The fugitives thereupon came down in all haste and especially on the day that had been set, June 4; yet notwithstanding this, so great was the anxiety to feed on the wretched Sangleys that [some people attempted to] persuade his Lordship that the whole arrangement was a sham; that all the Sangleys were still in the field, and that they only came down from their camp on this pretext, in order to search for what they needed and to carry away the few who remained in the Parián. His Lordship, giving another day of vigilance, apparently yielded to the importunate outcries of the many who clamored for the punishment of the Sangleys—who had committed no crime except their terrified flight; and ordered the soldiers to be made ready in order that he might freely select the troops who were to go out for the campaign.
The bowmen of Master-of-camp Don Juan Macapagal had already arrived, also the 200 Pampango veteran soldiers in charge of Master-of-camp Don Francisco Lacsamana. He [i.e., his Lordship] commanded them to be mustered on June 6; and when all were expecting [that he would select] a strong battalion of Spaniards, Pampangos, Mardicas,[9] Japanese, and creoles, he left them all mocked and humiliated who had attributed to cowardice the forbearance dictated by his prudence. He set aside only the regiment of Pampangos, arquebusiers and bowmen; and committed the exploit to the Pampango master-of-camp, Don Francisco Lacsamana—leaving in the lurch those who attached so much importance to the enterprise, and who attributed his delay to fear. Unaffected by considerations of mere policy, his Lordship moved in accordance with right and the light of truth which belongs to those free from prejudice; he had carefully considered the enterprise and saw that but little [poisonous] humor remained to be corrected. He therefore chose to make it evident that his delay was not for the sake of temporizing but to show clemency; and that, able to resist no longer, he was using rigor against those who in so many days had not availed themselves of his clemency. And, to show how great was his courage and how superior he regarded his forces, he did not vouchsafe to send out Spaniards but entrusted the issue to the Pampangos.
This was information which by one act, his discretion gained with great results. He made trial of the fidelity of the Pampangos, whose commotions and recent punishments had left their fidelity uncertain; and he put them on their honor with this so honorable commission, to act then with valor and afterward with constancy. It would make them hated by the Sangleys, to oblige them to become enemies; and would give Cot-sen to understand how little importance the governor attached to the latter’s men, since he was attacking them with natives alone. He could ascertain thus what was the disposition of the Pampangos, and how much courage they had for resisting that pirate; for himself, the injury which the islands had experienced in so many disturbances of the natives gave him some confidence.
He gave them their orders—that they should march to the camp of the Sangleys without doing harm to any peaceable Sangleys whom they might encounter on the way, who should be going to the city; and when they should arrive there, giving the troops a rest, they should make the assault on the next day cutting off the heads of all [whom they should find there]. At the same time his Lordship despatched orders to the alcaldes-mayor of Bay and Bulacan—through whose provinces the Sangleys would necessarily have to disperse after they were routed—to go out with three hundred bowmen from each province to occupy the roads against them; so that wherever they should seek a route to safety they should meet destruction. The Pampangos left the city before noon; his Lordship anticipating all possible events three hours later commanded two companies of horsemen to make ready, who should set out at daybreak for the [Sangley] camp—in order that if the Pampangos met bad luck they might have sufficient protection, and could thus recover their courage and renew the attack in full assurance of victory.
The Pampangos encountered on the way many bands of Sangleys, who were coming to the Parián, and allowed these to pass them without any harm. About five o’clock in the afternoon they came in sight of the camp; and, in order not to divide the merit of the exploit with the Spaniards—who, as they knew, were to go thither at daylight—they would not wait until the daylight watch as they had planned. Without taking any rest and unarmed they closed with the Sangleys who numbered some 1,500 men; and in two assaults they routed the enemy without any loss save a captain of their nation who fell dead, and some soldiers who were wounded. The Sangleys left in their camp more than sixty dead men, and all their provisions and baggage remained in the possession of the Pampangos; the latter did not follow in pursuit, partly as the hour was now very late, partly that they might satiate themselves with the booty. But on the morning of June 7 the cavalry appeared, who, learning of the defeat, pursued the fugitives until they entered a region that was rocky and overgrown with thickets, where most of them perished—some from hunger, and many from the cruelty of the Negrillos of the mountains. Then, as the alcaldes-mayor of Bay and Bulacan attacked them with their troops, hardly a Sangley could escape who did not perish either at their hands or those of the Negrillos.
Up to the twenty-fourth of June the troops, both cavalry and infantry, remained in active service—partly to put an end to the remaining fugitives, partly to keep the retirade occupied in case of any disturbance in Manila, since it was a place near that point to which the Sangleys resorted on such occasions. After that date the troops gradually withdrew, his Lordship showing great kindness and many favors to the Pampangos. To those who had shared in this exploit he granted exemption from paying tributes; and, honoring them by the confidence which he had in their fidelity, he gave up to them on the twenty-sixth the guard-room in the palace—with which they left service well content and full of courage for greater enterprises.
Afterward, the regiments from Pangasinan and Ylocos entered Manila, brought by General Don Felipe de Ugalde. After they had been mustered in Manila, so that the Sangleys could see the force that had been provided against Cot-sen, they were ordered to return to their own country so that they could attend to the cultivation of their grainfields; for, as they were nearest to us, they could easily be summoned for an emergency. The same orders were given to the Pampangos and to the men from the provinces of Bay and Bulacan; also that they should keep the picked and trained men separate, so that these might be found ready without confusion or disturbance at the first warning.
The cavalry, a suitable number for 600 horses, were finally assembled by General Don Francisco de Figueroa whom his Lordship had honored with this command. They were divided into six companies each containing twenty-five Spaniards, the remainder being cowherds, negroes, and mulattoes—men very suitable for this service as being dextrous and inured to hardship. They were mustered in the city and along the beach in sight of the champans; and were at once divided among the posts that were most suitable—two companies in Cavite, and the rest in the environs of Tondo.
All the Sangleys in the provinces of this mainland [of Luzón] who had not taken refuge in the Parián in time were decapitated. Those who thus took refuge were confined to the point of Cavite or to the Parián of the city, so that we might keep them within range of our guns, and where they would be of advantage for whatever had to be done for the fortification of both posts and the protection of the shore. His Lordship commanded that lists be made of [the Sangleys engaged in the different] crafts, reserving as many of these as were deemed sufficient for the needs of the city and service; and he ordered that of all the rest as many as space could be found for should be shipped [to China], compelling the captains to transport them. There was one champan which took aboard 1,300 of them; they were so crowded together that they could hardly sit down; but in this the captain had no small profit, for they exacted from each one ten pesos as passage-money.
When the champans were ready to weigh anchor, his Lordship was informed that the two chief leaders of the people who had fled to the mountains had come down in the last bands. These two were infidels; one was the contractor for the slaughterhouses, named Barba, and the other a shopkeeper named [blank space in MS.]; and by the help of some of their followers they had been hidden, so that they could go away in the first champans. We had certain information that these men were among the people on shipboard, but all the efforts of the officials were frustrated by the dissimulation of the Sangleys until his Lordship resorted to direct measures, and, summoning the ship-captains, commanded them to find and surrender those two men, saying that if they did not he would order their heads to be cut off. All were terrified and within a few hours they dragged out the two culprits by the neck—one from the champan on which he had embarked; the other from a hut in which he had hidden himself. On the following day they were executed between the Parián and the city in sight of the Sangleys. They had ruled tyrannically, and with their deaths our fear passed away, having inflicted due punishment with so little bloodshed.