Each battalion furnished a subaltern officer to take charge of its own baggage on the march. Each brigade, a captain who took charge of all the baggage of the brigade, and a field-officer was appointed to look after the whole. When the division moved right in front, the baggage animals of the lieutenant-general commanding the division led the way, and were followed by those of his personal and division staff;—then moved the baggage of the general or other officer in command of the leading brigade, and his personal staff. After the latter, followed that of the lieutenant-colonel commanding the leading battalion;—then that of the regimental staff, followed by the baggage of the grenadier officers, and the officers of the other companies in regular succession. The baggage of the other regiments followed in similar order. When the division moved left in front, the order of march, as far as regarded company baggage was reversed, but that of all the other officers moved as above described. The baggage of one corps was never permitted to intermix with that of another. At the close of every day's march, the subaltern made a report to the captain and his own commanding officer; the captain to the field-officer and general commanding the brigade; and the field-officer reported to the lieutenant-general commanding the division.
Before taking leave of this subject, I beg once more to urge on the attention of young officers, the necessity of their applying head and heart to their several books of instruction, if they wish to acquire a competent knowledge of their duties, and be at all times prepared to discharge them in a manner satisfactory to themselves, and beneficial to their country. When we look back and reflect how very few officers of the hundreds of thousands who have served in the British army during the last two or three centuries, have acquired that knowledge of the military art which qualifies an officer to form the plan of a war, we are forced to conclude, either that but few officers ever attain so much knowledge of their profession, or that opportunities have been wanting to develope their abilities in this peculiar department of their art. Now, it will be readily conceded, that there has been no lack of opportunities, consequently, we are led to the opinion, that the want of abilities in some, but the want of application on the part of a much greater number, are the sole causes why so very few officers have risen to any thing like eminence in the art of war.
I shall be told, perhaps, that it is not at all necessary that every officer should be qualified to form the plan of a war. In this opinion I perfectly agree: but in doing so I cannot shut my eyes to this fact, that unless all those are able to do so, who aspire to the higher ranks of their profession, they will, on a command of importance being offered them, be under the necessity of declining it, or of accepting the trust, in the full knowledge of their own incompetency to discharge its duties. To avoid the necessity of adopting either of those unpleasant alternatives, particularly the latter, which might put to hazard their own reputation and the interests of their country, nothing more is required from those officers who really intend to make the military art their sole business through life, than diligence and assiduity in the prosecution of their military studies. Personal experience has very generally been considered the officer's best instructor; yet as it is a very rare occurrence for a general to have an opportunity of attacking an enemy twice under exactly similar circumstances, and as the hundredth part of those accidents and changes of position which invariably take place in battles and sieges, cannot possibly come within the observation of one man, every officer who wishes to discharge his duties with ability, must of necessity add to his own the experience of others. This can only be accomplished by scanning the page of history, and making himself acquainted with the memorable actions of the most illustrious warriors of every age and country,—a study, in the prosecution of which, the young aspirant will discover the rocks on which so many officers have shipwrecked their fame and fortunes, and how the more successful commanders manœuvred, when they raised for themselves monuments of fame which will endure to the end of time.
CHAPTER XVI.
We had not been long in Coria, when a considerable number of our men found a residence in hospital, and not a few of our oldest and most experienced officers a premature grave. Amongst the latter, were Lieutenant-General Sir William Erskine, commanding the cavalry of Sir Rowland Hill's corps; Colonel Wilson, 39th regiment, and Colonel Stewart, 50th regiment; the former commanding the second, and the latter the first brigade of the second division.
The French being also without tents, were equally tired of the campaign, and in want of repose. Their clothing being much like our own, they, on retiring into quarters, looked around for something to shelter their bodies from the inclemencies of a Spanish winter. At Bejer, a town fifteen leagues from Salamanca, and about an equal distance from Coria, there was at that time a large quantity of woollen cloth in possession of a manufacturer, who had calculated on a very different issue to the campaign. This the French fixed their eyes upon, and to seize upon it, an expedition under General Foy, was prepared at Salamanca. On receiving notice of the enemy's intentions, Sir Rowland Hill ordered the 71st regiment and 6th caçadores to advance from Monte-Hermosa, and an adjoining village, to the aid of the inhabitants of Bejer, and the 50th and 92nd were pushed forward from Coria to Monte-Hermosa. These movements convincing the enemy that the rich prize would not be tamely given up, they thought it prudent to retire, and try whether a little undisturbed repose might not lull us into a criminal security.
Monte-Hermosa was exclusively occupied by farmers and their dependants. The streets being extremely filthy, and in the most wretched repair, we found it most unpleasant to be out after sun-set. Altogether it was an uncomfortable quarter; the weather being wet and extremely cold, the windows without glass, and the apartments without fire, I declare I never knew what it was to be warm, save when in bed, or sometimes after dinner.
In the second week of February, General Foy made another dash at Bejer, but Sir Rowland Hill having received timely notice of his intentions, ordered the 71st and 6th caçadores to move from Banos to Bejer, the 50th to Banos, and 92nd to follow as a reserve. When the 71st and caçadores occupied Bejer on the 12th of February, Foy was only a few miles from it; but on hearing of their arrival, he again retired. To secure the place against any future attack, the 50th and 6th caçadores were thrown into Bejer as a permanent garrison, the 71st occupied the villages of Puerto-de-Banos, and Candeleiria, and the 92nd regiment the town of Banos a few miles in rear. The 60th rifle company were quartered in Herbas.
A few days after this attempt had been so timeously frustrated, the hills of Bejer and Banos again rung with the dreadful note of preparation. Thinking to carry it by surprise, Foy advanced again at the head of 3000 picked troops, and with so much secrecy, that he was within a short distance of the piquets, before Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison of the 50th regiment, then commanding the garrison, received notice of his approach. So unexpected indeed was the attack, that one of the out-lying piquets was nearly surrounded before the officer in charge of it knew that the enemy was nearer to them than Salamanca.
In a few minutes after driving in the piquets, Foy was before the gates of Bejer anticipating an easy victory. But unfortunately for Foy and his followers, the several entrances were guarded by detachments of the old 50th, over whose lifeless trunks it behoved them to march before they could accomplish their object. The attack was made with all the characteristic bravery of Frenchmen, and was repulsed with that unflinching courage so peculiar to that excellent corps. Foy's great numerical superiority gave him decided advantages, but this had an effect on the spirits of the troops, directly the reverse of that which might have been anticipated, for as the danger increased, so did the courage of the troops, till Foy, perceiving that his reiterated attempts to penetrate into the town, were not to be attended with any other result than a defeat, withdrew before his adversaries could turn it into a disgraceful one. Part of the garrison followed the fugitives, and inflicted on them a severe punishment for their effrontery in attempting to intrude themselves into Bejer society without permission. Foy's loss amounted to upwards of a hundred killed and wounded, and amongst the latter, was an aid-de-camp on the Staff of the General.