Judge Keogh And Catholic Doctrines.
We have read the address of Mr. Justice Keogh[1] with feelings of surprise and sorrow. It is un-Catholic in its language, it is un-Catholic in its spirit, it is un-Catholic in its principles. If it had come from a member of a hostile sect, we could well afford to let it pass unnoticed; to let it live its short life, and die a natural death. But when the calumnies, the sneers, the sarcasms of our enemies are turned against us by one who is enrolled under the banner of Catholic faith, we can no longer remain silent in safety. The weapons which are powerless in the hands of a declared enemy, are dangerous indeed when they are wielded by a traitor in the camp.
Mr. Justice Keogh is no ordinary man. His mind is adorned with talents well fitted to amuse, to delight, to instruct an audience. In his short but brilliant career as an orator and a statesman, he won for himself a great name at the bar and in the senate. And now he is lifted up above his fellows, and placed in a position of high trust and extensive influence. When such a man comes forward, with forethought and preparation, as one of the instructors of the age, he is a conspicuous object of interest and attraction. He is looked upon, by those who are not acquainted with his antecedents, as the exponent of Catholic views, the representative of Catholic intelligence and education. We are therefore compelled, in self-defence, to declare that the opinions he has expressed are not the opinions of the Catholic Church, and the language he has thought fit to use cannot be regarded, by the Catholic people of Ireland, but as offensive and insulting.
His lecture contains little originality of thought or novelty of [pg 450] argument. It does but reflect the spirit of the age in which we live. The opinions and the views which it sets forth have long been familiar to our ears: they pervade the shallow current literature of England, of Germany, of Italy, of France. Intellectual freedom, unbounded, unrestrained; freedom of thought in the search after truth, without any regard to authority; freedom of speech in the circulation of every view and opinion; freedom to pull down old theories, freedom to build up new theories; freedom to roam at large without any guide over the vast fields of speculation, adopting that which private judgment commends, rejecting that which human reason disapproves; these are the popular dogmas of the present day; and these are the topics which Mr. Justice Keogh proposes to illustrate and to enforce by the life and writings of our great English poet.
Now, we are not the enemies of freedom. The Catholic Church is not the enemy of freedom. But we should expect that one who comes forward to enlighten the world on this important subject, would tell us how far human reason is to be left without restraint in the search after truth. It is easy to talk of intolerance, persecution, narrow-minded bigotry; but these words have no meaning unless we first clearly understand what that freedom is—in thought, in word, in action—which is the natural right of all men; which it is intolerance to deny, which it is tyranny to extinguish. First of all, if the fact of a Divine Revelation be once admitted, it is clear that human reason is not exempt from all restraint: it must be controlled at least by the Word of God. We are surely bound to believe what God has taught: and when reason would lead us to conclusions contrary to His teaching, as may sometimes happen, we are bound to check our reason and to abandon those conclusions. For, reason may be deceived, but God can not. This is what we understand by the words of St. Paul when he speaks of “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ”—II. Cor., x. 5.
With this preliminary remark we shall now submit to our readers the opinions of Mr. Justice Keogh:—
“Could words of mine prevail to induce you to devote a small portion of your leisure hours, stolen though it be from the pleasure paths of sensational or periodical literature, to those great productions of John Milton, in which the staunchest friend of freedom and of truth that ever lived has made the most successful war against tyranny and falsehood—in which he has proclaimed in tones not unworthy of the Apostle of the Gentiles,[2] that education really free [pg 451]is the only source of political and individual liberty, the only true safeguard of states and bulwark of their renown—in which he has for ever ‘justified the ways of God to man’, by asserting the right of all men to exercise unrestrained their intellectual faculties upon all the gifts of God—to determine for themselves what is truth and what is falsehood—to circulate their thoughts from one to another, from land to land, from tribe to tribe, from nation to nation, free as ‘the winds that from four quarters blow’—to raise their thoughts and to pour forth their words above the level of vulgar superstition, unrestricted by any illiberal or illiterate licenser—then you will find that he has risen, as mortal man never did before, to the height of greatest argument, and proclaimed in language which is affecting the fate of millions, even at this hour, on the banks of the Mississippi, and in the remote forests of the far west, that He who has made 'of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, willeth not that men shall any longer hold in bondage as a property the bodies or the souls of men, but that all alike shall have, unobstructed by any ordinance, a free book, a free press, a free conscience'. If any words of mine shall tempt you to approach these considerations, to ponder upon them as they are to be found in the tractates of Milton, in a tranquil, in a large and comprehensive spirit, and when you have done so, to make their fit application not only at home but abroad, not only abroad but at home, then we shall not have met in vain in this assembly”.
We do not propose to offer any remarks on the subject of political liberty. But the principles here enunciated are of universal application. Milton waged the “successful war” of freedom not less in matters of religion than in matters of state. And Mr. Justice Keogh adopts his principles without any limitation. He asserts with Milton “the right of all men to exercise unrestrained their intellectual faculties upon all the gifts of God—to determine for themselves what is truth and what is falsehood”. If we take these words literally as they stand, they are inconsistent not with the Catholic religion only, but with every system of Christianity that has ever existed. Luther, the great champion of intellectual freedom, though he shook off the yoke of church authority, set up in its stead the authority of the Bible. Even he was willing to admit that the wanderings of the human mind should be restricted by the teaching of the Word of God. It is clearly contrary to the common principles of Christianity to assert that in metaphysics, in ethics, in psychology, in any human science, the mind is at liberty to embrace opinions incompatible with the truths which God has revealed. And if it be not at liberty to do so, then it is not “unrestrained”.
It may be said, however, that the author of this address does not really intend to assert what his words seem to convey. How then are we to guess at his meaning? He insists upon [pg 452] “the right of all men to exercise unrestrained their intellectual faculties” in the pursuit of truth. If he does not mean this, what does he mean? If he does not wish to exclude all restraint on the “intellectual faculties” of men, what restraint is he willing to admit? Upon this point there seem to be just two opinions between which he has to choose: the one is the common doctrine of all Catholics; the other is the fundamental principle of the Protestant Church. Let us pause for a moment to examine these two systems.
According to Catholic faith, our Divine Lord has established in His Church an infallible tribunal, to pronounce, in matters of religion, what is true and what is false. Hence, it is never lawful, whether there be question of religious belief or of human science, to adopt opinions at variance with the teaching of this infallible tribunal. Here indeed is a check upon intellectual freedom, but a check which must, of necessity, be admitted by all who belong to the Catholic Church. And surely it is no great sacrifice to submit our finite understanding, so frail and erring, to the authority of God's Word, explained by a tribunal which He has Himself established, and to which He has promised His never-failing help.