The Memorandum was as follows:
The undersigned Corporations have carefully considered what measures are required to give practical effect to the formula, which has so often been heard during the last few months, viz., that this war must be followed by an honourable peace, corresponding to the sacrifices which have been made and containing in itself a guarantee for its continuance.
In answering this question, it must never be forgotten that our enemies continue to announce that Germany is to be annihilated and struck out of the rank of the Great Powers. Against such aims treaties will afford us no protection; for treaties, when the fitting moment comes, would once more be trodden under foot. We can only look for safety in a serious economic and military weakening of our enemies, sufficient to ensure peace for as long a time as can be foreseen.
We must demand a colonial Empire adequate to satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests, we must safeguard our future policy in matters of customs and commerce, and we must secure a war indemnity to be paid in a form suitable to our requirements: but our chief end in the struggle which has been forced upon us is, in our opinion, to strengthen and improve the foundations on which Germany's position in Europe rests, in the following directions:
In order to provide the necessary security for our influence at sea and in order to secure our future military and economic position as against England, Belgium, owing to the close connexion of Belgian territory (which is economically of such importance) with our main manufacturing districts, must be subjected to German Imperial legislation, both in military and tariff matters, and also in regard to currency, banking, and postal arrangements. Railways and canals must be incorporated in our transport system. In general, the government and administration of the country must be so managed that the inhabitants obtain no influence on the political fortunes of the German Empire; there must be separation of the Walloon and of the predominantly Flemish territory, and all economic and industrial undertakings and real estate, which are so vital for the government of the country, must be transferred into German hands.
We must consider the question of French territory from the same point of view, i.e. so far as it affects our position towards England. Hence we must regard it as a matter of vital importance, in the interests of our future influence at sea, that we should hold the French coastal districts from the Belgian frontier approximately as far as the Somme. and thus secure access to the Atlantic Ocean. The Hinterland, which must be acquired with them, must be so delimited as to secure to us the complete economic and strategic exploitation of those Channel-ports which we gain. Any further acquisitions of French territory, apart from the necessary annexation of the iron-ore district of Briey, must be determined solely by military and strategic considerations. After the experiences of this war, it may be regarded as self-evident that we cannot in the future leave our frontiers at the mercy of hostile invasion by allowing our opponents to retain those fortified positions which threaten us, in particular Verdun and Belfort and the Western slopes of the Vosges which lie between them. The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French Channel-coast would carry with it the possession, not only of the iron-ore district of Briey mentioned above, but also of the coal-country in the department of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. These annexations also—as is self-evident, after our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine—must be so arranged that the population of the annexed districts shall be precluded from exercising political influence on the fortunes of the German Empire; and all the economic resources of these districts, including both large and medium-sized estates, must be transferred to German hands on such terms that France shall compensate and take over their owners.
As to the East, the determining consideration must be that the great addition to our manufacturing resources, which we anticipate in the West, must be counterbalanced by an equivalent annexation of agricultural territory in the East. The present economic structure of Germany has shown itself so fortunate in this war, that it is hardly too much to say that every German is convinced of the necessity for maintaining it for as long a time as we can foresee.
The necessity of strengthening the sound agricultural basis of our economic system, of making possible a German agricultural colonisation on a large scale, of restoring the German peasants who are living abroad—especially those settled in Russia and at present deprived of their rights—to the territory of the Empire, so that they may take part in the economic life of Germany, and, lastly, the necessity of greatly increasing the numbers of our population capable of bearing arms, implies a considerable extension of the Imperial and Prussian frontiers in the East by annexation of at least parts of the Baltic Provinces and of those territories which lie to the south of them, whilst at the same time we must keep in mind, the object of making our Eastern German frontier capable of military defence.
The restoration of East Prussia requires a better safeguarding of its frontiers by placing in front of them other districts, nor must West Prussia, Posen and Silesia remain frontier marches exposed to danger as they now are.
With regard to the granting of political rights to the inhabitants of the new districts and the safeguarding of German economic influence, what has already been said about France applies here too. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia will have to consist to a large extent in the cession of land.
Of course these demands depend on the hypothesis that military results will enable them to be carried out. But in view of what we have already achieved, we confidently rely on our army and its leaders to gain a victory which will guarantee the attainment of these ends. We must pursue these ends, not from a policy of conquest, but because it is only by attaining them that we can secure that lasting peace which all classes of the German people expect in return for their sacrifices. Moreover, in our opinion, a voluntary surrender of hostile territories, in which so much German blood has been spilt and so many of our best and noblest have found a grave, would do violence to the sentiments of our people and to their conception of an honourable peace.
In the future as in the past, the want of harbours directly on the Channel would strangle our activity beyond the seas. An independent Belgium would continue to be a tête de pont to England, a point from which to attack us. If the natural line of fortifications of France were left in the hands of the French, there would be a permanent menace to our frontiers; and Russia, if she emerged from the war without loss of territory, would underestimate our ability and power to prevent her doing injury to our interests, while, on the other hand, the failure to win new agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier would diminish the possibility of strengthening the defensive power of Germany against Russia by a sufficient increase of the German population.
We have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the views expressed above, which are not confined to the undersigned Corporations, but are widely held—possibly with occasional variations in detail—in many German circles which have not as yet publicly expressed them, and at the same time to inform you that we have simultaneously communicated this petition to the Ministries of the various Federated States.
As a supplement to this Memorandum, we must here lay special stress on the fact that the political, military and economic objects, which the German people must strive after in the interests of the security of their future, are inseparably connected with one another. It is clear, to start with, that the attainment of our great political objects depends on the offensive power and the successes of our army. But precisely our experiences in this war prove, beyond any doubt, that our military successes, particularly in a long war, and their further exploitation depend to a large extent upon the economic strength and ability of our people. If German agriculture had not been in a position to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of our enemies, and if German manufacturers, German inventive genius and German technical skill had not been able to render us independent of foreign countries in the most different spheres, then, notwithstanding the brilliant successes of our victorious troops, we should have had to give way eventually in the struggle which has been forced upon us, if indeed we should not have been defeated already.
Hence it follows that even those demands, which seem at first sight to possess a purely economic significance, must be viewed in the light of the urgent necessity for the greatest possible increase of our national strength, and also from a military standpoint.
This applies with special force to the demands, which are set forth in the Memorandum, both (a) for the acquisition of territory suitable for agricultural settlement and (b) for the appropriation of the iron-ore district of the Meurthe and Moselle, of the French coaling districts in the Departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, and also of the Belgian coalfields.
The acquisition of sufficient territory suitable for agricultural settlement is indispensable—(a) in order to broaden the agricultural basis of our national resources, and thus to maintain that happy balance in our whole economic life which has been recognised as so necessary in the present war; (b) in order to strengthen our military power by safeguarding the sources of our national strength, which depend upon a vigorous agricultural policy, and more especially by assuring the increase of our population.
In the same way, acquisitions, such as that of the iron ore and coal districts mentioned above, are demanded by our military necessities, and not by any means only in the interests of our manufacturing development. This is clear from the following facts and figures:—
The monthly production of pig-iron in Germany has risen once more, since August 1914, to nearly 1,000,000 tons; that is, it has nearly doubled. The monthly output of steel has risen to more than 1,000,000 tons.
There is, however, no excess of pig-iron or steel; on the contrary, there is a deficiency in Germany, and an even greater deficiency in neutral countries.
The output of shells calls for both iron and steel, in quantities of which only a few persons originally had any conception. For cast-iron shells alone—the inferior substitute for drawn and cast steel shells—at least 4000 tons of pig-iron have been used daily during the last few months. The exact figures are not for the moment before us; but this much is certain, that, unless the output of iron and steel had been doubled since the month of August, a continuation of the war would have been impossible.