nature” the centre of a tribal confederacy which was to be extended to the northern bank of the Danube, and to impose a limit on the expansion of the world-empire of Rome. With a valiant army practised in Roman tactics at his disposal, and surrounded, like the imperator, with a bodyguard, Marboduus was able in a few years to make the Marcomannian league a power in the land, and to inspire the Romans with justifiable apprehension. For however the wary and prudent prince might at first demonstrate in his outward behaviour his friendship and devotion to Rome, whatever facilities for access to his country and traffic with his people he might give to the Roman merchants and traders, yet his self-confidence grew with the consciousness of power, and from his bearing and determined tone it was manifest that he was aware of the position he held. His kingdom soon became the refuge of all the persecuted and disaffected.
At Rome it was felt impossible to look on passively at the growing power of the Marcomannian state on the Danube. A simultaneous attack from east and west was to work its destruction. While Tiberius was assembling a large force at Carnuntum to proceed up-stream, Sentius Saturninus was to advance from the country of the Chatti by way of the Hercynian forest. This well-concerted scheme was, however, destined never to be executed. The revolt of the Pannonian tribes obliged Tiberius to lead his legions to the lower Danube, and Augustus hastened to keep the Marcomannian chieftain fast among his mountains by a peace on favourable terms, lest he should increase the impending danger on the Adriatic by joining the enemy. We have already spoken of the terrible war by which the country along the lower Danube was at once conquered and reduced to a desert. When Germanicus brought to Rome the news of the victorious issue of the three years’ conflict, a mood of unbounded jubilation took possession of the capital. The people vied with one another in celebrating these triumphant achievements with festal banquets and monuments. But the holiday was quickly transformed into a day of mourning, the thanksgivings into anxious prayers, when the terrible news of the disasters in Germany smote upon the bustle of the city like a bolt from the blue.[c]
THE BATTLE OF TEUTOBURG FOREST
[9 A.D.]
It has already been mentioned that, in the years 4 and 5 A.D., Tiberius had achieved some successes in northwest Germany. According to Velleius these successes consisted in the subjugation of the Caninefates, Hattuarii, and Bructeri, and in the voluntary submission of the Chauci and, more especially, of the Cherusci. It has also been observed that, from what Velleius says we can form no clear conception of the relations between these tribes and Rome, though from the different terms which he employs in speaking of the two groups it seems probable that the Cherusci and a part of the tribe of the Chauci occupied the position of allies, and had pledged themselves to act as auxiliaries. Strabo also says τὰ τρία τάγματα παραστονδηθέντα ἀπώέτο ἐξ ἐνέδρας.
Early German Weapons
The warlike tastes of the Germans may have facilitated their acceptance of such a position, for large bodies of them often entered the service of belligerent nations in the train of young and martial leaders of noble birth. Possibly the relation was similar to that which subsisted between the Swiss and the French at the end of the Middle Ages. Certain it is that Arminius had served in the Roman armies at the head of his countrymen, and, like his brother, had won distinction in several campaigns. The Bructeri, on the other hand, must have been to a certain extent in subjection, and thus have had painful experiences of the Roman art of government, in its system of taxation as well as in judicial procedure and recruiting. Varus in particular (as is evident from the whole description of his government given by Velleius and Dion) was over hasty in his attempts at “romanising” the Germans during the summer he spent in their territory at the head of his army. If (as Dion says and we may well assume) a strong party, in which the nobles formed a prominent element, had in the first instance submitted reluctantly to Roman domination, their exasperation now spread to a wider circle and the effects of Varus’ ill-judged measures extended beyond their borders to the Cherusci, their neighbours on the east.
The Romans had probably come in large numbers into the territory of the latter tribe also, and had practically treated their allies as subjects, assuming a peremptory tone towards them and perhaps even indulging in acts of violence. It is also possible that they had established advanced posts there before the year 9. Their own experience and the fate of the Bructeri must have taught the Cherusci, especially those of high rank, what fate was in store for them, and have incited them to take the resolution of annihilating Roman dominion in Germany. Hence it appears that the nobles of the Bructeri and Cherusci arrived at an understanding to the effect that Varus should be induced by the friendly reception accorded to him by the heads of the Cheruscan nobility when he came amongst the Bructeri to pitch his summer camp among the Cherusci, farther on in the interior of Germany than usual and nearer to the Weser. When he had been lulled into absolute security by the peaceful behaviour of the inhabitants and by amicable intercourse with the nobles, the revolt against Rome was to be set on foot and the Roman army annihilated. Whether they at the same time conceived the plan of allowing a remote tribe to commence the rebellion, so as to oblige Varus to go in one particular direction to subdue it, we cannot tell, but Arminius, who was minutely acquainted with the strategy of the Romans, must certainly have been aware—as is shown by the tactics he employed in the year 15—that they could not be successfully attacked in camp, but only on the march over difficult ground. It is also possible that the original design was to choose the return march of the Romans to the Rhine, but that the conspirators found it impossible to wait so long after once the Roman party, with Segestes at its head, had received some vague information concerning their intentions; and they were therefore constrained to have recourse to some other means in order to induce Varus to break up his summer camp earlier than he had intended. But the question is of no great consequence.