A TYPICAL BOER
(From a sketch by J.S. Cowen)
In these operations Lumsden’s Horse learned a great deal about the tricks and methods of Boer scouts, and soon began to realise that these could best be met by bringing all a shikarri’s varied experiences into play. In reality the wily Boers do not send out patrols, according to our interpretation of that word. When any considerable number of them are seen together, it may be taken for granted that their scouts have previously done all the work expected of them, or that they are off somewhere in another direction, acting as a screen for some more important movement. When watching a hostile force, with a view to aggressive tactics or defensive measures, the Boers hardly ever show themselves. If caught by chance on the move, they either halt where they are and lie down or steal away one by one to the nearest cover, knowing perfectly well that any large body moving can be seen a long distance off, while separate figures become almost invisible dots on the vast plain and attract no attention from people whose eyesight is less keen than a Kaffir’s. Once concealed from view, they are careful not to show themselves again on the sky-line, or on a sunlit slope, where their shadows would betray them. From hunting wild game they have learned to pursue the tactics of an antelope or a haartebeeste in eluding a vigilant enemy. As a herd of deer, browsing peacefully in some hollow, leaves a trusty sentinel on the nearest hill to keep watch, so Boers tell off one of their number for a similar duty, and he, like the sentinel buck, remains motionless beside a tree or stone, invisible himself, but allowing no movement on the plain to escape his watchful eye. The man on whom this task falls is generally a veteran trained by long experience to a knowledge of the veldt and the habits of every being, man or beast, frequenting it. By the actions of horses or cattle on the pastures, not less than by the hurried movement of more timid wild animals or birds, he knows whether they have been disturbed by anything unusual. Then he stoops down to listen, and his ears are so sensitive by long practice that he can distinguish the rumble of wheels or tread of marching men miles off, though the sound comes to him no louder than the whisper of wind among dry grass. And a bird on the wing, or animal scuttling through the undergrowth, will warn him at once of approaching foes.
CAPTAIN CLIFFORD
If the Boers want to lay an ambush they do not set about it in a clumsy fashion, but with due foresight, calculating all the chances. Far in advance of the trap thus prepared they will probably have posted some men among the rocks of a kopje, or preferably in a dry donga between high banks that effectually conceal any movement. These advanced scouts never show themselves or fire a shot when the prey for which their comrades are waiting approaches. They simply allow it to pass, and then perhaps will be heard a whistle like that of some wild bird, the lowing of cattle that cannot be seen, or other sound familiar enough but conveying no particular meaning at the moment. Yet in all probability it is a preconcerted signal from the foremost scouts to others within hearing, who pass on the message, so that every movement of the coming patrol or column is known to the Boers waiting in ambush for it. Thus many mishaps have occurred in a way that nobody could account for, and by practising similar methods Lumsden’s Horse at length became a match for their enemy at the same game. Other lessons than those learned at Springs were, however, needed to perfect them in the craft on which the safety of an army may sometimes depend. One such experience fell to their share in a reconnaissance towards Crocodile River, which Colonel Lumsden describes in a letter to the executive committee of Lumsden’s Horse:
A few days after the despatch of my previous letter, Colonel Ross, with a detachment of my own corps and the greater part of the 8th Mounted Infantry, collected at Irene under instructions to proceed to Pretoria. While we were still in camp there orders came from headquarters to patrol the country to the west and north-west as far as the Crocodile River. On receiving the above orders, Colonel Ross, accompanied by myself, Captain Taylor, and a small patrol of the Oxfords under Lieut. Percy Smith, went out to reconnoitre the country. Captain Clifford, of ours, had already proceeded early in the day (July 20) with a patrol of fifteen men in the same direction. Overtaking this party about noon, Colonel Ross ordered Captain Clifford to push on and ascertain that the ground was clear of the enemy as far as the river. Colonel Ross’s party then returned to Irene. Late in the evening Captain Clifford’s patrol came back and reported that his party had been ambuscaded before reaching the river, and had had to make the best of their way out of a tight place on jaded horses at the best speed they could, leaving two of their number, Privates Bearne and Cayley, in the hands of the enemy. Captain Clifford estimated the enemy’s strength at 300, and reported that as far as he could ascertain they were laagered in a strong natural position near Six Mile Spruit, commanding a perfect view of its valley. Not being quite satisfied with the information, Colonel Ross ordered him to proceed again next day with a patrol of thirty. Captain Sidey accompanied him. The task was a difficult and dangerous one, for, although the first twelve miles were clear of the enemy and comparatively open, the last eight miles of the journey led down the valley of Six Mile Spruit, with high hills to the right and lower ones to the left, the enemy’s laager being situated about half-way down on the right. The Boers had thus the option of stopping the patrol on the way down, or cutting it off on the return journey. The reconnoitring party could reach the Crocodile River in comparative safety by advancing along the higher ground to the left of the valley and holding the commanding posts as far as numbers permitted. But as this course failed to draw out the Boers, it was useless as a method of discovering their strength and whereabouts. Captain Clifford therefore effected a compromise, reached the river as above described, and when about half-way through the valley on the return journey turned off in the direction of the Boer laager, leaving Sergeant Mitchell and four men in observation on high ground to cover his advance. As soon as he and his party were well down to the Spruit, the Boers rushed out in large numbers, forcing them to retreat in haste towards the covering party, who were unable to fire, as they could not distinguish friend from foe. The whole patrol, being outnumbered by ten to one, with their line of retreat threatened, had no choice but to escape as best they could in an easterly direction. Three men were taken prisoners through their horses being exhausted. Sergeant Mitchell’s party, finding itself cut off, escaped in a southerly direction, and reached Johannesburg in safety next day. The patrol that night came back nine short. It turned out that three had been taken prisoners, and the remaining six arrived in camp from various directions the following day. The three prisoners returned three days later, having been treated with great kindness by the Boers, who only took their horses, rifles, and accoutrements, and were evidently much amused by the way in which our patrols were sent out every day to face almost certain capture or death in accordance with orders. They considered this patrol as very useful to supply them with the necessaries of warfare, and treated the whole thing as a huge joke. During the retreat on the first of these two patrols Private Graham did very good work. When Cayley’s horse had fallen and then run away, Graham made him hold his stirrup to expedite his flight on foot, and offered to take turn and turn about riding and running with him. It became evident that they could not both get away, so Graham, taking Cayley’s rifle and catching his horse afterwards, brought both animals and rifles out of action, saving them from the hands of the enemy and earning the commendation of the Colonel on his arrival in camp. On the 22nd Colonel Ross’s Irene command was ordered to start at two hours’ notice for Pretoria viâ Swartzkop. He complied, camping at Swartzkop for the night, and reaching the camp by the Pretoria Racecourse next day.
Photo: Elliott & Fry
J.A. GRAHAM, D.C.M.
Captain Clifford, in an official report of the incident to Colonel Lumsden, does full justice to Trooper Graham’s conduct in the following words:
When about two miles from Crocodile River, while I was questioning a farmer, the enemy suddenly opened fire on us from a ridge in front, between 300 and 400 yards distant. I was with the scouts when this happened. We galloped back to the rest of the patrol, which only consisted of a total of nine troopers, and before we could take up any position the fire began to come from three sides, so I gave the order to retire as fast as possible to avoid being surrounded. In the retreat, under a heavy fire, Trooper Cayley, one of the scouts, was thrown from his horse, whereupon Trooper Graham, with great gallantry, stayed behind and gave Cayley a ride on his own horse, running by his side, and then mounting and Cayley running. The rest of the patrol being scattered, and the ground much broken, these two were not missed for some time. After some distance had been traversed, the Boers were getting so close, and the fire so hot, that it would have been impossible for both to escape. Trooper Cayley thereupon flung himself into a small ditch and Trooper Graham made off, not, however, without bringing Cayley’s rifle. On the way to rejoin the patrol, and still under fire, he came across a riderless horse of another of the party, and brought it safely back with Cayley’s rifle. The patrol then, observing him coming, turned to his support, and the Boers discontinued the pursuit.