On retiring behind the Guadiana, Cuesta took up an excellent position between Medellin, and Don Benito, with his right resting on the Guadiana, and his left on an almost inaccessible mountain. In fact, it was so well chosen, that Victor was compelled to use stratagem, before he could with prudence make any attempt to drive his opponent from his stronghold.
Anxious, therefore, to bring Cuesta to action, but yet afraid to do so in his position, Victor, in order to rouse the pride of the haughty Don, detached one party after another, close up to his front line, with instructions to use every effort in their power to draw their opponents into the plain. For some time, the Spaniards bore all the insults and degrading epithets gratuitously bestowed on them by the French, with considerable humour, but the same species of abuse and insult being continued day after day, and hour after hour, Cuesta's wrath at length waxed so hot, that he was induced to depart from the defensive system which he had hitherto adopted, and to risk the fate of his army, I may add, his country, on the issue of a general engagement.
Were we called upon to estimate the character of Cuesta as a military leader, by the talents displayed by him on this occasion, I fear that the utmost praise, I should feel myself warranted in bestowing on him, would amount only to this, that had the fate of the day depended on the personal courage of the Spanish chief, perhaps the result might have been less disastrous for his country. But unfortunately for Spain, the fortune of the day did not depend on the personal courage of either of the military chiefs, but on courage, aided by military talent and experience, tempered with prudence, and guided by a clear and sound judgement, none of which military qualifications Cuesta possessed. Had the Spanish Generalissimo taken a proper view of the duties which of necessity devolve upon the commander-in-chief of an army, he never could have permitted this important truth to escape his recollection, that a general who is appointed to command the armies of his country in times of peril, is entrusted not only with the lives and honour of those under his immediate command, but with the lives, honour, liberties, and property of all his fellow-countrymen. Had Cuesta not lost sight of this fact, he never would, for the sake of a little ephemeral praise, have placed in jeopardy the lives of his followers, and the best interests of his country, by attempting to accomplish that which ages yet unborn will look upon as a rash, hazardous, and totally uncalled for military enterprise; for had the attack been delayed but a few days longer, the French soldiery, who frequently can brook no delay, would have compelled their leader to attack his opponent, when Victor's defeat must have been as inevitable as Cuesta's appeared to be on that fatal morning, to almost every person but himself. Situated as Cuesta was, one of two things appears to me quite evident—he must either have been totally incapable of commanding-in-chief on such an occasion; or he must have grossly betrayed the trust reposed in him by his country, otherwise he never would have yielded up the many and important advantages he possessed, and unnecessarily placed himself on a footing of equality in point of ground with his antagonist—a piece of infatuation not only without a parallel in the history of Spain, but one which might have shaken the pillars of his country to their very foundation. O Spain! Spain! how many thousands of your bravest sons were in those times offered up as sacrifices to the pride, ambition, ignorance, or hateful personal feelings of your generals.
In the early ages of the world, a victory obtained by stratagem, did not confer much honour on the victor, for every thing then was attempted and achieved by force alone. But as men improved in military science, they perceived that there were occasions, when, by sacrificing the lives of a few of their followers, a less bloody and more complete victory was obtained, than when they exposed to hazard the lives of every man under their command. They became convinced, that by using stratagem, much time was saved, and many an advantage gained, which open force would never have accomplished. So satisfied were the Spartans of this, that, in order to make their officers endeavour to achieve every thing by stratagem, they ordered that every general who obtained an advantage by stratagem, was to be permitted to sacrifice an ox, but those who succeeded by open force, a cock only. This shews us how much that gallant people preferred the wiles of war, to open force, and I trust may induce my military friends to follow their example, being of opinion, that as the performances of the mind are preferable and superior to those of the body, so in exact proportion is stratagem to be preferred to open force.
CHAPTER X.
We remained quietly cantoned in Almendralejo, from the 13th of April to the 11th of May. At day-light, on the 12th, the 13th light dragoons, one brigade of artillery, the 28th, 34th, 50th, 71st, and 92nd British infantry, the 6th and 18th Portuguese infantry, 6th caçadores, and two companies 60th rifle battalion, moved from Almendralejo for Almarez to break a link or two of the enemy's chain of communication, between the French army under Marmont, and that of the south commanded by Soult. That evening we encamped about a mile from Merida, on the left bank of the Guadiana. The arches of the bridge which were destroyed during the siege of Badajoz, having been temporarily restored, the infantry passed the river by the bridge on the 18th, all the rest of the troops, including the baggage, crossed by a ford above it. In the evening we halted at St Pedro; next morning advanced to Villa-Macia, and on the 15th entered Truxillo.
At eleven o'clock, the same evening, we proceeded to our alarm-post, and soon after moved off towards Almarez. By sun-rise, our main body was ensconced in the bosom of a wood, three leagues in advance, so that the enemy neither got a glimpse of our persons or arms. Here we cooked; and those friends who were to lead the storming party, had their limbs pretty well exercised, by running one hundred and one times up ladders placed against the front of an old stone bridge. On hearing one of the party, a jolly ensign, afterwards complain of stiffness of the joints, a friend of his, who overheard him, turned round and said, "Be thankful, my good-fellow, if your limbs are not stiffer to-morrow; what you have received to-day, is only in part payment of what you, as a member of the FORLORN CLUB, may expect to receive at day-light to-morrow morning." Being a married man, the joke was not at all well received.
There being three distinct points of attack, the troops were formed into as many columns. The left column consisted of the 28th and 34th regiments, and 6th Portuguese caçadores, and was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Tilson Chowne, who had a short time before assumed the command of the second division. The centre commanded by Major-General Long, was composed of the 13th light dragoons, the 6th and 18th Portuguese infantry; and the right column led by Major-General Howard, consisted of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, and one company 60th rifles. Each column was provided with scaling ladders.
The works against which the right column moved, consisted of a pontoon bridge, thrown over the Tagus by the French, near the village of Almarez, defended by a tete-du-pont on the left bank, rather strongly entrenched. On a height above the latter, the bridge was farther defended by a fort called Napoleon, mounting ten guns; and on the right bank by another fort, named Ragusa, mounting eight guns. Four miles from the bridge, the road from Truxillo runs through the pass of Mirabete, at the highest point of which the enemy had a fort, and so judiciously was it erected, that its guns not only swept the Truxillo road many hundred yards, but flanked the various turnings of the road, which, on the opposite side of the mountain, winds along the face of it in a zig-zag manner all the way from the base to the very summit of the long and very steep ascent. The centre column was ordered to attack this point. On the very summit of a rugged peak, which, from the fort just mentioned, rises several hundred feet, in an almost perpendicular manner, an old convent had, by French ingenuity, been converted into a place of strength, and dignified with the title of "Castle of Mirabete." The guns of this fort were so planted, as to bear upon that part of the road from Truxillo, which was out of range and view of those at the pass; and so great was the altitude of the castle, that it could be seen from points many leagues distant both on the south and the north. To capture this formidable little castle, was the portion of labour allotted to the left column.
Formed in this manner, the whole corps moved from their bivouac in rear of Jaracejo, about eight o'clock in the evening of the 16th, towards the several points of attack. But a body of troops, when marching in the night, frequently meet with obstacles against which no human foresight can provide, particularly when cross roads, or difficult passes intersect, or branch out from the principal line of march. One of those obstacles most unfortunately interposed its baleful influence on this occasion, between the right column and the enemy, and so effectually, that when the hour arrived at which the works were to be assaulted, the column was still five miles from its destination. Under these circumstances, Sir Rowland Hill deemed it prudent to halt the right column on the summit of a bleak ridge called the Lina, which overlooks the vale of the Tagus, and to order the other columns to withdraw from under the guns of Mirabete.