Captain Estevan Rodriquez de Figueroa went to pacify it in 1596 at his own cost, with the title of governor and captain-general of the island conceded by your Majesty. But he was so unfortunate that, the first time when he set foot on land, he was killed by an Indian concealed in ambush. Captain Juan de la Xara, who was master-of-camp, continued the enterprise; but as he, like his master, died, the whole enterprise was destroyed by accidents that came upon them. Consequently, not only were the natives not pacified, but more angered and desirous of vengeance. For that reason, they began to build vessels and to make inroads among those islands during the term of Don Francisco Tello, to commit depredations. They captured many Indians and their wealth (for the latter had considerable gold) through the fault of the captains and alcaldes-mayor who were governing those islands, and were not punished for it. And although punishment is one of the two arms of justice that preserves states, there has been so great lack of it in Manila, that signal injuries have thereby resulted.
The Moros became excited by those captures, and through the exercise of war they became more skilful and daring. To such a height has their boldness reached, through the carelessness and neglect of the governors, that all those islands have been destroyed and ruined. They could very well have been restrained, but the reasons why they neglected to do that cannot be explained here, because the case in hand demands that many things be passed by; but if your Majesty cares to know, I will explain them.
Those Indians [i.e., the Moros] are so vile and cowardly that they have never engaged in close combat with the Spaniards, very few of whom have dared to resist vast multitudes; yet the Moros have inflicted signal injuries. The worst is that these last few years they have committed greater ones, so that there is no Christian or friendly Indian who is safe in his house or country. These, although Indians, set forth arguments that must have shamed your Majesty’s governors considerably; since, although the latter are so careful not only to collect their tributes, but to impose continually so many taxes, and to cause the Indians innumerable troubles, yet they do not defend them from their enemies. Consequently the Indians say, “Let us be free, and let us have arms, and we shall be able to defend ourselves, as we did before the advent of the Spaniards.” And, surely, did not the religious—especially those of the Society, who instruct nearly all those islands—entertain them with hopes and fair arguments, they would all have revolted, as some have done. I have related this to your Majesty so that you may order your governor to remedy that matter, which is so incumbent upon your Majesty’s royal conscience. But how poorly he informs your Majesty; since at the very moment when those people were destroying your churches, the governor wrote that they were all peaceful and quiet. It is very easy to conquer that island, if its inhabitants are made slaves, as I have said in special memorials.
Chapter X. Of the result obtained by the coming of the Dutch to the Filpinas Islands and the city of Manila.
The enemy learned from the Mindanao Indians, as above stated, of the death of Don Juan de Silva, whom they had intended to go to seek. They went to the island of Panay, to a port called Yloylo, with the design of building a fort there, in order to gain possession of those islands and to get the quantity of food that was stored for the relief of Terrenate. (whence the forts of Maluco are chiefly maintained), and at the same time to make themselves masters of the island. For, two years before, and during Don Juan de Silva’s term, another Dutchman had arrived at that island at a Spanish town called Arevalo, burned it, seized its provisions, made quantities of dried beef at stock farms near there, and then returned, without any one having dared to fire a shot, although there was a captain there with two hundred soldiers. Then he made a pact with the natives of the country, by which they were to render him homage.
Three or four days before the arrival of the enemy, the news reached the ears of Captain Don Diego de Quiñones, who was there with about seventy soldiers. He resolved to die there or to prevent the enemy from following out his designs. As hastily as possible, he threw up a redoubt, or small fort of fascines, stakes, and gabions, which he filled in with earth. Then having assigned his men to their positions, he awaited the enemy’s arrival. The Dutch arrived with their ten galleons and went to anchor within musket-shot of the small fort, which they began to bombard with their artillery, and with musketry to pick off those who showed themselves. But seeing that they were defending themselves, and that so great a multitude of balls could not dislodge them, they threw seven companies of infantry ashore, and assaulted the fort twice with the batteries which were free; but the infantry, getting the worst of it, had to retire. Don Diego, although shot through the thigh by a musket-ball, was encouraged; and had sent Captain Lazaro de Torres outside with forty soldiers to make an ambush. He pressed so heavily against the enemy that they had to embark hurriedly, leaving on the field and taking away many dead and badly wounded, while we suffered in dead and wounded twenty or a few more. Thereupon the enemy weighed anchor and left the port in great ignominy and sorrow. That feat of arms was of great importance as can be understood from the condition of the country and of the natives of that island and others near by. I cannot keep silent on one thing that happened through the fault of him who was governing, since my intention is to make your Majesty understand the state of that kingdom. The building of a fort in that port of Yloylo, and the sending there of six pieces of artillery and one engineer to Don Diego, had been discussed in Manila. But there was the utmost remissness and neglect in sending those pieces, for it was considered certain that if the enemy came he would manage to make himself master of the port. And although they could have been sent him one month before, they reached him one week after the opportunity was gone—when, if Don Diego had had them, he would have sunk half the enemy’s fleet. Such injury is done by the remissness and neglect of him who governs.
The enemy thought that they would make little from Don Diego, and consequently left that place, and went to anchor in the mouth of the bay of Manila. They reached an island which is situated in the middle of the entrance, called Marivelez, where a sentinel is always posted to give notice of the ships that come to the city. He made signals, and hence, as we had advices, their arrival was known. They anchored their vessels at both entrances, so that no ship could enter or leave without being seen. They captured a few provision-boats, and on some days they entered the bay with two or three ships to reconnoiter the port of Cabite, with the desire of having an extended view, and then returned. They had some communication with the Japanese, who, as arrogant and barbarous people, despised our fleet. Those people informed the Dutch that they had nothing to fear, for we were unable to prepare our fleet because of the lack of many things, so that they could be quite easy. Consequently they proceeded as would those who feared nothing.
Licentiate Andres de Alcaraz was then senior auditor, and was exercising the duties of captain-general. At several councils of war, it was discussed whether it would be proper to prepare the fleet that was in port, in order to drive the enemy away. Most were of the opinion that the fleet should go out, founding their opinion on the ignominy and taunts that the enemy flung upon the Spaniards, the reputation that we would lose among so many nations who were watching us, the need of provisions that the enemy were making them endure, and the design of the latter to await the ships from China in order to enrich themselves from the merchandise that the Chinese were bringing to Manila. Those vessels were to come by April, and, besides the general danger of depriving the community of the necessities brought to it by the Chinese, many of the inhabitants were interested in the said ships. Although this last could be obviated by sending advices to China, the captain-general refused to do it, although he should have done so, because of the harm that might ensue to your Majesty’s service, the common welfare, and the great harm that would result to the enemies.[10] For opportunity was given to the enemy to enrich themselves exceedingly with the spoils [of the Chinese], at the expense of the community; then, too, the Chinese were losing so much there by favor of their friends, since they would be ruined. The cause of that error was that, in that former year when the other Dutchman came with five vessels thinking to stay there until he pillaged the Chinese (for he bore instructions to that effect), advice was given the Chinese so that they should not come. They obeyed the advice and did not come, and as the enemy went away, the inhabitants conceived that they had signally erred, ruined the city, and deprived the royal treasury of the great sum that the duties on the merchandise brought by the Chinese would be worth. For that reason Alcaraz neglected to do that, although it was so desirable, whence so great injuries have resulted. When he who is governing heeds the murmurs that may be raised against him, and consequently neglects to take the measures that are advisable and to which he is obliged, such troubles generally follow.
Returning to the case [under consideration], almost all the city urged the preparation of the fleet, and it even came to such a pass that injunctions and protests were served on him by means of the entire ecclesiastical estate. Innumerable difficulties were represented to Licentiate Alcaraz: one that there were many repairs to make in the fleet, which had come in quite bad shape; that it even lacked considerable of its sails and rigging, and what was left was rotten; that, as no ship had come from Nueva España that year, the royal treasury was considerably in debt, and had no money with which to prepare the fleet; that for the same reason the citizens could not possibly loan what was needed; that most of the artillery was under suspicion, and it was necessary to recast it; and, above all, that if it did not succeed well the entire kingdom was about to be endangered.