It is possible that, had Olivares immediately applied himself with vigour to reduce Portugal, unarmed as she then was, with an empty exchequer and an unorganised government, she might have been again subjugated. Fortunately for her the count-duke looked upon the insurrection with a contempt that averted the danger. He announced the event to Philip, by wishing him joy of the forfeiture of the duke of Braganza’s large estates; and, influenced partly by disdain for the Portuguese, partly by excessive exasperation against the Catalans, he positively rejected all advice to send against Portugal the army preparing for Catalonia. He thus gave Portugal all she needed—time; and a very few months saw her in a condition to maintain and defend the independence she had recovered. Olivares was not, indeed, altogether inactive with regard to Portugal and her king, but his measures were rather those of a petty intriguer than of a great statesman. He prevailed upon the emperor, Ferdinand III, to seize and imprison João’s brother Dom Duarte, who was then serving as a general in the imperial armies. He appears likewise to have instigated the plots and conspiracies by which the new Portuguese government was, for a while, considerably disturbed. The first of these was perhaps the most formidable, being conducted by the primate, the inquisitor-general, and many of the chief nobility, including some connected, by blood or marriage, with João. Not less than six hundred persons, of different ranks, are said to have been concerned in the plot, the object of which was to kill the king and submit Portugal again to Spain. Various stories are told as to how the conspiracy was detected. The following seems the most probable. The archbishop, it is said, endeavoured to seduce the Count of Vimisis to join in the scheme, relying on that nobleman’s supposed anger at his ill treatment by the king, who had deprived him of the government of Alemtejo. The prelate had mistaken his man. The count’s loyalty was superior to his resentment, and the aggrieved nobleman immediately revealed the plot to the king.
The whole project was known to the government, and preparations were quietly made for defeating it; a grand review was ordered, and the principal ringleaders were invited to the palace for the occasion. They went fearlessly, were there made prisoners without difficulty, and the number of troops present prevented any rising in the city. The prisoners were tried and convicted; about ten persons were executed; the primate and inquisitor-general were imprisoned for life; and the remainder were pardoned. The duchess of Mantua was sent back to Spain, under the idea that she had fomented the conspiracy; and the only person for whom Dom Duarte might have been exchanged being thus dismissed, the unhappy prince languished out the remainder of his days in prison. The next plot was entirely hatched at Madrid, where Olivares engaged a Portuguese fugitive to murder João. The man made every arrangement, but his courage failed him at sight of his intended victim, and he fled, without perpetrating his meditated crime. By increased bribes, Olivares induced the villain to renew the attempt, when he was betrayed by an accomplice, seized, and executed. A base fraud, contrived to deprive the king of the ablest of his ministers, Lucena, secretary of state, answered better.
The two countries were now decidedly at war, but their languid and desultory hostilities produced little effect beyond harassing the frontiers. Portugal was weak, and thought only of self-defence; Spain was chiefly intent upon chastising the Catalans.[b]
[1647-1663 A.D.]
The Portuguese were at first successful, and after the defeat which Mathias de Albuquerque inflicted on the baron of Molingen at Montijo on May 26th, 1644, felt at their ease, until it became obvious that Mazarin would desert them without compunction if it suited his purpose. The colonial war with Holland deprived them of the assistance of the Dutch in Europe. Mazarin’s refusal to insist on their independence at the congress at Münster, though he protected their envoys against the Spaniards, made them despondent; and a very curious letter of Mazarin’s (October 4th, 1647), offering the crown of Portugal to the duke of Longueville, exhibits at once the feeble character of João IV [who had timidly offered to abdicate], the despair of the Portuguese, and their dependence on France. Mazarin’s desertion did not at first do great harm, for the war between France and Spain continued, though peace was made with the empire.[c] In the war which, notwithstanding their alliance in Europe, the Portuguese prosecuted against the Dutch in their colonies, they displayed much of their original valour and energy. In Brazil they gradually recovered their lost possessions.[b] But if the arms of João were successful in Brazil and Africa, in India they met with many reverses. In several engagements the Dutch had the advantage; and, in 1655, they succeeded in wholly expelling the Portuguese from the island of Ceylon.
João died in 1656. His eldest son, Prince Theodosio, preceded him to the tomb. Three other children survived him: (1) Catherine, married to Charles II king of England; (2) the infante Alfonso, who, by the death of Theodosio, was heir to the monarchy; (3) the infante Pedro, who, as we shall soon perceive, succeeded Alfonso.
ALFONSO VI (1656-1667 A.D.)
[1656-1667 A.D.]
As the new king was only in his thirteenth year, and had exhibited no proofs of understanding, but a waywardness which would have adorned a savage, the queen-mother was intrusted with the regency.
The administration of this princess—a lady of the house of Guzman, her father being the eighth duke of Medina Sidonia—was distinguished for prudence and spirit. As a Castilian, she was at first obnoxious to the people, who suspected that she must have a leaning towards her own country; but the vigour with which she prepared for war, and the perseverance with which she conducted it, prove that the suspicion was injurious. We cannot advert to the interminable and trifling events which followed, where the combat of a few hundreds is described with as much minuteness as if whole nations had been embattled on each side; where the destruction of a hundred enemies is hailed with as much exultation as if the force of Attila had been annihilated; and the whole campaign was disgraced by the most deplorable imbecility, on the part both of the Portuguese and the Spanish leaders, until the count de Schomberg and Don John of Austria were opposed to each other. After the Peace of the Pyrenees, between France and Spain, when Catalonia was pacified, and the Spanish troops were at liberty to turn their undivided force against Portugal, no doubt was entertained that this country would be subdued. But the queen-regent did not neglect to strengthen the national cause by alliances. Some French, Dutch, and English adventurers, under Schomberg, were obtained; the infanta Catherine, with the fortress of Tangier and a large sum of money, were given to Charles II as the condition of his alliance, and for the aid of some English regiments. Schomberg sustained so much opposition, so much jealousy and ill will from the chiefs associated with him, that he could not prevent Don John from obtaining some rapid successes. Among them was the conquest of Evora. But this advantage was soon neutralised by a signal victory attained over the Castilians; it was still further improved by the recovery of Evora—both monuments of Schomberg’s ability and of English valour. Don John was deprived of the command. This change was fortunate for Portugal; for the new general was so signally defeated at Villaviciosa, that it may be said to have secured the independence of that kingdom. This was the last noted exploit during the reign of Alfonso.