The thorough knowledge which he had of all his officers was doubtless the reason for the wise and fortunate selection that he made in naming to his Lordship, the year before, the leaders who were best qualified for positions of authority in the armadas—through which he obtained the so glorious results which we have described, providing the fleets with all that was necessary to gain success. The rapidity with which he carried on the work was sufficient to make ready [for battle] anew the two galleons “Encarnacion” and “Rosario” in one single week, in order that they might convoy the galleon “San Diego;” they gained the third victory, which was the complement of the others that were gained the year before.
All this being known to his Lordship, as soon as the news came this year of the enemy’s armada he gave the sargento-mayor full and adequate commission to arrange and order everything as should appear best to him, in order not to delay sending aid, as occasion might demand, not only at the storehouses but in the provinces—to which he sent supplies with the promptness which the case required. Thus the islands have been freed, on land and sea, from the attacks of the enemy, and the vessels which have come to us from other lands have made port in safety—thoroughly frustrating the designs of the heretics. This was especially the case in the attack on Abucay, where the sargento-mayor sent very opportune aid of men and ammunition—so greatly to the satisfaction of the alcalde-mayor, Diego Antonio, that he wrote to him that all was done very promptly, and he was expecting to achieve some great exploit. If the alcalde had carried out this promise, as he could have done, or at least had allowed the brave Pampangos to fight, neither would the above-related defeat have occurred, nor would the enemy have obtained any results from their attack.
However, by promptly despatching General Juan de Chaves, his vigilance and skill were able to harass the heretics—much to their own cost, as it was not lack of foresight, but the little military exercise in the commander of that province, which occasioned that defeat. Finally, through the sargento-mayor’s vigilance and care, and the valor of the generals and chiefs, much has been, and we hope will be, accomplished in these islands for the success of our arms and the reputation of this military post—which is so destitute of aid, as being remote from his Majesty, whom may God protect.
Printed with permission, at Manila, in the printing-house of the Society of Jesus, in the year 1647.
[1] Murillo Velarde says (Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 138 b) that the commander of the Dutch fleet was fatally wounded in this conflict, and died a few days afterward.
[2] According to Murillo Velarde (Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 129) this was Captain Diego de Cabrera, who “apparently understood stamped paper better than war.”
[3] Santa Cruz (Hist. de Philipinas, pp. 103–105) says that the two religious captured by the Dutch were Fray Geronimo de Sotomayor Orrato and Fray Tomas Ramos; that Governor Fajardo refused to ransom them, and they were sent to Batavia; and that, having been finally liberated, they died en route to Manila. Reseña biográfica states (i, p. 426) that they were drowned in shipwreck, late in 1647 or early in 1648.
[4] This was Cornelis van der Lyn, governor-general of the Dutch possessions from April 19, 1645 to December 11, 1650. See Valentyn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, deel iv, pp. 296, 368, for sketch of his life, and portrait.
[5] For further accounts of these attacks by the Dutch, see Diaz’s Conquistas, pp. 485–495, 505–509, 511; Santa Cruz’s Hist. de Filipinas, pp. 102–105; Murillo Velarde’s Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 126–129; Concepción’s Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 113–118.