The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments

by Unknown

(6) Temporary Commissions of Enquiry.

(7) Stationery.

(8) Office of Arms.[69]

Before proceeding to discuss the method by which the control of the Legislature may be most easily and effectively established over these various departments, I wish to consider whether any of them should be temporarily reserved from that control. There is undoubtedly, a strong feeling among Irish Unionists, and among many moderate Nationalists, that, if Home Rule does come, Judicial Patronage, and the control over the Police, should be in the beginning reserved or excepted from the general transfer of control to the new Government which would take place when the Bill becomes law. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party are, I understand, anxious that there should be no delay in transferring the judicial patronage. They have been dissatisfied with the exercise of judicial patronage in the past: and they wish for a distribution more to their liking in the immediate future.

I have myself no fear that judicial patronage will be misused to the detriment of any party by the Irish Government of the future; but Irish Unionists are apprehensive on the point; and in my opinion something should be done to allay their fears. If the Bill should contain provisions similar to Clause 19 of the Bill of 1893, which maintained in the Irish Supreme Court two judges with salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, appointed by the King in Council, and removable only by his Order, the Unionist apprehensions might be, to some extent at all events, removed. But as the Financial Provisions of the coming Bill will probably be different [pg 064] from those of the Bill of 1893, a clause like Clause 19 of that Bill may not be inserted.[70]

In that case, I think it would tend to the establishment of general confidence if the patronage in connexion with judicial appointments were, during the transition period, reserved and administered, as at present, by the Lord-Lieutenant. I think it would be good policy to abstain from every transfer of authority from the Lord-Lieutenant to which the Irish minority may at the outset reasonably object. There must be a period of transition—be it seven years or ten years or even longer—during which the minority will be suspicious of such change as I am now concerned with. I would let these suspicions wear themselves out, as in time they are sure to do with the growth of further knowledge and of that saner outlook on Imperial and Irish affairs, which collaboration towards common objects brings with it. It seems to me that in the reassurance of opponents and hesitating well-wishers, and even in the immunity, for a time, from the pressure and annoyances of this class of patronage, the new Irish Government may well find, in its infancy, satisfaction for the temporary withholding of a part of its prerogatives. It might be an instruction to the Lord-Lieutenant, that, during the transition period, (which need not be long) the wishes of the Irish ministry, in regard to appointments to judicial vacancies, should be ascertained and fully considered before the vacancies are filled.

But if this view cannot prevail then I suggest that during the transition period the patronage in connexion with the Supreme Court should, at all events, [pg 065] be reserved. It is highly desirable that the apprehensions of the Irish Unionists should be allayed in every practicable way.

Advantage should, I think, be taken of this opportunity to remove the Irish Chancellorship from the list of political appointments. Whatever strong reasons or justification may exist in England for the Lord Chancellor changing with the Government, there should be none that I can discover in the Ireland of the future, unless it be in connection with the appointment of Justices of the Peace. But fairness in distributing that sort of patronage can surely be secured by other means than a frequently recurring and unnatural change of Chancellors, whereby the Pension List is heavily and unnecessarily burdened.

In connexion with the Royal Irish Constabulary, I am clear that the control should rest, as now, with the Lord-Lieutenant (that is, with the Imperial Government) until Land Purchase has made further progress, and the new Government has gained experience of administration; but it is only fair that during this period of reservation the Imperial Government should allow Ireland a drawback on the cost of the police force, the present strength of which is excessive if judged from the Irish point of view.

The situation will, of course, be anomalous inasmuch as there will be an Executive Government responsible to the Irish Parliament yet relieved of the prime responsibility resting on all Governments—the maintenance of law and order. This anomaly cannot be avoided: it inevitably arises from the political conditions of the case. The best way of dealing with the situation will be to maintain existing arrangements which are directed by the Under-Secretary and to preserve the subordination of the Law Officers to the [pg 066] Lord-Lieutenant in all matters relating to the maintenance of order. But while the Minister for Law and Justice should have no control over the police during this transition period, his wishes in regard to any matter will, of course, be carefully considered; his request for the performance by the police of all duties not of a purely police character which they now customarily discharge, will be complied with, and his proposals to reduce the strength of the force, and thereby effect saving in the public expenditure, will no doubt be favourably considered by the Lord-Lieutenant if the state of the country permits.