The military memoirs of an infantry officer, 1809-1816

by Unknown

On the 11th of June, a severe, gallant, but unfortunate action was fought near Llera, between the French cavalry under General L'Allemand, and our heavy dragoons commanded by General Slade. In the early part of the conflict our troops were completely victorious, but from some unfortunate cause, they were ultimately beaten back with great loss to themselves, besides the loss of all the prisoners they had previously taken from the enemy. To whom the heavy cavalry brigade were indebted for this drubbing, I shall not affirm, but it was reported that Sir Rowland Hill was highly displeased with the issue of the affair.

This disastrous affair cast a deep gloom over every battalion in the division; but fortunately it was of short duration, for Sir Rowland Hill having received intelligence, on the 12th, that the men General Slade had lost on the preceding day, were then in the village of Meguila, under a slender guard, instantly despatched fifty of the heavy brigade of cavalry, under Lieutenant Strenuwitz, to recapture them. This was exactly the kind of thing for Strenuwitz, for as he frequently told us, "he was so fond of de fight," that he was sure to be killed some day or other. Away the whole party went in high spirits. In their principal object, however, they were unsuccessful; but having fallen in with a detachment of French cavalry consisting of eighty men, the British, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers, instantly attacked them, and after a tight little brush, defeated them with the loss of many killed and wounded, and twenty prisoners, and completely established the superiority of our heavy cavalry over that of the enemy.

The enemy's cavalry in front of Llerena having been reinforced, and their every movement indicating an intention of attacking us, the allied cavalry were withdrawn from Llerena on the 14th June. The latter continuing to fall back, and the French to advance, the 50th and 92nd regiments retired from Sancho Perez to Los Santos on the 16th, and at sun-set, on the following evening, the whole corps retired towards Santa Martha, behind which we halted at sun-rise on the 18th. Resuming our retrograde movement on the 19th, we marched to a wood a mile and a-half in front of the position of Albuera, and encamped on the right bank of the little river of that name, where, on the 20th, we were joined by the 5th, 17th and 22nd Portuguese regiments of the line, and one battalion of caçadores, which raised our force to upwards of 21,000 men.

Fully convinced that Soult intended to attack him, Sir Rowland Hill lost not a moment after going into camp, in making such preparations as he considered necessary to give the Marshal a warm reception, on the same ground from which Marshal Beresford so unceremoniously drove him on the 16th of May 1811.

The ground denominated the position of Albuera, is a ridge covered with heath, the left or lower part of which is washed by the small river Albuera. From the river, it runs in a southerly direction about three-quarters of a mile, and all the way rises with a gentle acclivity, till it terminates abruptly at a deep ravine, which separates the position from a high range of mountains farther to the right. The slope on each side of the ridge is long, but not steep. The village of Albuera stands on the lower part of the ridge, at a short distance from the river; and the high-road from Zafra to Badajoz runs through the centre of it. The extreme right being considerably higher than the other parts of the ridge, must be considered as the key to the position.

As this part of the ground, therefore, was likely to become the grand bone of contention, an engineer and strong working parties were instantly ordered to the spot, to increase its natural strength by all the artificial means in their power. Accordingly, by dint of hard working, day and night, a most respectable looking redoubt crowned the summit of the ridge in course of a few days. Another redoubt was raised on an eminence a little lower down, and a third one begun still farther to the left. The parapet of the bridge over the Albuera, a little in front of the village, was thrown down; the road broken up; the streets were barricaded; many of the houses loop-holed; and numerous breast-works graced the slope of the ridge. An officer from each regiment proceeded to the position, under the Quarter-Master General, who pointed out to them the ground which their respective battalions were to occupy, in case of an attack, as well as the particular fords of the river, where each corps was to cross on its way from the encampment to the position. Cavalry piquets were posted in front of the wood where the infantry were encamped. These were supported by some companies of infantry, placed within an abattis, and the first brigade, 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, were ordered to be in readiness to proceed to the front of the wood, on the first appearance of the enemy, and to retard their progress till the other brigades had taken up their ground. Such were the precautionary measures adopted by Sir Rowland Hill at Albuera in June 1812,—measures which every individual present characterized as the offspring of caution, prudence, and a very considerable portion of military talent.

On taking possession of the ridge of Albuera, we were a good deal astonished to find a trench, forty yards in length, nearly half filled with human skeletons, without so much as one handful of mould sprinkled over them, to screen them from the eye of the eagle, the vulture, or carrion crow. "Look," cried the men, one to another, on first beholding the horrifying spectacle, "behold our reward!" In order to quiet their minds, we threw out a hint that the skeletons were those of the French soldiers who had fallen in battle the previous year. But our oratory produced very little effect;—and no wonder, for that circumstance formed any thing but a good apology for the conduct of those to whom Marshal Beresford had entrusted the duty of burying the dead. That the dead were ordered to be buried, we require no other proof than the existence of the trench;—for had no order been given, that tomb of many warriors would never have been made. Now, as an order to bury the dead is all that can be expected from a general commanding an army, no blame can possibly be attached to the general who commanded the allied army at Albuera, in May 1811. To suppose for a moment that he gave no orders to bury the dead, would be a foul aspersion on his military character; for every general whose breast, like his, glows with humanity, will, after completing the rout of an enemy, invariably endeavour to enhance his victory, by extending mercy to all those who are in his power, and consigning to the tomb, with becoming solemnity, all those, whether friends or foes, who may have fallen in battle.

"Did you ever hear a good reason given why Marshal Beresford did not either destroy, or capture the remains of the French army after the battle of Albuera?" is a question which has been privately put to me more than a hundred times, and to which I shall now endeavour thus publicly to return a satisfactory answer.

In the height of their patriotic frenzy, the inhabitants of these realms are but too apt to anticipate from their naval and military armaments, a degree of success far beyond what they can possibly achieve. In forming these extravagant notions of success, it often happens that the sanguine people lose sight of a great many facts, which, if kept in view, would assist them materially in forming a correct estimate of the advantages which may be expected from any particular body of troops. On the occasion alluded to, the querists must unquestionably have forgotten, that when an army is composed of troops drawn from various nations, it is almost impossible for a general to infuse into the breasts of all his followers the same daring spirit, the same ardour, and the same praise-worthy disposition, to emulate in deeds of valour, those who have gone before them in the path of danger, of honour, and of glory. Let him do his utmost, he will not succeed; for so long as the troops of each nation possess, as they now do, a separate and distinct species of courage from the others, there will, there must be a secret enemy at work in the shape of jealousy and envy, which will prevent the soldiers of different nations from co-operating so heartily, and so effectually with each other, as the different corps of an army composed entirely of native troops do. Even in a native army, trivial causes have frequently been known to produce jealousy, hatred, and envy. It often happens that a particular battalion, brigade, or division is engaged in many and successive combats, while others have no opportunity of displaying their prowess, and all without any premeditated arrangement of the general commanding. This succession of partial combats, seldom fails to draw down upon the general, a charge of partiality, and upon the troops engaged in them, the envy and hatred of their less fortunate companions. This again produces ill-will between the different battalions, brigades, and divisions, which, in the end, tends to destroy confidence, and of consequence, unity and strength in an army.

That the victory would have been more complete, had the general placed the key of his position in the keeping of the British troops, instead of those of Spain, there can be but one opinion; for the great loss of the former did not arise from defending their own portion of ground, but in retaking that which the Spaniards had too tamely yielded up to the enemy. That the original plan of operations on that day was forced on the general, I believe there cannot be a doubt. But whatever may have been his reasons for agreeing to the arrangements, the issue shews us, that to place implicit confidence in foreign troops, is, to say the least of it, a bad and dangerous policy. Let us, therefore, hope that the fate of the key of the position of Albuera, on the 16th May 1811, will for ever operate as a warning to every British general or officer in command of a mixed force, never to place a post of importance in the keeping of foreign troops, but on all occasions to give the preference to the troops of that nation, whose army he commands.