[Sixth], the sentence of the judge, who condemned the lover for his criminal knowledge of her, which made this adultery notorious. [Citations.]
Furthermore, we are not here arguing to prove adultery for the purpose of demanding punishment [upon the adulteress], but to excuse her slayer, and for his defence; in this case, even lighter proofs would be abundant, as Matthæus advises. [Citations.]
These matters being held as proved, the opinion of certain authorities who assert that a husband is not excusable from the ordinary penalty, who kills his adulterous wife after an interval, does not stand in our way. For the aforesaid laws speak of the wife who had been found in her guilt and has been killed incontinently. Hence such indulgence ought not to be extended to wife-murder committed after an interval, because the reins should not be relaxed for men to sin and to declare the law for themselves. [Citations.]
Furthermore, Farinacci does not affirm this conclusion, but shows that he is very much in doubt, where he says: "The matter is very doubtful with me, because injured honour and just anger—both of which always oppress the heart—are very strong grounds for the mitigation of the penalty." Matthæus well weighs these words on our very point. And both Farinacci and Rainaldi conclude that the penalty can be moderated at the judgment of the Prince.
I humbly pray that this be noted. The aforesaid laws, which seem to require discovery in the very act of sin, as some have thought, do not decide in that way merely for the purpose of excusing a husband moved to slaughter by a sudden impulse of wrath and by unadvised heat. But they so decide lest on any suspicion of adultery whatsoever, oftentimes entirely without foundation, men should rush upon and kill their wives, who are frequently innocent. Hence the "discovery in the very act of crime," which is required by law, is not to be interpreted, nor to be understood, as discovery in the very act of licence, but is to be referred to the proof of the adultery, lest on trifling suspicion a wife should be given over to death. But when the adultery is not at all doubtful, there is no distinction between one killing immediately and killing after an interval, so far as the matter of escaping extreme punishment is concerned. [Citations.]
For whenever a wife is convicted of adultery, or is a manifest adulteress, she is always said to be "taken in crime." [Citations.]
And in very truth the reasons adduced by those holding the contrary opinion are entirely too weak. For murder committed for honour's sake is always said to be done immediately, whensoever it may be committed. Because injury to the honour always remains fixed before one's eyes, and by goading one with busy and incessant stings it urges and impels him to its reparation. [Citations.]
Such relaxation of the reins to husbands, for taking into their own hands the law, would indeed be too great if the law of divorce were still valid. For in that case husbands would not be permitted to make such reparation of their honour. For another way would be satisfactorily provided for them, namely, in their right to dismiss and repudiate the polluted wife. In this way they could put far from themselves the cause of their disgrace, yes, and the very ignominy itself. But when by the divine favour our Gentile blindness was removed, and matrimony was acknowledged to be perpetual and indissoluble, those were indeed most worthy of pity who, when all other way of recovering their honour was closed to them, washed away their stains in the blood of their adulterous wives. Petrus Erodus [Citation], after he has discussed a matter of this kind according to the usual practice of Roman Law, adds in the end: "For as all hope of a second marriage is gone so long as the adulteress still lives, we judge that such very just anger is allayed with more difficulty, unless it be by the flight of time;" and therefore such a case, when not terminated by divorce, is usually terminated by murder. For as Augustine says, "what is not permitted, becomes as if it were permitted; that is, let the adulteress be killed, that the husband may be released."
I acknowledge that it is laudable to restrain the audacity of husbands, lest they declare the law for themselves in their own cause; since they may be mistaken. But it would be more laudable indeed to restrain the lust of wives; for if they would act modestly and would live honourably they would not force their husbands to this kind of crime, which I may almost call necessary. Nor can we deny that by the ignominy brought upon them by the adultery they are exasperated and are driven insane, and a most just sense of anger is excited in their hearts. For this grievance surpasses all others beyond comparison, and hence is worthy of the greater pity, according to the words of the satirist [Juv. X. 314]: "This wrath exacts more than any law concedes to wrath."
Papinianus also well acknowledges this [Citation], where we read: "Since it is very difficult to restrain just anger." For these reasons, authorities hold that a just grievance should render the penalty more lenient even in premediated crimes; because the sense of "just grievance does not easily quiet down, or lose its strength with the flight of time, but the heart is continually pierced by infamy, and the longer the insult endures, the longer endures the infamy, yea, and it is increased." [Citations.]