The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 — Volume 19 of 55 / 1620-1621 / Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and their peoples, their history and records of the Catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the close of the nineteenth century.

by Unknown

[1] Span., La puso en el cofrecillo secreto del acuerdo; literally “placed it in the secret drawer of the assembly.”

[2] In 1621, the flagship of which Fernando Centeno was commander, “Nuestra Señora de la Vida,” was wrecked in Isla Verde. See Colin, Labor evangélica, p. 159.

Letter from Fajardo to Felipe III

Sire:

1st. While anxious, as may be understood, over the delay of the ships from Nueva España, and the anticipated rise of the vendavals with the so great fury with which they began this year; and fearing on that account some disaster, or their making port in distress at Japon, where also there is cause for fear; and while considering the hardship that might result to this country from any one of those things: we had news that three ships of the Dutch rebels were awaiting our ships between the channel of San Bernardino and the Cape of Spiritu Sancto, where the latter had to come. Consequently our anxiety deepened, knowing that this country would necessarily be endangered if those ships were driven from its coasts, with the men that we have for its defense, at such a season that, if they left the strait, they could not possibly return here this year; or, if there were a failure to act, the people [of this city] must remain not properly cared for, much less contented. Although it was evident that we might go out at a time when we could be of [no] use, and when the aforesaid danger would not happen to the ships, with all the resources at my command, I had the galleys and light craft manned, so that they might go out immediately with what advices and orders seemed advisable. While preparing the ships, which were almost ready to go out, for whatever might arise, and in the midst of that anxiety, God was pleased to do us the favor of freeing us from it by the news that I received of our ships. That news, thanks to His Divine Majesty, was most favorable, when one considers what might have come. The news was that the flagship—a large galleon, and, as its actions showed, not a very good sailer—happened to encounter, without its consort (which was a bark), the three Dutch ships. These approached the galleon, and ordered it to strike its sails for Mauricio. Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Fernando de Ayala, warder of the port at the point of Cavite (whom I had sent out in order that he might return as commander of the said ships because the person who went as commander from here was to remain in Nueva España—namely, Don Luys Fernandez de Cordova, a relative of the viceroy of that province) answered them, as a valiant cavalier and soldier, with his artillery and firearms. He continued fighting and defending himself all that day and part of the night, until under cover of its darkness and a heavy fog that settled down, pursuing their voyage, the Spaniards left the enemy with the intention of running upon the coast of an island of the strait, called Ybabao. Our Lord guided them to a port, where a ship was never known to have entered. There they anchored, and fearing that the wind with which they entered might shift to that which generally prevails in that season and with greater fury, they determined to run the said ship into the mud, and to cut away the mainmast, in order to render them less liable to drag, and to leave the port again and encounter the enemy. Accordingly, all possible haste was displayed in disembarking the men, and the silver and reals of your Majesty and of private persons, and the most valuable goods; but scarcely was that done when the storm, coming down upon the ship, drove it upon some rocks. There it foundered and sank, although in a place so shallow that but little of the ship’s cargo was lost. For they continued to take out and use many things, except the articles of luxury. Although no use could be made of the ship’s hull, as it was entirely ruined, the resultant loss is almost nothing, and inconsiderable when one thinks what it might have been, and what this event has gained in advantage and reputation for these islands, and for your Majesty’s arms herein. For, although your Majesty, thanks to God, has had excellent successes in the islands, still it has all been by superiority of ships and men; and there is nothing, according to common opinion, so fortunate as this event, considering what the enemy will have lost in all the aforesaid respects among all the nations with whom they have relations—especially with that of the Japanese, who place their honor and ground for self-praise in war. It would appear that they will not be well esteemed there, nor even pleasantly received by their creditors—with whom, as we understand here, they were indebted for about three hundred thousand ducados for their preparations and the relief of their forts, having assigned to the creditors their pay from a good prize that they were to make, which must have been this galleon.

Then, in order that everything might turn out well, our Lord guided the patache—which was coming as almiranta—without its meeting an enemy. However, from the severity of the weather, the same thing happened to them as to the flagship; but they lost no cargo, for that vessel was so small that I bought it for not more than one thousand pesos.

Although some think that those ships did not have a more satisfactory voyage because they left Acapulco April 4, in my opinion that could not have been avoided; for they reached that port late because their voyage thither was long and troublesome. Notwithstanding that they had been despatched, they would have found, when they arrived, vendavals already in these islands, as these commenced so early, as I have said. Although the viceroy wrote requesting greater haste in those despatches, yet because they are sent late from there, they also arrive late here, even if no such events happen as the above. It is almost impossible for the ships to leave here early, if the arrival of those from Nueva España is delayed, unless no opportunity be given the inhabitants to receive their share of money and letters, which is a thing that they would feel keenly.

[Marginal note: “War. What you say in these sections is reduced to three points. Firstly, the thanks that you give and should have given to our Lord for the good success of the flagship, and the same has been done here. May He be praised for all, and thus it is to be hoped, in His divine mercy, that He will be in all other events; for the just end and cause to which all is directed is His holy service and the extension of the holy Catholic faith. The second main point is of the utmost importance, and is regarding what has been written you, with the remonstrances required by the case—namely, that if the flagship and almiranta sail late, it is impossible that they can be despatched early from Nueva España; and although we have written to the latter country, giving the method that is advisable to be used in that voyage and despatch, they always excuse themselves for the late sailing of the ships by the risk of vendavals, as the violence of the weather is an unavoidable difficulty. We have also written to you that the only cause of the delay is the waiting to lade those ships with the commerce of Manila—which are detained for personal ends, by awaiting the merchandise from Japon, China, and the Orient. That is poor management; and the welfare of private persons must not have more force than that of the public. For the customs duties received on departing and returning are not at all to be considered with the great danger of bad weather, in which everything is risked—especially since the only cause for the commerce between Nueva España and those islands is not the benefit of the merchants, nor the lading of Chinese cloth, but the maintenance, succor, and payment of the military and of the ministers who assist in the service and defense of that country. If you should one year cause the ships to sail on time, those at Acapulco [los terceros] would be warned by it for the future, and would understand the diligence that they must use in their despatch. It is said—and let this serve as caution and warning to you—that the chief officials who have in charge the despatch of the flagship and almiranta are those most interested, as figure-heads for third persons, in what is laded. The third point is, that when those vessels (not only of trade, but of war) sail, and since their risk of enemies is at the departure and return (but most on the return), you are advised to take warning not to let the ships be so overladen that because of that they go ill equipped with seamen, and even worse defended. In conformity with this we have written to the viceroy of Nueva España; and have stated that it would be a less disadvantage to increase the number of ships than to overload those that are sent—to say nothing of the damage done to the hull of the ship by carrying so heavy a cargo. Also you are advised, on account of what you say in this section—since you say that the Dutch get help in boats, money, ammunition, food, and men in Xapon—that it would be well, since there is so continual communication between Japon and our government [in those islands], that you endeavor—through an embassy, or in any other way—to negotiate with any king of those of Xapon, or with the person who is the cause of that [aid to the Dutch], and tell them that those enemies are pirates, and that they violate the laws of nations and the public peace. Finally, since you have the matter in hand and know the importance of separating the Japanese and Dutch, you shall do this with such energy and skill as your prudence admits, doing all that you shall deem necessary and useful to attain that end.” In another hand: “A letter is being written to the viceroy of Nueva España, sending him a copy of his [i.e., Fajardo’s] clause, and what answer is made to it; and advising him, as here above stated, that an order has been given so that they shall endeavor to have the despatch of the flagship and almiranta of Filipinas attended to promptly and seasonably, as is necessary for their voyage. Accordingly he shall again issue orders to that effect, and advise us of what is done in this matter.”][1]

2d. I am also writing to the viceroy not to waste time and money in making unnecessary repairs on the ships, and those for which their captains and commanders do not ask; for that is of use only for those who have slaves who act as calkers and as other kinds of mechanics, in which they sometimes gain more in such works than they are worth.