E.S. CLIFFORD
CORPORAL KIRWAN
H. GOUGH
N.C.O. AND TROOPERS
CHAPTER XII
JOHANNESBURG AND PRETORIA IN OUR HANDS
In all operations up to this point Lumsden’s Horse, with Loch’s Horse and companies of the West Riding and Oxfordshire Light Infantry, forming the 8th Mounted Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Ross, had, with other corps of Colonel Henry’s brigade, been so actively engaged scouting ahead of the main column with which Lord Roberts moved, that they had neither time nor opportunity to know what was being done by other divisions of the army. It is necessary, therefore, to explain briefly here the general dispositions for an advance on Pretoria at the moment when Lord Roberts crossed Vaal River into Transvaal territory. Since they marched out of Kroonstad the troops, whose advance was most direct—following the line of railway with slight divergences—had covered just a hundred miles in four days. Mounted troops, being employed to reconnoitre on each flank and keep up communications along their front, almost doubled that distance. In face of such a rapid advance the Boer commandos which had dispersed after their evacuation of Kroonstad found a difficulty in concentrating for the defence of any strategic points. They were evidently puzzled by the sudden mobility of British forces, and, what with Methuen marching for the west, French’s Cavalry making a dash for the drifts at Parys and Reitzburg, as if Potchefstroom were their objective, the main column pushing along beside the railway for Viljoen’s Drift, and Ian Hamilton marching as if for Engelbrecht’s Drift on the Heilbron-Heidelberg road, the Boer commandants could not agree as to which point would most likely be threatened first or at which they might make a stand with the greatest chance of success. Hasty preparations were made by them with a view to checking General Ian Hamilton, whom they credited with a design on Heidelberg and the Eastern railways. Possibly that, combined with a great movement in force upon the junctions outside Johannesburg, might have been the shortest way to end the war, because, as we know now, the Boer Generals attached very little importance to the defence of their big towns, while they realised fully all the strategical advantages of free communication between Pretoria and the eastern districts; and President Kruger especially was anxious to keep open a line by which prominent members of his Administration might be able to get away with a sufficient store of bullion for private and political uses at the last moment. The defenders of Engelbrecht’s Drift, however, waited in vain watching the trap they had laid for General Ian Hamilton. His line of march had been suddenly changed by orders from Lord Roberts, and, instead of crossing the Vaal where he was expected, east of Vereeniging, he had made a rapid march westward to strike the river between General French’s Cavalry and the main body, leaving our right flank to be guarded by General Gordon with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. With regard to all this and the ceremony at Viljoen’s Drift, when Lord Roberts proclaimed the annexation of Orange Free State to the British Crown, Lumsden’s Horse knew nothing at the time. Content with their own share of the good work that had been accomplished, they were consoling themselves by the prospect of at least one day’s well-earned rest for men and horses. But that good fortune was not to be theirs after all. Colonel Lumsden, continuing his official record, explains how these pleasant hopes were dashed:
The 27th dawned, the horses were turned out to graze, leave was given for men to go into town, and general cleaning up began, when suddenly at 10.30 A.M. we had an order to move at once to help the 3rd Cavalry Brigade under General Gordon, who was reported to be in a tight corner to the north-east. Horses were caught, saddles put on, and we were away by 11, with no rations for man or horse. The rest of the brigade joined in four miles further on. All proceeded with every precaution through a difficult bit of trappy country, arriving about 4.30 P.M. at the drift where General Gordon was supposed to be stuck up. There no signs of him could be seen, so we made tracks back to a point four miles north of Vereeniging, where we were to have joined our column, when it camped there that night. We struggled on until, our horses giving out, the whole brigade bivouacked at 8 P.M., having put behind us some seven miles of our return journey, and having done quite twenty-five miles. Lieutenant Neville, with a guide, was sent in to headquarters for instructions, and returned at 3 A.M. with the order that our brigade was to come on at once and resume its position in front of the headquarters, leading the army. By 4 A.M. we were away again in the bitter frosty cold, leading our starved horses, the sun rising as we waded a nasty drift over the Klip. We reached our place in the advance guard at 7, in the nick of time, just as all had begun to move off, and were at once pushed on three miles at a trot ahead of everything, fighting being expected at the notorious Klip River position. No Boers, however, were seen. The country was ablaze with the burning veldt, which the Boers had set fire to systematically as they went, and the Klip River was gained without a shot. There were sounds of heavy fighting, however, in the hills on our left, where French and Hamilton were forcing back the enemy on Johannesburg.