Appendix: Judicial Condition of the Philippines in 1842
[In addition to the following account by Mas, the student desirous of pursuing the subject will find much data in the various Guias de Filipinas. Some statistics are also presented by Montero y Vidal (Archipielago Filipino, pp. 194–203) for the years 1883–1884. Much of value and interest will also be found in the various reports of the Philippine Commission, and in the numerous pamphlets issued by the United States Government.]
Justice is administered by means of an Audiencia, which has the title of royal, and resides in Manila, being composed of one regent, and five judges; by means of alcaldes-mayor who govern the provinces; and by the gobernadorcillo whom each village has and who is equivalent to our alcalde de monterilla.[1] The latter proceeds in criminal cases to the formation of a verbal process, and tries civil causes up to the value of two tailes of gold or 44 pesos fuertes.
The royal Audiencia is a court without appeal in Filipinas. The alcaldes-mayor cannot terminate by their own action civil questions that have to do with a sum of greater value than 100 pesos fuertes, or impose any corporal punishment without the approval of the Audiencia, and then only imprisonment for one week. But they are judges of the first instance for every kind of litigious or criminal cases.
In order that one may obtain the post of alcalde-mayor, it is not necessary that he should have studied law. Hence, the greater part of the heads of the provinces are laymen in that respect. Generally those posts are given to military men. Consequently, this is the origin that for every process which is prosecuted in a lawsuit or cause, the alcalde has to have recourse to an assessor, in order to obtain the opinion of that one on which to base his action. But since the advocates reside in Manila, the records have to make at times many trips from the province to the capital. From this results the inconvenience of delay, the liability of theft, or the destruction of the mail. For, in the many rivers that must be crossed, the papers become so wet that they are useless (as happened with several letters of a post which was received in the chief city of a province when I was there, the envelopes of which it was impossible for us to read), and the malicious extraction in order to obscure the course of justice. The defect of this system can only be understood if one reflect that the various provinces of the colony are not situated on a continent, but in various islands, and that by reason of the periodic winds and the hurricanes which prevail in this region, the capital very often finds itself without news of some provinces for two or three months, and of that of Marianas for whole years.
It appears that what we have said ought to be sufficient to show the necessity of radical reforms in this department, but, unfortunately, there are other more grave reasons for such reform. The alcaldes-mayor are permitted to engage in business.[2] The author of Les Estrits des Lois[3] said many years ago that the worst of governments is the commercial government; and surely, for those who have studied the science of government, all comment on this point is superfluous. The alcalde who is permitted to engage in business naturally tries, if possible, to monopolize it by all means in his power. This vice of the system leads some greedy men to the greatest excesses, which later are attributed to all alcaldes in general. Upon my arrival at Manila, I asked a very respectable Spaniard who had been in the country for many years about what happens in the provinces. He replied to me: “You know that the alcaldeships are reported to be worth 40,000 or 50,000 duros, and he who seeks one of those posts very earnestly has no other object or hope than to acquire a capital in the six years for which the government confers them. Before going to his province, he borrows 8,000 or 10,000 duros from one of the charitable funds at such and such a per cent. Besides, he has to pay an interest to those who act as bondsmen for him, both to the government for the royal treasury, and to the charitable funds which supply him with money. When he arrives at his province he acts according to conditions ruling in that province, for not all provinces are alike in their productions and circumstances. He generally establishes a supply store, and, consequently, from that moment, any other storekeeper is his rival and enemy. If such storekeeper has a creditor whom he tries to hurry up and goes to the alcalde, he gets no protection. If any theft happens to him the same thing more or less occurs; for, although the alcalde orders efforts made to ascertain the thief, far from taking those measures earnestly, he is secretly glad of the losses of his rivals, and it has even been asserted that there are cases in which the alcalde himself has been the instigator of the crime. Who is your enemy? That of your trade. But does the alcalde himself sell the goods? Sometimes he sells and measures them, at other times he keeps an agent in the store; the most usual thing is, if he is married, for his wife to take charge of the expense, especially of those goods of any value. But his greatest gain consists in making advances of money at the time of the sowing, the period when the Indians need it and try to get it at any cost, for their negligence and their vices do not allow them to foresee such a case and be prepared for it. For example: a farmer signs a paper for the alcalde which obliges him to deliver at harvest time ten measures of sugar, which are worth at least two and one-half duros, and he himself receives only one and one-half, consequently, by that operation alone of advancing money, the alcalde-mayor sometimes gains 40 per cent. But what generally happens is that the Indian is so short sighted and is so indifferent to the future that he signs any burdensome obligation provided he gets some money, and he only takes account of what they give him without thinking of what they are going to get from him. For example, the alcalde gives him 60 duros as an advance for forty measures of sugar at the harvest time. The harvest is bad and he can only give 20. In such case the reckoning is after the following fashion: ‘The sugar has been sold for 4 duros, and hence 20 measures will amount to 80 duros. You cannot pay them to me, consequently they can just as well remain as an advance for the coming year at one and one-half.’ In consequence of that the farmer signs a paper by which he enters under obligation to deliver 53 measures at the next harvest. Harvest time comes, and if it is bad, he only presents, say, 13. Therefore, 40 measures at 4 duros amount to 160 duros of debt, and at one and one-half make 108 measures for the following year. In this way the man keeps on adding more and more until all his goods are at the disposal of the alcalde. Besides, there are innumerable other vexations to which he must subject himself. For instance: he has to deliver to the alcalde 100 cabans of rice; when he presents them the alcalde measures them out with a larger measure than that used in the market. Hence, in reality, the alcalde exacts from him more than he is bound to pay. The same thing happens with indigo. For, a discussion arises as to whether the indigo is, or is not, very damp, and some libras must be taken off for waste; or, whether it is of poorer quality than the Indian promised, and so on.” “But surely it must needs be that it is fitting to take money advanced, since there is one who seeks it, and it is worth more for a farmer to cultivate his land in this way than that he leave it without cultivation for lack of the necessary capital. In regard to the tyrannies which the alcalde tries to commit, it seems to me that they might be avoided by the countryman borrowing the money from a private person who is not in position to annoy him.” “That is all very well thought out, but I will tell you what happens. The Indian borrows money very easily, but it is very difficult to get him to pay it, and he generally avoids doing so, if possible. If a private person lends him money and does not collect it when due, he has to go to the alcalde in order that the latter may force payment. The latter either does so coldly, or pays no attention to the whole matter, since his intention is that such private persons take warning and never again lend to anyone; for, it is evident, that if many come to speculate in this kind of business, the alcalde will soon be shut out, or at least will have to submit himself to the general rules. Consequently, the result is that capitalists draw back from him, saying, and very rightly, that it is only fitting for the alcaldes who possess the means to cause themselves to be paid when a debt is due. The alcalde, then, remains master of the field, and monopolizes this department at his pleasure, for he who needs funds has to go to him, for there are very few who enjoy enough credit to get them elsewhere. Many other advantages also favor the alcalde. The parish priests aid him, and many times take charge of the division of the money of the alcalde in their villages, for they know that that is the sure means of keeping on good terms with him, and obtaining the measures which depend on his will in the matters of their villages. The gobernadorcillos and officials of justice are other instruments of which the alcalde makes use to apportion and collect his funds.” “Why is it that these do not occupy themselves rather in their affairs than in those of the alcalde?” “The alcalde can always, whenever he wishes, make trouble for the gobernadorcillo by making him go to the chief village with innumerable pretexts, and by various other methods which it would take a long time to enumerate, and which it is very easy to conceive. Besides, it is important for the alcalde to keep the gobernadorcillo satisfied. Suppose now, that a road has to be built, or a bamboo bridge, or any other work for which the people of the village who have to do it, according to their obligation called polos and services, are summoned. As some of them are busy in their fields or other business, they wish to be free from such a burden, and they give the gobernadorcillo two or three reals and he excuses them on the ground of sickness. A party of troops or a Spaniard passes by and asks for some beast of burden, or an aid in food. That is also an occasion for the gobernadorcillo to get even with those whom he dislikes and obtain part of his demands; for some give him presents in order that he may not give the beasts of burden, while others do not receive the pay for that food. During the days of tiangui or village fairs, such and such a sum is exacted for each post in the market place. In general there are some men of service called bantayanes who are a kind of sentinel placed at the entrances of villages. Many of them also pay to be excused from that burden when their turn comes or when they are told that it comes. In general he has ten or twelve men called honos, manbaras, etc., given to him, who are exempt from polos and services, and they serve the ayuntamiento to send papers, conduct prisoners, etc., and the gobernadorcillo gives them permission so that they may cultivate their lands, by collecting from them a contribution.” “But it seems to me that the gobernadorcillo will have to give account, if not for all, at least for many of the taxes that you have mentioned.” “It ought to be so, and in fact, some enter into the communal treasury, but they are the fewest and those connected with the legal matters, for of the others there is nothing to be said. For example: I have seen an order enclosing a fine as a punishment on the gobernadorcillo for some fault or misdeed that he had committed. He assembles the cabezas de barangai; the whole sum is apportioned among the people of the village. The amount of the fine is collected and the gobernadorcillo has still something left for his maintenance and revelling.” “Why do they not complain to the alcalde?” “Because, sir, of just what I told you. The alcalde needs the gobernadorcillo so that he may use him in his business, and for all such things he is a very far-sighted man. Besides, the alcalde who tries to investigate those snares of the tribunals (ayuntamientos) will lose his senses without deriving any benefit from it. He does not know the language. As interpreter he has the clerk, who is an Indian, and the entangler-in-chief, and almost always in accord with the Indian magnates.” “If the clerk is a bad man, will he not be hated?” “I do not say that he is beloved, but some fear him, and others are his accomplices. Since the alcalde is, in reality, a business man, he naturally takes more interest in his business than in that of other people, and leaves all court matters in charge of the clerk, who comes to be the arbiter in that matter, and here is where the latter reaps his harvest. One of the members of the tribunal (ayuntamiento) steals, or causes to be stolen from some man his buffalo. The man finds out where it is; he complains to the gobernadorcillo; they begin to take measures; at last the animal is returned to him, but if it is worth five duros, they make him pay ten duros in expenses so that the man either considers his beast as lost and the thieves keep it, or the latter get from him twice as much as it is worth. Hence, if I were to tell all that passes in this wise, my story would be very long. One of the things which they are accustomed to do is to let the prisoners go out of the prison for several days without the government knowing it. I have seen that done this very year of 1841 in the province of—-, in regard to some prisoners whom the alcalde-mayor believed to be in prison; but they were working on the estate of the clerk, and one of those prisoners had committed very serious crimes.” “But why do not the curas remedy all that? I have heard it said that they are really the ones who govern the villages.” “In reality, when the curas take that matter upon themselves, those abuses are remedied, at least in great measure, for they know the language well, and every one in their village knows the truth, if the cura wishes to ascertain it. That is what happened in former times. And also at that time the communal funds were deposited in the convent, and [thus] many tricks and tyrannies were avoided. But for some years the governors who have come from España have desired that the parish priests should keep to their houses and say mass and preach and not meddle with the temporal government; without taking heed that in a whole province there is no other Spaniard who governs than the alcalde-mayor himself, who generally comes from Europa and goes without reflection to take his charge without any knowledge whatever of the country or knowing even a single word of its language. Consequently, many religious, in order to avoid trouble, see and keep still, and allow everything to take what course God wills. This is one of the chief causes of the disorders of the villages, and of the increase of crime.” “Now tell me, do the alcaldes make all the wealth that they are accustomed to acquire with the kind of trade which you have explained to me?” “They have many means of hunting [buscar] for that is the technical expression used in this country, but those means vary according to circumstances. In some provinces great efforts are made to obtain posts as gobernadorcillos and officials of justice, and that department generally is worth a good sum annually. Those are things which the clerk or secretary manages. In the province of—- while Don—- was alcalde-mayor, that gentleman was in collusion with the manager of the wine monopoly and they practiced the following. The harvesters came with their wine, but they were told that it was impossible to receive it. There was a conflict within themselves, for they had to return to their village. Then they were told that if they wished to deposit the wine they would put it in certain jars which had been provided in the storehouse, by paying such and such a rent until the administration could introduce it. The harvesters, who needed the money, thereupon sold the wine to the agents of the alcalde, at any price at all in order to return to their homes. Finally, as he who had come to be an alcalde, has had no other object than to acquire wealth, every matter which does not contribute to that object, such as the making of a bridge, or a road, the prosecution of evil doers, or any occupation purely of government or justice, distracts and troubles him. On the contrary every means of attaining his end appears to him fitting and good. This method of thought is a little more or less in the minds of all; and thus you observe that no one says here, not even excluding the religious, who are those who know the country best, ‘I have such or such reasons for gaining this suit,’ but, ‘I have so many thousand pesos to gain the suit.’ But to tell the truth, it is not to be wondered at that the alcaldes-mayor work without much scruple. In the space of six years they have to pay their passage from and to España; to satisfy the high interest on the money which they have borrowed; to acquit themselves of the amount which their alcaldeship has often cost them; and besides they make their fortunes. Not more or less is done in Turquia.”
In the same way as this good man talked, the majority talk. The faults and vices of some are attributed and laid to all. It is certain that this system is fatal, for governors of such sort must be essentially interested in turning down the attempt of private speculators, and to frighten away instead the attraction of capital. That has, as a natural consequence, the increased interest on money which so endangers production, and, consequently, exportation and the encouragement of the islands. But not less fatal is the opinion that the authorities of Manila themselves are fed on such abuses. Complaints are continually presented against the alcalde, at times very captious and filled with falsehood and absurdity. The Audiencia and office of the captain-general receive those complaints kindly and very easily dictate measures humiliating for the alcalde, and impose fines on him, of which a copy is given to the complaining parties. Rarely is it that one leaves his alcaldeship without having paid many fines. The Filipinos make the greatest ado, as is natural, over those triumphs against authority, but authority loses decorum and moral force. All this comes from the bad system established, for, since the governor from the moment that he becomes a merchant, must be a bad governor and a usurer and tyrant, the government of Manila is predisposed against his acts, and declares itself the protector of the Filipinos. In this way one evil is remedied by a worse. The supreme authority instead of supporting and sustaining the subordinate government punishes and degrades it. Illusion, respect, and fear vanish. It is believed that that severity against those who rule is advantageous in making our yoke loved, and that the natives will say, “The government is kind for it punishes the alcaldes,” while it would be better for them to say, “The government is kind because it gives us good alcaldes.”
Shortly after my arrival in the islands, being at the feast of Cavite, distant four hours from the capital, I wished to go thither on horseback, but all who heard of it dissuaded me from the idea, asserting that I was about to commit a rash act. Another time when I was coming from Laguna, on passing through Montinlupa, the manager of the estate of that name was so greatly alarmed that he wished to accompany me with his servants until we came near the city, and in fact I learned soon that I was running a great danger on that road, and that shortly before a Spanish sergeant had been murdered on it. Then I was very much surprised to find that it was dangerous to go near the capital without an escort, but later I have been much more surprised to see that in provinces distant from the capital a complete security is enjoyed. In order to show the condition of the criminality of the island we shall present the following data drawn from the clerk’s office of the Audiencia.
Criminal causes sentenced in the Audiencia of Filipinas between the years 1831–1837