[p. 571 et seq.] So frequent were these losses that Don Juan Grau de Monfalcón, procurator in Madrid for the city of Manila, in a curious treatise which he presented to the royal and supreme Council of Indias makes a computation of them for sixty-five years, and finds that only fifteen of these were exempt from such misfortunes. But they were almost continual in this calamitous term of office, although Don Sabiniano met all these disasters with serenity and steadfastness, and apparently with cheerfulness; this he did through prudence, in order that the sorrow [of the people] might not extend to despair.... But no art could long veil so much misery. The more warlike provinces of these islands ascertained the unusual events which had caused our forces to be so small, however much prudence dissimulated these; and they sought to avail themselves of so good an opportunity, deeming it a suitable time for recovering their liberty, a gift of priceless value. Subjugation is always a matter of coercion, and this in turn needs other and greater violence that it may repress this natural inclination; and in natives whose condition makes them abject this desire increases more vehemently. They did not realize that the Spaniards had freed them from the harsh captivity of their barbarous tyranny, transferring them to an honorable subjection which made them more the masters of their liberty, because these rebels had not endured that tyranny. They came to know our lack of strength, and from that passed to despising it; they presumed more on their own strength than they ought, and rashly went on, without consideration, looking only at the end and forgetting the means [to attain it].
The first who decided to try fortune by experience were the Pampangos, the most warlike and prominent people of these islands, and near to Manila. [Their rebellion was] all the worse because these people had been trained in the military art in our own schools, in the fortified posts of Ternate, Zamboanga, Joló, Caraga, and other places, where their valor was well known; but it needed the shelter of ours, and therefore it was said that one Spaniard and three Pampangos were equal to four Spaniards. This people were harassed by repeated requisitions for cutting timber, for the continual building of galleons, and they received no satisfaction for many purchases of rice for which the money was due them. The province of Pampanga is in our charge in spiritual matters, and there we have sixteen convents and doctrinas, among the best which there are in this field of Christianity. The convents are: Bacolor (which is the head of them all), Baua, Lubao, Sexmoan, Betis, Porac, Mexico, Minalin, Macabebe, Apalit, Candava, Arayat, Magalang, Gapan, and Santor. Then in the hill-country beyond these places we have large missions of warlike peoples who are being converted to our holy faith, called Italones, Abacaes, and Calonasas, and Ituríes, and various others, who have been induced to settle in several villages. These are continually increasing, and we expect in God that they will attain much growth if it is not interfered with by subjecting them to tribute and personal services, of which they have a great horror. These are the hindrances which delay the conversions of these numerous peoples, some heathens and others recently converted; for among these tribes of low condition the appetite for liberty increases with great force—spurred on by the envy which is aroused in them at seeing the freedom which is enjoyed by other peoples as being more noble or vigorous, or because the cultivation of their mental powers procures it for them. Many peoples were conquered because they did not know their own strength until they found that they were subdued. In these islands we find by experience that in no province do the people live more peaceably than in those which received us with hostility, and in none have they attempted a change [of rule] except in those which invited us with [offers of peace]—and the most pusillanimous of these have most strenuously endeavored to throw off the curb of subjection. Those immediately surrounding Manila were the last to do so, because in them our hands had seized the reins. Some were intimidated by the contact with our power, and others were restrained by a sense of honor, seeing themselves admitted to the privilege of [carrying] our arms, and honored by the confidence which up to this time had been merited by the fidelity of the Pampango people. On this occasion they were the first who broke away, because even our esteem could not remove from them their mean nature.
The Pampangos, determined to break the bonds of subjection and throw off the yoke of the Spanish dominion, carried out that resolve with valor. In their opinion, they had just cause for this action, in the timber-cutting that was being done in their forests, in the place called Malasinglo and Bocoboco; they alleged as their first pretexts some acts of oppression committed on them by Juan de Corteberria,[31] chief overseer of the said timber-cutting—which lasted eight months, a thousand Pampango men assisting in the work, levied in the usual repartimientos. In the early days of October, 1660, the loyal population of Pampanga made their first rebellious movements—the people being exasperated against the overseers of the wood-cutting, who had been ill-treating them. Setting fire to the huts in which they had lodged, they declared, by the light of the fierce flames, their rash intention; and as leader of their revolt they appointed an Indian chief named Don Francisco Maniago, a native of the village of Mexico, who was master-of-camp for his Majesty. The post of chaplain for the said wood-cutting was filled by a religious of the Order of St. Dominic, named father Fray Pedro Camacho;[32] he made all possible efforts to pacify them, but all in vain. On this account he decided to come to Manila and report everything to Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, to whom he represented that he did not regard as prudent the idea that he must proceed with rigor against the ringleaders of the sedition. At the same time when the information of that fire reached Don Sabiniano there came also advices from the alcalde-mayor of the province of Pampanga, Don Juan Gomez de Payva, that he had exhausted all measures for restoring security. In consequence of this, Don Sabiniano again despatched father Fray Pedro Camacho with a message for those people, that he on his part would assure them of pardon and relief if they would return and resume their work. Don Sabiniano rightly guessed the burden imposed by the circumstances of the occasion; for the revolt was in one of the most warlike nations of these islands, and the garrison at Manila was drained of soldiers by the continual reënforcements sent to Maluco, and by the aid [furnished from it] to the relief that had come from Nueva España. This had been brought in the patache “San Damián,” in charge of Admiral Don Manuel de Alarcon, sent by the viceroy, Conde de Baños, and had been secreted on the coast opposite the port of Lampón; and therefore Don Sabiniano, although he put on an appearance of assurance, in reality experienced the utmost anxiety. He wrote secretly to our father Fray José Duque, who was then prior of the convent of Sexmoán, and to father Fray Isidro Rodríguez, prior of the convent of Baua, to ask that they, with the authority which they had acquired during so many years as ministers in that province, would endeavor to persuade those people to return to their obedience. Those religious labored to that end, with all the greater eagerness on account of what was risked in the revolt; but the only effect was to set spurs to the boldness of the insurgents, who attributed to the governor’s fear of them the peaceable measures that were proposed. The result showed this, for, tearing off at once the mask which they had worn, they presented themselves, armed, in the village of Lubao, under the command of the above-named Don Francisco Maniago, although many of the mutineers had gone to their own villages. Others gathered in a strong force in the village of Bacolor, closing the mouths of the rivers with stakes, in order to hinder the commerce of that province with Manila; and they wrote letters to the provinces of Pangasinán and Ilocos, urging them to follow their example and throw off the heavy yoke of the Spaniards, and to kill all of the latter who might be in those provinces. Information of this reached Don Sabiniano at night, and, without stopping to wait for daylight, he embarked in company with the twelve military leaders, and set out at daybreak for the village of Macabebe.
The governor took with him, besides his alférez Francisco de Roa and others, the following recently-created officers: Generals Don Felipe de Ugalde, Juan Enrique de Miranda, and Don Juan de Vergara; Admirals Don Diego Cortés and Don Felix de Herrera Robachero; Sargentos-mayor Don Pedro Tamayo, Martín Sanchez de la Cuesta, and Pedro Lozano; Captains Don Pedro Carmona, Don Juan de Morales, Don José Cascos de Quirós, Don Alonso de las Casas, Don Alonso de Quirante, Don Gabriel Niño de Guzmán, Juan Diaz Yañez, Silvestre de Rodas; and for his secretaries General Sebastian Rayo Doria and Juan de Padilla. The government notaries were Captain Juan Fijado and Captain Simón de Fuentes; and the aides-de-camp, Pedro Méndez de Sotomayor and Francisco Iglesias. With this detachment, who numbered at most 300 men, in eleven small champans and with four pieces of artillery, each carrying four-libra balls, Don Sabiniano began his journey; and he reached the village of Macabebe at six in the afternoon of the following day, having been delayed a long time by removing the stakes with which the insurgents had closed the entrances to the rivers. All the islands were imperiled by this war, since all the tribes were on the watch for its outcome—which, in case it were adverse to the Spaniards, would give to this [Pampango] people a great reputation, and to the rest so much confidence that not one of them would forego the opportunity for their fancied relief. A very hazardous corrective was that of resort to arms; for, whether [we remained] victorious or conquered, in any event the Spanish power would be left diminished and weakened. For, although only 200 infantry had been taken from the Manila garrison for this expedition, it was necessary that the deficiency should be made good by the ecclesiastical estate in that city—which was left in charge of Master-of-camp Don Domingo de Ugarte. As we have stated, Don Sabiniano arrived at Macabebe, a rich and populous village in that province; he came opportunely, as on that very day the people in that village had made ready their vessels and weapons to go to join the mutineers. Those of Macabebe received the governor with affected friendliness, the presence of the Spaniards so well armed having taken away their courage; and all their anxiety was to hide the tokens of their disorder. The governor was lodged in the house of Don Francisco Salonga, as it was the best in the village, although the convent was offered to him by father Fray Enrique de Castro (who was its prior), observant of the civilities requisite to guests so honored, although unexpected. He also endeavored that all the women should be kept out of sight, so that the wanton conduct of the soldiers might not give any occasion for new dangers; and Don Sabiniano gave the men strict orders, with heavy penalties for the transgressors, so that they might not render the Spanish name more odious through fault of ours. This unexpected arrival diverted the course of the resolution made by the Macabebe natives, and therefore they revoked it, dissimulating with affected protestations of loyalty; but those who were found with arms did not neglect to hasten to hide their weapons, in order that their recent inconstancy might not render suspicious, by so manifest a token of rebellion, the loyalty which their respectful behavior pledged. Don Sabiniano well understood it all, but, feigning affable manners, and careful to show confidence, he made a virtue of the occasion. The obsequious solicitude of the Macabebe men rendered doubtful the resolution of the others, who in the village of Apalit took away the despatches that had been given to Don Agustin Pimintuan, the intended ambassador of the rebels for conspiring in the provinces of Pangasinán and Ilocos, their near neighbors—fearing that he who bore them would place them in the hands of the governor, that he might with the names of the conspirators blot his own from the list of the traitors. All were afraid at the so close proximity of the governor, imagining that they already had upon them the entire Spanish power, which discouraged the former ardor of all. It was worth much to Don Sabiniano that he had made sure of one individual, named Don Juan Macapagal, a chief of the village of Arayat, since it was necessary to pass through there to reach the province of Pangasinán; and, this being assured, we were free from the danger that the Indians of the two provinces might unite their forces. Don Sabiniano wrote a letter to Don Juan Macapagal, in which, assuming his fidelity to his Majesty, he ordered that chief to come to confer with him at Macabebe. Don Juan Macapagal immediately left his home, and, passing through the camp of the rebels, went to assure Don Sabiniano of his obedience, offering his life in the service of his Majesty. Don Sabiniano treated him with great kindness, accompanied with promises [of reward], with which the fidelity of Macapagal was easily secured. Don Sabiniano made him master-of-camp of his people, and, as pledges for his constancy, asked him for his children and wife, on the pretext of assuring in Manila their safety from the rebels—thus mingling his confidence with measures of suspicion, but veiling this with pretexts of protection. The Pampango, quite contrary to what was believed, accepted this so harsh condition; but when once the resolution of a nobleman has been declared, any alteration brings in greater distrust. Don Sabiniano sent Captain Nicolás Coronado with twenty-five soldiers, ordering him to construct a fort in Arayat, as was afterward done, and also to hasten the coming of the wife and children of Macapagal. [The mutineers send an envoy to Macapagal to secure his support, but he kills the envoy and compels his followers to turn back.] The chiefs and leaders of the mutiny were already finding that their followers had grown remiss, and the courage of those who supported them had diminished, and they despaired of the constancy of these. They were still more depressed by the news which they received of the extreme honors which the governor paid to the wife and children of Don Juan Macapagal—sending them to Manila with great distinction, and entrusting them to the gallant care of General Don Francisco de Figueroa, the alcalde-mayor of Tondo—and of their entertainment and kind reception, in which they were served with a display beyond what their condition and nature required. At this demonstration the envy of the rebels guessed the superior position to which Macapagal’s fidelity would raise him, above all those of his people. By the honors paid to this chief, the governor allured the ambition of the rest, and introduced discord in order to separate by craft that body which ambition held together. Our religious availed themselves of this opportunity, and like thieves in the house, since they understood the natural disposition of the Indians, they neglected no occasion to persuade some and allure others with promises—an endeavor which, although the governor had not charged it upon them, they prosecuted with great earnestness, on account of the great risk which was incurred by the Christian church in such disturbances. All the ministers of that province accomplished much, especially the father definitors Fray José Duque and Isidro Rodríguez, also Fray Jose de Vega (the prior of Guagua), Fray Andres de Salazar, and Fray Enrique de Castro, and others—whom those natives reverenced, as their abilities deserved. Soon the results of these efforts became available; for the chief promoters of the rebellion, finding the courage of their followers so weakened, began to search for paths for their own safety. They despatched our father Fray Andrés de Salazar with a letter to Don Sabiniano, in which they alleged, as an excuse for the disturbance, the arrears of pay which were due them for their services, together with the loans of their commodities which had been taken to Manila for the support of the paid soldiers; they entreated his Lordship to command that these dues be paid, so that their people, delighted with this payment and therefore laying aside their fury, could be disarmed by their chiefs and sent back to their homes. Don Sabiniano allowed himself to be influenced by the arguments which they placed before him, considering that the anger of the people is not easily quenched by resorting to another force, and so he agreed to grant them a part of what they demanded; and they were pacified by his paying some part of the debt—although the authorities must contract fresh obligations to do this, as the royal treasury was exhausted on account of not having received even the interest on the money which had been landed at a place one hundred leguas from Manila. In view of this, the governor offered them 14,000 pesos, on account of what was due them, which amounted to more than 200,000 pesos. For this he sent his secretary, General Sebastian Rayo Doria, to authorize two other commanders, Generals Juan Enriquez de Miranda and Felipe de Ugalde, to establish peace and publish the general amnesty for the past which he granted to all that people. When the writ of amnesty was drawn up, and the words were repeated to them in their own language by the amanuensis (who was one of the Pampango tribe), in reading to them these words, “In the name of his Majesty I grant pardon, for the sake of avoiding all bloodshed,” he altered the sense of this sentence, telling them the very opposite [of what it said]. Then, slipping out of the conference, he went among the crowd to tell them [this false statement], and from this resulted fresh disturbances. The effect of this was the detention of our generals as prisoners, and the choice of a new head, or master-of-camp, for the mutiny, Don Nicolás Mañago—who immediately issued a proclamation that on the following day all should be on hand, with their arms ready for use. That day’s interval gave opportunity for the labors of our religious, who did everything in their power to undeceive the people and dispel the error under which they were laboring—making known to them the true meaning of the terms of the amnesty; and thereupon those timid creatures began to grow calm. Nor was the governor negligent meanwhile; for, as soon as he was informed of the condition of the generals whom he had sent, he commanded that the drums should immediately call the troops to arms, and they should move against the rebels—for his very desire for peace had made him keep his forces in readiness and at their stations; but, as a good officer, he knew that the most suitable means of securing an honorable peace is to make more formidable the preparations for war. The troops—[as yet] in peace, but well armed—were encamped very near the rebels; they traveled through the open country, as is possible in the settled part of that province (which is all rivers and bayous), conveyed in boats that were adequate for their numbers. The mountain route was taken by Captain Don Luis de Aduna and Don Sebastian Villareal with the cavalry, in order to embarrass the enemy’s retreat, and deprive them of their accustomed refuge, which is the mountains. Don Juan Macapagal, who with loyal ardor took the field in his Majesty’s service, was sent to his own village of Arayat, that he might, in conjunction with the people from the farms about that village, prevent the enemy from using that route to go to Pangasinán—a matter which caused the governor much anxiety, as those natives are warlike. On the same day, at sunset, Don Sabiniano met his secretary, General Sebastian Rayo Doria, whom the rebels had sent back with entreaties, that he might delay the just wrath of his Lordship, and they accompanied these with submissions and offerings. Most of our success in quieting this second revolt is due to the many efforts made by the fathers who were ministers in that province, not only with the common rebels but with their leaders—offering to the former amnesty, and to the latter rewards, on the part of his Majesty. With only the near approach of the army, its march being directed toward the rebels, and with no other writ of requisition than its fearful reputation which threatened them with chastisement, affairs assumed another guise; and those who before looked at any plan for peace with distrust now solicited it, having lost their expectation of any more favorable arrangement.
As Don Sabiniano understood the desire which led them, he spoke to them with affected severity, and despatched a courier to give them orders that they must immediately send him the two generals (whom they had detained to secure a settlement favorable to their fears), with their weapons, furnishings, and clothing, without a thread being missing. He said that if any one of these articles should be lacking, a duel would be enacted in honor of it, which would be satisfied [only] with the fire from weapons that were already intolerable in the hands [of the soldiers]; and that, if their valor could ill endure the bridle of clemency so ill recompensed, if they did not accept it he would now proceed to exchange it for severity. At the distance of a few paces the courier met Generals Sebastian Rayo Doria and Juan Enriquez de Miranda, whom the rebels had set at liberty through the persuasions of the father ministers. As their fear was not quieted by any means whatever, they made haste to the safety which imagination suddenly presented to them; they feared that the illegal detention of the Spanish generals would add fire to our indignation. The governor, seeing our honor thus satisfied, and discretion triumphant, turned to the alcalde-mayor of that province, and told him that on the following day he must surrender to him its chief men. Those who were present looked at one another in surprise, wondering that the governor should not know the condition in which the chiefs still were, united and armed in so great a number that their submission was not to be expected at a mere summons. It is a fact that in the excuses which the chiefs had given for their resolution they cast the blame on the villages, attempting thus to confuse their own malice with [that of] the multitude. Accordingly, it was expedient that the governor should follow their usage, by making them think that he had not fathomed their purposes, so that they could not guess that he was dissimulating. The result corresponded to the ingenious scheme, skill obtaining what guile had concealed. For the chiefs, seeing that their excuses were so readily received, attempted to carry them further; and therefore at one o’clock at night they arrived, with all the people of the revolted villages, in eighty vessels, at the village of Macabebe. The military officers felt anxiety, not only at their coming at a suspicious hour of the night, but at the multitude, a great impediment to negotiations for peace; in view of this the governor deferred until the next day giving them audience. But as there are cases in which confidence is safer than mistrust, especially when one is intent on giving security to distrust and calming fear, the governor commanded that all should enter his presence, and that our armada and troops should, without any outcry or demonstration of anxiety, watch very attentively the actions of these people. It was the effect of fear, which is with difficulty laid aside when conscience itself accuses, that these rebels came armed to capitulate, concealing by the submission that they tendered the cunning with which they acted. Many things have to be tolerated in an enemy when there are certain expectations of gaining one’s end. The governor overlooked their being armed, and granted what they asked; and his efforts succeeded in allaying the fears of those people. He commanded the chiefs to make the people go away, so that they might resume their industries; and, in testimony of the fidelity which their authority guaranteed in the common people, he ordered them to continue sending the men necessary for the timber-cutting for the galleons, the only source of life for these islands. The multitude gladly took their departure, and the governor, although he was victorious and armed, did not choose for that time that the chiefs who had incited the rebellion should make amends for their fault; instead, he granted them all that they asked, and afterward talked with them quite familiarly—endeavoring to convince their minds, although he saw their strength conquered at his feet. To the chiefs who were humble and repentant he said: “I cannot deny that in demanding the payment of what was due you, you asked what was just; but as little can you deny that you did not ask it in a just way. Not only because, when the manner in which you act must be so costly both to yourselves and to the king, he who solicits justice by such means is the aggressor, more cruel than is justice, perverting peace and introducing war (in which this virtue [of justice] is always lacking), but because in war all the wealth that one had intended to increase is destroyed; and it is more cruel than kind to employ, in order to show anger at the wealth which recognizes a debt, what will cause the ruin of property and lives. Who has ever grown rich through war? and who has not lost in war that which in peace he held secure? Many are they who with the wealth that they possessed had not yet been able to attain the success at which they aimed; and those who had attained it were subjected to a lamentable misery—the villages burned, the countries depopulated, and their customs trampled under foot. It is not, then, justice to bring in general ruin as the price of so limited an expectation, which vanishes through the very means by which it is secured. If this mode [of obtaining what you demand] is so harsh, your purpose is no less unjust. You make an arrogant demand upon the king, when you know that he cannot pay you; and in order to expedite it you oblige him to incur greater expenses, thus doing more to render his efforts impossible. Ignorance may serve other provinces as an excuse, but not you, whom our continual intercourse with you has rendered more intelligent. You know very well the scantiness of the relief which has come from Nueva España during my term of office; and you are not ignorant of the unavoidable expenses which this government is obliged to meet for the preservation of the country, which much exceed the aid received. One galleon alone demands half of the money, even when the wages and other expenses are reduced to what is absolutely necessary. The [expenses of the] fortified posts, which are paid for by all the native peoples, amount to five thousand [pesos]; while the aid [sent], averaging one year with another, hardly amounts to 5,000 pesos. The king has no other wealth than that of his vassals, and his own is in the amount that their defense requires, when the necessities of these islands are so great; for with you [Indians] he does not avail himself of this right, which is that of all kings and commonwealths. Many times have I written to his Majesty to ask that he regulate this matter; and from his clemency I am expecting the relief for which I have been so anxious, which I am sure he will furnish. Must his Majesty, since the peace of these islands and the maintenance of the faith in them are all so costly to his royal treasury, make up the omissions of the officials in Nueva España? Your patience would be greater than ours if your gratitude more quickly recognized our kindness in employing our forces for your defense, and our arms in watching over your peace. I ask you to consider, not the powerful enemies who oppose our forces, but the wretched condition in which you formerly lived without our arms—in continual wars, within even your own homes, one village against another; without liberty having two leguas of extent, and being waylaid by your own tyranny, without any right save might, or further justification than deeds of violence. Let me remind you of the way in which you lived; your huts were the taller trees, like bird’s nests,[33] your sleep was disturbed by the nightmare of anxiety, because danger confronted you, so near that it was no farther away than from one house to another. Cast your eyes on the Spanish infantry; consider the hardships which they endure on sea and land; and see what support they receive, only the fourth part of the wages assigned them, which still does not bring them to the condition which among your people is misery. See how they give to the king, as a loan, each year much more than this, and of much more importance—since they deprive themselves of life itself, without any opportunity remaining to them for supplying their needs. They serve as if they were slaves, and would be fortunate if we paid them as we do our servants. And finally, consider that the king taxes himself in enormous sums, for your safety and defense alone, while the rest of the nations in the world obey him and pay him tribute. They all enrich his treasures, yet he willingly lavishes these here, for you people. Understand these reasons, and you will see how little cause you had for so ungrateful a resolution. Your natives must be blamed for the ungrateful way in which they have acted, since they have shown no patience with a nation which has endured so much for you, or for its king, who has so generously spent his money for your welfare. Notify them also that I acknowledge the docility with which they have returned to their obedience, more in humility than in distrust; for I would grieve much if we came to blows, since if fighting began I could not restrain the soldiers from compelling me, against my wishes, to behold your entire ruin. You know very well that there is no people in these islands who can resist their valor in the field, and no hope could render you secure [from them]. The open country [would be] clear of obstructions, the ground level, the villages wide open; and you would have to flee to the mountains, wherever necessity guided you lost creatures, or else the ashes of your villages must be mingled with those of your bodies. I have had a greater struggle with the Spanish valor, to check its ardor, than even with your thoughtlessness [in trying] to bring you to a full knowledge of your error. Now let your behavior blot out that error, since I have forgiven you for what is past; and beware that you do not repeat your faithless ingratitude.”
Thus did the discreet and sagacious governor, Don Sabiniano, destroy the infernal seed that discord had sowed in the hearts of the Pampangos, alluring them with [the idea of] liberty, more potent than the apple of gold flung down at the marriage of Peleus and Thetis....
Don Sabiniano received all their excuses with his usual affability, and in the name of his Majesty restored them to his favor and to the condition of faithful vassals, and gave them in due form, in writing, a general amnesty. He commanded the alcalde-mayor to distribute to them with exactness and care the sum which he had, by contracting new obligations, brought for their relief; and to order them in testimony of their repentance—now that he had brought them back to their former fidelity, and as this outbreak had been [the result of] their anxiety, in grief rather than in rebellion—to repair, as before, with men to the wood-cutting for the construction of the ships. They asked from him time to repair their houses, and permission to attend to their cultivation of the soil; and this was granted, to their satisfaction. The affairs of the province were immediately put in order. The governor commanded Juan Camacho de la Peña to retire, and left as governor of the province General Don Francisco de Atienza y Báñez—an old soldier whose valor was equal to the wisdom gained by his experiences in the governments which he had held in these islands, in Caraga and Zamboanga—with orders that he must exercise vigilance in regard to every indication of disturbance, and by prudent action and kind treatment constrain the natives to prefer their own tranquillity.
He sent a despatch by Adjutant Francisco Amaya, accompanied by seven soldiers, to the province of Pangasinán, to notify the alcalde-mayor, named Francisco Gómez Pulido, of the outcome in Pampanga, in order that he might with this example be on the alert in his own province. Don Sabiniano also ordered him to communicate this information to the alcaldes-mayor of Ilocos (Don Alonso de Peralta) and of Cagayán, and warn them to keep watch on the movements of the natives, and to endeavor that the submission of the Pampangos should confirm the others in their tranquillity. Nor was the governor content with this activity only; but he sent a sealed letter to the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment in Manila, Francisco Pedro de Quirós, with orders that he should deliver it, in a well-equipped champan with twelve soldiers, to a thoroughly reliable person; and that the latter, when two leguas beyond Mariveles, should open the letter, and execute the orders that he should find therein. These were, that he should take the route to Pangasinán, and deliver the letters which he had sent to the alcalde-mayor, in which he warned him by the events in Pampanga of the danger which he had cause to suspect in the province which was in his charge, and of the watchful care that he must exercise over the actions of the natives therein; and that if any Pampangos should be dispersed through his villages—and he regarded it as certain that such had been sent, in order to form conspiracies among those natives—he should by suitable plans arrest them and send them to Manila. Having made these arrangements, the governor returned to the capital, taking in his company Don Francisco Mañago, under pretext of employing him in the office of master-of-camp for those of his tribe in that city. Under the pretext of honoring this chief, he cloaked his anxiety to remove from the sight of the Pampangos the man to whom all eyes were directed on account of his authority and power, and from whom, it was understood, their resolution took new breath; for, if their regard for peace grew weak, his prestige and authority might not be lacking for seditions—although this alone was not the sole incentive which moved them, since it was accompanied by the influence of José Celis, a native of that province, who was incited by the laws that he had learned, which had been taught to him by the auditor Don Francisco Samaniego y Cuesta, under whom he had served. At the same time he carried with him others of the more guilty, whom he attracted with the hope of greater rewards; there was no discussion of other modes of satisfaction, as the occasion did not allow them.
After the return of the governor to Manila, affairs were so skilfully arranged that the Pampangos themselves demanded that two garrisons be placed in their province, as necessary to their security—one in Lubao, to free themselves from the invasions which in that direction they are continually suffering from the blacks of the hill-country; and the other in Arayat, as a precaution against the fears which arise from the Pangasinans—and that these should be in charge of officers thoroughly satisfactory to the governor. This, the very thing that the governor desired, was quickly agreed to, and he stationed in Arayat Captain Nicolás Coronado, and in Baras (which is Lubao) Captain Juan Giménez de Escolástica, soldiers of great valor. This step was of great importance on account of the commotions (which will be considered further on) in the provinces of Pangasinán and Ilocos, the results of which were so lamentable that up to this day they have not ceased to arouse grief. Very different were they from the events in Pampanga, for in the latter province there was not experienced any death, or ravaging of churches, or burning of villages, but merely threats of disobedience to their chiefs; but in the other provinces, all these things occurred, and many of each kind.
The alcalde-mayor, Francisco Gómez Pulido, replied to the governor’s letter that the natives in his province maintained remarkable peace, and that the alcalde-mayor of Ilocos, Don Alonso Peralta, had made the same report to him; and with this the anxiety that was felt in regard to those provinces was partly dissipated. But his vigilance was deceived; for in a fortnight from that time, in the village of Malunguey in the province of Pangasinán, from some slight cause was raised a sedition which compelled the alcalde-mayor to hasten out with the soldiers whom the governor had sent him in the champan. Those first disturbances were quieted, more because the fruit of rebellion was not yet matured than because other endeavors were made [by the Spaniards]. The alcalde-mayor was more easily satisfied than he should have been with the dissembled tranquillity, and sent a report of the whole affair to Manila. However much the ashes of dissimulation hid the fire, it did not fail to make its presence known, by the smoke that it sent forth, or by the flames which arose at every breath of wind. One is wont in such case to curb caution, even though he has not yet the wood ready for keeping up the fire of his strength; but if one is sure of safety without having turned over the ashes, a fire that cannot be checked will leap upon him in his sleep.