But the arts of French diplomacy overbore Godoy’s steadiness in preferring the real interests of Spain to hopes of sharing in the military fame and the territorial aggrandisement of France. On the 19th of August, 1796, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was signed between France and Spain, by which it was stipulated that either power, if engaged in a separate war, should be entitled to claim from the other fifteen ships of the line, and twenty-four thousand soldiers; and that if the two countries should be jointly engaged in war, all the forces of both should act in common. It was further distinctly stated in the treaty that these stipulations referred especially to England, inasmuch as Spain had no cause of quarrel with any other enemy of France.
Two months after the signature of a treaty so incompatible with any views of real neutrality, the Spanish court declared war against England, with the usual accusations of contraband trade, and infringement upon colonial rights. But Spain failed in her endeavours to detach Portugal from the coalition, and to exclude English goods.
[1797-1801 A.D.]
By the Treaty of Campo-Formio (1797) Austria ceded the Netherlands to France, and the Milanese to the new Cisalpine Republic, formed of all the conquered or revolutionised Italian states. But all this prosperity was for France, not for her allies. Since the commencement of hostilities the Spanish fleets had, like the French, been blockaded in port by British squadrons. Early in February, 1797, however, the Spanish admiral, Don José de Cordova, at the head of twenty-seven sail of the line, made his way out of Cartagena harbour, and passed the straits of Gibraltar in search of the British fleet, which, relying upon his great superiority of force, he hoped to annihilate. On the morning of the 14th Cordova came in sight of the enemy he sought. Sir John Jervis, the English admiral, had only fifteen sail of the line, but resolved, nevertheless, to give battle, and endeavoured to compensate his great disparity of numbers by a manœuvre somewhat analogous to those by which Bonaparte gained his victories on land. He bore down with his whole force upon the Spaniards before their line was formed, cut off one large division of their fleet, and thus engaging upon less unequal terms, defeated Cordova, took four large ships, and drove the rest into the port of Cadiz. He was ably assisted in this bold attack by Commodore Nelson.
In Cadiz, Jervis (created Lord St. Vincent, in honour of his victory) blockaded the Spanish fleet, still far more numerous than his own, and, whilst he lay off the harbour, greatly harassed the coasting trade of Spain. He likewise bombarded the town, but, though he thus did a good deal of damage, produced no material result. Lord St. Vincent thought to follow up his advantage in another direction, by sending Nelson with a squadron to seize, if possible, both the town of Santa Cruz, in the island of Teneriffe, and a valuable register ship then lying in the port of that island. The attack was made with the daring intrepidity that characterised all Nelson’s actions; but the admiral had been led to form the scheme by false information as to the strength of the place. The attempt failed, and cost as many lives as the preceding battle. Nelson lost his arm. The Spaniards defended the fort with great gallantry, and when the English abandoned their enterprise, displayed towards them all kindness and courtesy. In the West Indies an expedition under Admiral Harvey and General Sir Ralph Abercromby sailed from Martinique to attack the island of Trinidad. Four sail of the line were voluntarily burned to prevent their falling into the hands of the English, and the governor capitulated the 18th of February. Encouraged by their success, Abercromby and Harvey next attempted the stronger island of Porto Rico, but failed, with considerable loss.
In the month of November General Stuart attacked Minorca, and after a short resistance, the governor, Quesada, surrendered the island, upon condition of being sent with his garrison to the nearest Spanish port. This was pretty much the whole Spanish share in the war this year, beyond the usual contribution of troops to the French armies. With the military transactions of 1798-1799 Spain had no concern. Her merchant ships were everywhere captured by British cruisers, as were the few armed vessels necessarily sent to sea singly or in small detachments.
During the year 1800, Spain and Portugal had little to do but to observe the change in the fortunes of France and her enemies, resulting from the return of Bonaparte and his exaltation to the head of the government. Bonaparte crossed the Alps, traversing the Great St. Bernard by ways till then deemed hardly passable for single foot travellers, but over which he actually transported his whole army, even artillery, and, by the splendid victory of Marengo, recovering at once all losses in Italy, re-established his Cisalpine Republic.
The first consul had already, in a secret treaty, extorted from his ally Charles IV the cession of Louisiana; and he now required from Charles’ kinsman, the duke of Parma, the reversion of his duchy at his death to the French Republic. In return, he bestowed Tuscany, under title of “the kingdom of Etruria,” upon the duke’s eldest son, Luis, prince of Parma, who had married a Spanish infanta. In April, 1801, the king and queen of Etruria left Madrid, where they had resided since their marriage, to take possession of their newly assigned dominions. They were directed by Godoy to pass through Paris; and thus two Bourbon princes were the first of the many sovereigns who, during Bonaparte’s reign, were required to present their personal homage at the Tuileries.
[1801-1802 A.D.]
But Tuscany seems to have been judged more than compensation for Parma and Louisiana; and Charles was expected to pay a yet higher price for the kingdom bestowed upon one daughter and son-in-law, by assisting to despoil another daughter and son-in-law of their patrimony. Affection for the princess of Brazil and her children had urged the king of Spain to make unusual exertions for the sake of warding off from Portugal the effects of French enmity; and his troops, his fleets, and his American gold had been found so useful that he had enjoyed sufficient influence to render his mediation effectual with the Directory. But the peace of Lunéville rendered the friendship of Spain less important; and Bonaparte’s hatred of England was far more implacable than that of his directorial predecessors. The first consul could not forgive Portugal’s fidelity to her old ally; and now insisted upon Charles’ declaring war against his son-in-law. The obstinate refusal of the court of Lisbon to comply with the solicitations of the court of Madrid, detach itself from England, and accept the alliance of France, was the ground of hostility alleged in the Spanish manifesto.