Let us examine, then, what interest would accrue to España in the other point, the appropriation to itself of the trade with the Philipinas. The consulate says that España will be enriched with the exportation, to Manda[8] and Xapon, of its products and other merchandise that will go to those islands, where they also desire so ardently to have an abundance of what is brought from there [España?] and from China; and this will easily prevent the loss of the great quantities of silver that pass by this road from Nueva España.

To the first, sufficient answer is made with what experience, that great teacher in such matters, has taught us to the contrary—to me, at least, during the time while I governed in México. For, since your Majesty was pleased to order me in a decree, dated December 17, 604, to give my opinion as to whether export duties would better be levied on the merchandise sent to the Philipinas from the port of Acapulco—since all the other merchandise sent thence, to Guatimala and Perú, pays two and one-half per cent—and that in order to do this I should investigate the quality and nature of the said merchandise, I made special efforts to ascertain these facts. After examining the registers of several years I found that, even if the duty should be collected from the Philipinas exports as from the others, it would not amount to two hundred pesos of eight reals each year; for all those goods were articles of luxury, and in very small quantity. I sent your Majesty an official report of this in my letter of February 17, 606. On August 19 of the same year, I received a reply, ordering me to make no change so long as the trade did not increase to such an extent that I thought it inadvisable; and in such case to advise your Majesty of it confidentially. Consequently, since there will be no greater exportation from Nueva España of like commodities from that kingdom [i.e., España]—where there are no others, and whence only these would be sent—the same thing would result.[9] One errs in saying that those goods are desired in Manila and Xapon, since cloth stuffs (the only thing lacking to them) besides being a merchandise of so great value that he who would export them so far to the Philipinas would lose them—are not used, because of the heat; and in Xapon, where the cold might make them sought, they cost very little, for the natives clothe themselves with the taffetans of that country, and use cotton quilts. Consequently, I have also answered what was alleged concerning the increase of the duties that would accrue to your Majesty from the export duties in España and the import duties at Manila.

The other argument namely, that España would be filled with products from China and Xapon—may be conceded to them; but it remains for them to show us the utilty that would accrue to them, after the goods had been obtained. For I, on the contrary, regard them as a very great harm, since with those goods would cease the present industry [in España] of the raising of silk, its weaving and trade; and all this would be exchanged for what is so much poorer and of so little durability. It is a fact that even now we are experiencing that, and are discovering here the harm caused by even the small quantity of silk of this class [i.e., the Chinese silk]; it comes mixed with that of España, in almost all the velvets and taffetans brought from España, for in but two days’ time they become useless.

That by this means would be prevented the exportation of silver from Nueva-España, is an opinion that one might value and thank them for, if they were not trying to withdraw the silver from another and more important region, where the harm would be greater. But, supposing that what now goes from México will be sent later from Castilla and Andalucía, it seems that the only utility will be found in the less occasion [for buying Chinese goods] that each of those provinces would have, so that the export of silver would be in smaller quantity. That is to be regulated by the wealth of each province, and by their facilities for diverting it. All the silver that Nueva-España obtains now comes from its own provinces, or is brought from the provinces of Perú. The bulk of it is used in the trade with España, some in that with the Philipinas, and very little in the retail trade of its own cities and towns; for although Nueva-España has intercourse with Perú, it never uses more than the products of the country for that. What is sent to the islands goes by way of Acapulco, which is the only port in all the South Sea where this despatch is made or can be made. That España would have more silver if it retained within its bounds what it receives, seems to be undeniable, since therein is gathered the silver of México, Perú, and all the Indias. But the gates by which that silver issues [from España]—now it is known whether there are any—are, to speak correctly, as many as there are seaports and sterile districts, with the usual and accustomed communication between them.

Accepting this as true—on which is based assertions of those who say that less silver will be sent to Manila from a kingdom where conditions are such [i.e., España] than México [now] gives—I, at least, no matter how long may be the argument, do not comprehend so obscure a secret; on the contrary, I am persuaded that España will be no poorer thereby. For, if this mouth be stopped, España must be drained, by those that remain (as is done today), of all of this article that other kingdoms are offering it, as in a flood. But with equal certainty, I understand that incomparably more money will go to the Philipinas by this road than now goes by the other. And to assert that this loss will cease because, with the increase of trade with Xapon, the merchandise which must go to España will come from that country, is a statement without foundation. For if this argument were worth anything, it must have the same force, in preventing what is today carried from México; since trade with Xapon from Manila is open and permitted to all who wish it.

The consulate is trying also to strengthen its proposition with the improvements that it pretends to find in the voyage, if it were to be made by the cape of Buena-Esperanza. But, discussing that point by what I have been able to learn of it, I find that the emperor and king our sovereign, of glorious memory, your Majesty’s grandfather, having been persuaded that the discovery and conquest of the Spice Islands—the name then given to those islands today included in the name of Philipinas or Malucas—pertained to the crown of Castilla, inasmuch as they were within the line drawn by his Holiness, Alexander VI, for the division of the world, ardently desired, and made extraordinary efforts, so that his vassals might make that voyage without touching at the ports and lands of the kingdom of Portugal. For that purpose he made an agreement with Fernando de Magallanes to discover [such a route]. The latter discovered and gave name to the strait in this region at the south. Although by the result [of Magallanes’s expedition] one could recognize the great difficulty and danger of the voyage, his Majesty would not desist from the undertaking. On the contrary, he immediately sent, in the year 25, two other fleets by that way while, at the same time, he sent a ship under command of an intelligent man to find a new entrance by the coast of Labrador and the Bacallaos.[10] Following up the attempt, he ordered Don Fernando Cortés, conqueror of Nueva-España, to attempt this expedition from Nueva-España. He would not have ceased like means until attaining it, had not he made that contract or agreement concerning those islands with the king of Portugal in the year 29.[11] That put an end to the enterprise until afterward, when Don Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of Nueva-España, took up again the same search in the year 42, and continued to persevere in it, so that it was realized during the latter years of the governorship and life of Don Luis de Velasco, who succeeded the said Don Antonio in that office.

I would, Sire, narrate in minute detail to your Majesty these labors, and those of many others, who lost their lives and possessions at various times to see the accomplishment of so important a matter, if I were not afraid of making a history of this letter—in order to entreat you that, since God our Lord ordained that a good desired by so many should be enjoyed with so great quietness in these most fortunate days of your Majesty, you will not permit the glory of this happiness to be disturbed and obscured; for the motives and efforts of so suspicious a people embarrass it. They, in order to gain their own private interests, try to cover them with this cloak of convenience and conservation of so superior authority. And although it appears that a great part of the former injuries are lacking today, since the kingdom of Portugal (although by light of a separate crown) is under the universal domain of your Majesty, still, the zeal and affection that your Majesty has always felt in greater proportion for the inhabitants of Castilla ought not on that account to cease; since there is also no cessation of the rancor and hostility with which the Portuguese, in all the Indias where they rule, withhold the friendly intercourse that they owed to the Castilians as the vassals of the same sovereign.

I am quite persuaded that there is little difference between these two routes as regards the weather and dangers of the sea. For, although the Nueva-España vessels consume not longer than sixty days, and sometimes less, the return voyage is of longer duration, and the whirlwinds and gales more continuous. And although I believe that voyages made by way of the cape of Buena Esperanza take more than the three months that the prior and consuls assert (especially since the vessels have to stop at one or two way-stations), yet, in regard to this, I estimate the two routes as equal. But in point of certain security, the advantage lies greatly with the voyages made by way of the South Sea, as it is at all times so free from enemies. No further proof is necessary regarding this statement than the fact that not a single vessel going to and fro between Acapulco and Cavite and the port of Manila has been captured;[12] while very many vessels take that other route, which are so heavily armed that, in comparison with the first, one may consider them as more than fortresses. The warning that the Dutch make use of this route [i.e., through the Strait of Magellan] cannot force me to believe the contrary; and by it without so many advantages as those enjoyed by your Majesty’s ships they have made themselves almost complete masters of all the Spice Islands, for they had no other routes from which to select this one. I assert from the prudence with which the Dutch consider what is of advantage to them, that if they could enjoy so great convenience as Nueva-España possesses, they would not take the risk of running by the coast and ports of your Majesty as they do today by the open sea, where they might meet one who would resist their progress. An excellent proof of this truth is their so-oft repeated effort to find a passage through the strait of Anian.[13] For they consider it more conducive to the peace of their voyage to experience rough and unknown seas, than to be liable to the sudden surprises to which those that are milder and more traversed are liable. The mastery that I know them to exercise in those districts, is to enter for pillage and barter, as they usually do, even in the very kingdoms of your Majesty which are nearest to the defense and power of your fleets And if, in addition, the Dutch have any trading-posts, established and manned with soldiers, it is not necessary that España should trouble itself to dislodge them, but the governor of the Philipinas, and the soldiers and ships of Malaca and of the viceroy of India, should attempt it; and it will be easy to drive them out at once. In truth, however, (that I may always discuss a similar case), our design must be more difficult to attain than theirs; for they content themselves with going where they are received, and of receiving what they are given, without caring much whether others enter that district, while your Majesty desires, as is right, to be absolute and sole ruler, and to shut the gate to all who do not enter under the name and title of vassals.

As to the difficulty and delay of sending aid to the islands, although it is understood that the enemy is attempting some entrance in the islands, I can easily comprehend that it would be easier to build a fleet in España, and that it would be despatched much more quickly than from these provinces. But I have always considered that, in this regard, Sire, he who has so extensive a monarchy as your Majesty, must see that each part of it have all the force necessary for its sole defense, without being dependent for so costly and remote reenforcement, as would necessarily be the case did your Majesty send it from the the ports of that kingdom. Consequently, I presume that, if the islands should find themselves in a like necessity, either they would have to resist an attack with their presidios and walls, or (to extend the hope farther) that they would not have need for more aid than what they could secure from Malaca with the galleons of that crown. The aid that is not so pressingly needed, and which, it seems, must necessarily come from España—such as infantry for the presidios—is sent there with some difficulty, because of the long distance overland from Veracruz to the port of Acapulco, in a land so open that the companies necessarily lose some men. But it would prove more costly should your Majesty, in order to avoid this, have to form a fleet on occasions when it would be necessary. However, I have thought that an effort might be made, some time, to send the soldiers who must go to the islands in the trading fleet or galleons sailing to Puertobelo;[14] and to advise the president [of the Audiencia there], somewhat earlier, to have small boats provided to take the soldiers by river from Chagre to Cruces. Since from that point to Panama it is only five leguas overland, the men might be taken there easily and at little expense. The viceroy of Peru, having been notified beforehand, should, without any expense to your Majesty, have a vessel at Panamá, where the soldiers could embark and go to Acapulco. There they could change ships for those in the Philipinas line. By this method some of the greatest inconveniences could be avoided.

And lastly, as the concluding argument of this discourse, I remind your Majesty that since the Philipinas Islands are surrounded by enemies so powerful as are Xapon and China—one because of its strength and valor, and the other because of its incredible multitude of inhabitants—with only the seven hundred Spaniards that the islands had, during my government of Nueva España, who could bear arms (a number now increased somewhat by the presidios of Terrenate and Thidore), they are preserved solely for this reason, that by their means the trade of those countries is opened to your Majesty’s kingdoms. Thus said the emperor of Xapon, when he was advised to conquer Manila. The Chinese king wrote the same words to Don Pedro de Acuña, when the latter suspected that the insurrection made in those islands by the Chinese king’s vassals had been made by his orders. And it must be considered seriously that if the trade be carried on by way of the cape of Buena Esperanza, it would be quite possible that the Chinese—who, in order to go to Manila, have to sail, both in the open and among islands, with some risk and danger because of the smallness of their craft—after seeing that the Spanish ships had to make a way-station at Malaca or Xava, would go from the river of Canton, which is the gateway from which the Chinese ships set out, coasting from land to land along their own country, and would change the bulk of their trade to Portuguese ports, and thus deserting Manila. If they did this, the principal support and defense of Manila would fail, and its enemies would change their opinion, since they would no longer enjoy the benefits that now attract them.