9. The first battle
On arriving at the entrances of Mariveles, the ships were placed in battle array, the artillery loaded, the matches lighted and the linstocks ready, the rigging free, and other preparations made. This was done because the sentinels [on Mariveles Island] warned our men that the enemy were, with their squadron, not far from that place, in the port of Anus; and that they might expect at any moment to encounter the Dutch—although in fact the latter were not descried until the fifteenth of the said month of March. At nine o’clock in the morning of that day, our almiranta—which had pushed ahead of the flagship perhaps half a legua, and was sailing with a northwest wind—fired two cannon-shots and lowered the maintop-sail as a signal that it descried the enemy. The flagship put about, and followed her, and from the maintop they soon saw a sail in the distance, but it was impossible to overtake it; and it soon disappeared, because it was favored by a fresher wind than our ships had. After that, our galleons were left becalmed until one o’clock; and at that hour were descried from the flagship four hostile sails, which were sailing toward her aft, with an east wind. It was two hours before they reached the flagship, and in that space of time the men were stationed, the ships cleared, the posts reconnoitered, and all other arrangements made, both spiritual and temporal, required by the occasion. The almiranta fell two ship-lengths astern of the flagship, and in this position the ships awaited the enemy, in order to fight them. As soon as the enemy came near, they extended all their ships, and, without attempting to give a broadside to our flagship, passed, in line, to larboard, and the enemy’s flagship began the battle by firing a cannon. Our commander immediately commanded that response be made with two shots—one with a thirty-pound ball and a cylinder of the same weight, which tore open all their cutwater at the bow; the enemy’s ship went on in this condition, and the others continued to exchange shots with our flagship. Recognizing their own strength, the enemy tried to approach the almiranta, which they supposed was not so well armed, being a smaller ship. But they were received with equal valor and spirit on our side, our vessels firing so often and throwing so many balls that they could not be counted. The fight lasted about five hours, and the mortality and damage were so great that all the anxiety that the heretics had felt to reach our ships when they thought to conquer us was now directed to separating themselves from us. They anxiously awaited the night, which was now approaching, to make their cowardly escape, which they did with lights extinguished. But the enemy’s almiranta did not succeed in doing this in safety. It had been the most persistent in the attack upon our flagship, and remained to our leeward; it was so badly damaged that its cannon could not be fired, and hardly could it flee. Our ship was so near it that our commander had the men ready at the bow to board the Dutch ship; but the darkness of night forced us to abandon the chase, on account of the danger from the shoals which the pilots declared were in that place.
It was noticed that the enemy did not use lanterns as they had formerly done, seeking protection for their armada. Our commander ordered that they be used in our ships, and that the lights be allowed to shine very brightly, in order that the enemy might come to look for us. Our people fully intended to renew the pursuit at daybreak, to finish their defeat; but when day came our two galleons found themselves alone, and did not know what course the enemy had taken. They followed the Dutch, in the direction which they thought most probable, as far as Cape Bojeador, which is at the farthest end of this island of Manila. From there our ships returned, as the coasts were now secure, to the port of Bolinao, in order to send to this city despatches announcing the result of the battle. This was regarded as a brilliant victory, not only because of the disparity in the number of ships, but because of the little damage our side had sustained. In that battle not a man was killed, and comparatively few were wounded. It was evident that the enemy’s loss was great, although we could not then ascertain it correctly; but afterwards we learned that many had been killed and wounded, and that two of their vessels were rendered useless.
10. Second and Third Battles
Our squadron took some rest at the port of Bolinao, and while there it received orders to sail to the Embocadero and there await and escort the galleon “San Luis,” which was expected from Nueva España. Our ships set sail, and, after encountering many calms and head-winds, made port on the first of June, in the island of Ticao,[9] within sight of the Embocadero.
About this time news came to this city from the forts at Samboanga, that the enemy with ten vessels, was at that place, and it was known that they came intending to attack again the fort at Jolò, which, the previous year, they had attacked with three vessels, at the instigation and with the aid of some native insurgents. It was gallantly defended by its governor, Captain and Sargento-mayor Estevan de Ugalde y Orella (a brother of our commander-in-chief), who with the aid and succor that came to him from the forts of Samboanga under command of the governor there, Don Francisco de Atienza y Ibañes, compelled the Dutch to raise the siege, and to retreat as fugitives to their ships—our people pursuing them until they drove out the Dutch from that country and sea. For that reason the enemy returned this year with three times as great a force; but their plans were frustrated, because at that very time orders had been sent to withdraw honorably that garrison, for pressing reasons of convenience which existed therefor, in regard to his Majesty’s service. Seeing, therefore, that they had nothing to do in Jolo, and that in Samboanga our forces gave them as little opportunity to accomplish anything of importance, they undertook to push forward the completion of the other projects which they were engaged in by orders from Jacatra. As the chief of these was the one regarding the Embocadero, they made their appearance there on the twenty-second of June, when one of our sentinels reported seven ships, which were heading toward the port in which our two galleons were anchored. With gallant resolution, our commander immediately gave orders to weigh anchor and go out to meet them; but afterward, when he complied with the obligation resting on the general commanders of fleets and armies, which is on such occasions to hold a council, it was decided therein that it would be more proper to let the enemy waste [their powder], and not to engage in battle with them until the galleon should arrive from Nueva España with succor, for which they were waiting, or until it should make some other port in safety. The port in which the ships were anchored lies open to the sea, in the form of a semicircle, and is entered by a passage through which vessels can go only one after another; and this entrance was guarded by our two galleons, to prevent the heretics from entering. On the twenty-third of the said month of June, the enemy descried us with two of their ships, and fired a gun to summon the others. Our ships returned the fire with two guns, to show that it was not cowardice, but design and strategy, which made our galleons remain at anchor. On the following day, the arrogance of the enemy brought them nearer, and they very haughtily sailed in view of our two ships. The squadron was composed of seven vessels, and sixteen lanchas with their crews; they sailed down the coast of the Embocadero, and then, returning, anchored at the very mouth of our port, blockading it with their ships, stationed at convenient intervals along the entire bar, so that we could not leave the harbor. On one side of it the land formed an eminence, which, if seized by the enemy, might cause great damage to our vessels. This fact was not overlooked by the attention and vigilance of our commander; and he immediately sent ashore a hundred and fifty infantrymen, under command of Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, and Captain Gaspar Cardoso as his subordinate, to fortify that point. This was done at once, and was a very important measure; for at ten o’clock at night the enemy sent four armed lanchas to that point to reconnoiter the port. Our soldiers, who were cautious, but vigilant, allowed them to approach within gun-shot, until they were embarrassed by [the approach to] land, and gave them a volley, which caused them to retreat hurriedly, with the loss of several men who were killed. Every day, not once but often, these lanchas sallied out to reconnoiter us—their ten challenging our two vessels, which always went out against them, and always remained victorious, because, as soon as they saw our vessels approach, they always retreated toward their own ships. If our vessels pursued them, one of their ships would come forward to protect the lanchas. Thirty-one days passed in these manœuvers. One day, our lanchas having sailed out, as usual, to reconnoiter, our people saw the heads of some men who were swimming from the enemy’s ships to ours. At first it was feared that they were daring Dutchmen bent upon burning our galleons; but soon all doubt was over, for it was found that they were a negro and four of our Indians whom the enemy had captured and who were coming as fugitives to gain their freedom. They were taken aboard the flagship, where the negro was known; he gave a very clear account of the plans of Antonio Camb, who, as he said, was the commander of the Dutch fleet. He also said that other squadrons were coming to join this one in raids on these islands; that this one had brought from Jacatrá eight hundred Dutch soldiers; and that the said Dutch commander had promised to carry back to his governor the relief ship which was coming from Nueva España. He said that among the seven vessels two, which were the smallest, were fireships; that the flagship was as large as ours, or larger; that it carried forty-six pieces of excellent artillery; and, as for the other vessels, the smallest carried thirty cannon, and already they considered us as their booty.
This information was of no little importance, and threw light upon what should be done. On the twenty-first of July our commander, considering that it was now time for the ship “San Luis,” which was expected from Nueva España, to have made port in some one of the many harbors that these islands contain, decided to set sail at dawn on the twenty-fifth, the day of the glorious apostle Santiago [i.e., St. James], to cannonade the enemy in the midst of his fleet, and to challenge him to battle. In order to do this without the enemy knowing his intention beforehand, he gave orders two days previously that the anchors should be gradually raised, so that on the eve of St. James’s day each galleon should remain held by one anchor only. These arrangements having been made, the enemy, who also must have thought that it was getting late, fired a salute on the same day of St. James’s eve—the flagship firing five cannon, and the almiranta, and the vice-admiral’s ship, each two guns. The squadron weighed anchor and took the route for Manila.
Our commander was much grieved that his plans should be frustrated by the enemy, and gallantly set out in pursuit of them, determined to force them to fight, wherever he might encounter them. He regarded himself as fortunate when, on the twenty-eighth of July, he sighted two of the seven [Dutch] vessels above mentioned. When they recognized our galleons, like cowards they backed toward the land, in search of the five ships which were out of sight. During the rest of the day, and all night, our ships continued to approach them; and at daybreak on the twenty-ninth we discovered all seven of their ships together, who were coming from the windward side to look for us. At midday they halted, and again they tacked in another direction, until five o’clock in the afternoon—when our commander, unable to endure such delay, challenged them to battle by firing a cannon.
Apparently they did not wish to fight by day, but thought the night more suitable for their design, which was to send their two fireships against our galleons. At that time, the nights were very clear and calm, and the moon shone brightly. They waited, then, until sunset; and about seven o’clock, between Banton and Marinduque, they came down with an east wind ahead of our flagship, and surrounded it, the fearful multitude of their artillery filling it [with balls]. Our flagship also did its duty, responding to them as they deserved. Our almiranta followed in its wake firing the artillery at its prow, and inflicting much damage on the ships that were fighting astern of our flagship. The enemy’s flagship came up with ours, to the sound of loud clarions and trumpets, and well garnished with lanterns of various sizes, all lighted. Its sails were so trimmed as to let it go no faster than our flagship, as arrogantly as if they had already conquered us. It came so near that our men heard distinctly the noise made when our ball hit the side of the enemy’s ship. From both sides there was an incessant fire of both artillery and musketry, from the maintops, forecastles, and poops. In both the Dutch and the Spanish ships were seen heaps of cannon-balls, cylinders, and palanquins,[10] which caused great destruction of masts, yards, and rigging, and even damaged the sides of the vessels. The battle went on, as keenly and fiercely as might be expected from our persistent valor and the great strength of the enemy. At the height of the battle our flagship, undertaking to bear down upon two ships that were hard pressed, found itself entangled with their almiranta, and this was the greatest danger that had arisen, on account of the ease with which the enemy could then work havoc among our men. The brave mariners came to the rescue, cutting the ropes and separating the galleons, with great courage and promptness. Meanwhile, our artillery and musketry kept up an incessant fire on the enemy’s sides, which were unprotected—displaying as much dexterity and order in their firing as they could have done if the galleons were apart. It pleased God, through the agency of His glorious mother, that the ships should quickly separate. Then one of their fireships approached our flagship; but our artillery checked this rash boldness, hurling at the fireship terrible volleys on the starboard quarter until it came under the stern-gallery of our flagship. Then our commander gave orders to attack it with the stern-chasers, which pierced the enemy from side to side, and with such volleys of musketry that the heretics became demoralized and retired toward our almiranta, which received the fireship with a volley from ten guns at once, so opportunely that its destruction was completed; for its fireworks being thus kindled, it was sent to the bottom. Soon came the lancha from our flagship—which our commander, with military foresight, had equipped with musketeers and seamen, to hinder the fireships—and picked up a Dutchman, the only one left alive. This man informed us of the enemy’s plans, and of their signals, and said that they had another fireship—his statements entirely agreeing with those of the captives already mentioned. This fierce and stubborn battle lasted from seven o’clock in the evening until daybreak, without the loss of a single man on our flagship, and only two wounded; the almiranta did not lose over five men killed. This must be one of the most unusual records known in naval warfare; it was a favor, evident beyond doubt, from God and His mother, who protect the Catholic power in these islands, on account of its importance to the propagation of His holy faith. The damage sustained by the heretics was well understood from the care with which they began to retreat as soon as daylight came. The whole day was spent by both sides in cleaning and repairing their vessels; but the enemy continued to retreat. Although our commander gave orders to summon them again to battle, by discharging a gun, and began to bear down upon them, they made no reply.