II
[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde, Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeeded by Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés, Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde, Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal, Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]
Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.
After the disaster to Admiral Morales, the Guimbanos of the villages of Paran were very arrogant and haughty, so that, however much they were invited, with assurance of peace and pardon, to lay down their arms before those of our king, and to restore the Spanish weapons that they were keeping, they paid no heed to it. Seeing this, Sargento-mayor Don Augustin de Çepeda, the better to justify the expedition that he intended to make against them, sent word to them through other Guimbanos who were our friends, that they must restore the arms that they had taken from the Spaniards, and that if they did not restore these he would wage war against them. To this they replied that those arms were converted into lances, and that nothing would be given up to the Spaniards, whether Don Agustin marched against them or not. The captain and sargento-mayor received this reply on Tuesday, December 29, and on Wednesday, the thirtieth of the same month, he determined to make a daylight attack on them with the utmost secrecy. Accordingly, at four in the afternoon, almost all the soldiers made their confessions, and the sargento-mayor exhorted them to rouse all their courage, as brave soldiers, since they were fighting for both the majesties [i.e., the divine and the royal], and they had the sure protection of the mother of God, our Lady of Good Success. Then they set out from the hill of Jolo with only twenty-five Spaniards and three officers, [Cepeda’s lieutenants being] Adjutant Diego de los Reyes and Alférez Gaspar de Chaves; and twenty-two Pampangos and Cagaians, with their officers, also ten or fifteen servants with their pikes and shields. Of this infantry the captain formed three divisions, giving to each one its own watchword—to the first one, “Jesus be with all;” to the second, “Our Lady of Good Success;” to the third, “Saint Ignatius”—and each division was ordered to render aid according to its watchword, and as the enemy should sound the call to arms. With this order, they began their march, and proceeded until nightfall, when they marched in single file, since the road and the darkness gave no opportunity for doing otherwise. They passed rivers, ravines, marshes, and miry places, until they arrived at a village of a Guimbano chief named Ulisten, near which they heard coughing in the houses; and [they moved] so cautiously that they were not perceived. The sargento-mayor did not choose to enter this village, not only because the chief had showed his friendship for the Spaniards, but because his only intention was to punish the people of Paran, who had merited this by their acts in the past and by the haughty spirit that they showed. For the same reason, he would not enter another village near this one, belonging to another chief, named Sambali—who, if it were not for the purpose that the commander had in mind, deserved to lose his head for his rebellious disposition in not being friendly to the Spaniards. From the hill to these two villages may be a journey of about two leguas and a half; the road is very bad, and of the sort that has been described, [passing through] marshes and rough places; and, with the darkness of a moonlight night, to go among trees, thickets, and tangled briers was intolerable and full of difficulty. Not less wearisome was the road which they still must take to reach the people and village of Paran, and even more difficult: but neither the one nor the other could weaken or diminish the tenacity, spirit, and valor which not only the captain but his soldiers displayed. They traveled all night in this way until a little before daybreak, when they mistook the road, and took another, which did not lead to the village where they meant to go; but God chose that the people of that very village should serve as guides [to the Spaniards], by furnishing them light—for on account of quieting some infants who were crying, they kindled lights in the houses. The sargento-mayor ordered them to march toward that place, where they arrived at daybreak; and there they remained about half an hour, waiting for the dawn to brighten so that they might break the countersign[1] and make the daylight attack [dar el albasso] on the said village, which they did. For when it became light, and the day was brightening, they broke the watchword, which was “St. Ignatius;” and the division to which that belonged made the first attack on the houses, jointly with the vanguard, which went ahead to reconnoiter. All the forces united to make this assault on the houses, and to break through the defenses of the village and enter, all in order, with lighted matches and to sound of drums, as they did. In their houses this occasioned a great tumult; some were slain by musket-balls, some by lance-thrusts; others escaped naked, fleeing without thought of their kindred or their possessions, abandoning their weapons and whatever they had; others, finally, were burned to death in their houses, to which our men set fire—the natives remaining in them either through fear, or that they might not fall into our hands and be slain by our lances. They hid themselves, therefore, for the greater protection—only to have their houses, and their granaries of rice, and their bodies burned [here], and finally their souls in hell. Besides this, their cultivated fields were laid waste, set out with all the plants that they rear—bananas, sugar-cane, and other plants which furnish them with food; and our men did the same with these, destroying and burning everything. This done they looked about, scanning the country in all directions, and saw an impregnable height; and when the commander understood that this was (as it proved to be) the citadel of the enemies, he gave the order to march thither. They proceeded by a path or trail so narrow that they were obliged to ascend in single file; and when they reached the top of the said hill they found a plateau, more spacious than that of our hill of Jolo, on which were houses, some fortified and some small ones. The former were full of provisions and contained some Guimbanos. These, seeing our men and recognizing them as enemies, immediately abandoned the houses and took to flight, throwing themselves headlong from the heights. Our men entered the place, and burned the houses with the rice and other things contained in them; and they laid waste the fields and destroyed what had been planted in them, as they had done in the villages before ascending the hill. Our men were occasioned no little anxiety by their failure, after this exploit, to find the road by which to leave the hill; for, as it had in every direction precipices and rugged heights, they had great difficulty and hardship in getting away from the hill, on account of not being able to strike the path by which they had entered. But finally the Blessed Virgin who hitherto had been our Lady of Success, chose to show also that she was our Lady of Good Success—which she did by enabling our men to depart in safety from the hill. For the alférez, going to make a hasty reconnoissance with four arquebusiers, and some servants armed with pikes and shields, saw [traces of men’s] work among the trees that covered the hill; and, upon reaching the place, ascertained that there was a path by which he could descend. Notifying the troops of this, they went down the hill by this path, and thus returned to the houses that they had burned, all marching in regular order. They approached the seashore through a level field, passing near the harbor where the natives had slain Admiral Morales; and, as they advanced through the open country, they encountered four Guimbano Indians, shouting [or grimacing?—haciendo carracheo], who came from a grove that was growing on the said seashore. When our men tried to get near them, these Indians took to their heels, retreating toward the grove—where, it was understood, they had an ambuscade; and as it was now eleven o’clock, the sargento-mayor did not think it best to delay [his return] longer. Accordingly, they marched in the same order, and to the sound of drums, toward the fortification that stood on the seashore, going through fields and mangrove thickets, and along beaches and pools of water, another two leguas and a half, until they reached the harbor where they had provided some boats. In these the sargento-mayor and all his troops embarked, and returned to these forts, with great satisfaction and rejoicing at so complete a success, without losing one of our men, or encountering any danger. Many salvos were fired from the boats in which they came, and from the forts, in honor of their protectors, Jesus, Mary, and Ignatius.
From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterward the people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take to flight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”]
[Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishment on the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]
The Joloans remained at peace, as thoroughly chastised as were the Mindanaos, curbing their haughty arrogance, and repressing their hatred in consideration of the advantages of the time. Among the agreements for the peace, they accepted one that a fort for the Spaniards should be erected at their harbor-bar; this was maintained with many difficulties and little advantage, unless from the pearl-fishery, which yielded many and valuable pearls.[2] The island of Joló abounds in these, so that on the Dutch hydrographical maps they have given it the name “Island of Pearls,” on account of the many fine pearls which the Joloans sent in those years to Nueva Batavia by ambassadors from their king, asking their alliance, and aid against the Spaniards. The Dutch granted them protection, those valuable gifts arousing in them greater desires for profit—although afterward the first aid that they furnished the Joloans cost them very dear. But in this year of 1641 the Joloans had a fortunate opportunity for recouping themselves for past expenses, with a mass of amber[3] as large as an ox’s body, which the sea cast up on their shores, which yielded them great profits, and increased the reputation of their island. This sort of find is usually very frequent in those islands, since they are beaten by many currents which flow from the archipelago; and thus goes drifting on the waves what the sea hurls from its abysses, along with other debris, under the fury of the wind—this so precious substance, whether it be the excrement or vomit of whales, or a reaba which the sea produces in its depths. But in Joló it is apt to be more often found, because those islands are scattered and their coasts prolonged for many leguas opposite many currents and channel-mouths. And for this reason some amber is usually found in Capul, an island beaten by so many currents—as the ships which come on the return from Nueva España know by experience—and also in Guiguan and on the beaches of Antique. Near Punta de Naso the sea cast up, in the year 1650, an enormous piece of amber, although it had not the fine quality and excellence of that which comes from Japón. (Diaz’s Conquistas, p. 447.)
[For several years after Corcuera’s expedition against the Mindanaos (1637), various military operations were conducted in that island by the Spanish forces, notably under Pedro de Almonte. Corralat and other Moro chiefs were sufficiently reduced to render them nominally peaceful; but they formed various plots and conspiracies against the Spaniards, and, on the other hand, these availed themselves of the jealousies and personal interests of the Mindanao chiefs to separate them and neutralize their efforts. The foolish arrogance of a Spanish officer, Matías de Marmolejo, caused an attack on his detachment by Corralat and Manaquior; all the Spaniards save Marmolejo and six others were slain (June 1, 1642), including the Jesuit Bartolomé Sánchez, and the survivors were captured by Corralat. But when Corcuera heard of this encounter he was so angry that he ordered Marmolejo to be ransomed and afterwards to be beheaded in the plaza at Zamboanga, for disobedience to his orders. He also ordered that the fort at La Sabanilla be demolished, and the men there be sent to punish Corralat, which was done. That chief, to revenge himself, intrigued with the people of Basilan to secure possession of the Spanish fort there; but its little garrison defended it against the Moro fleet until aid could be sent them from Zamboanga. As soon as Diego Fajardo became governor of the Philippines in Corcuera’s place, he endeavored to secure peace in Mindanao, and finally (June 24, 1645) a treaty of peace was signed by Corralat and his leading chiefs, and Francisco de Atienza and the Jesuit Alejandro López. This treaty settled questions of mutual alliance, of boundaries of possessions, of trade, of ransom of captives, and of freedom for the ministrations of Jesuit missionaries. Christian captives in Corralat’s domain should be ransomed at the following rates; “for men and women, in the prime of life, and in good health, each forty pesos; for those who were more youthful, thirty pesos; for aged and sick persons, twenty pesos; for children at the breast, ten pesos.” In this very year Salicala, son of the king of Joló, had gone to Batavia to seek aid from the Dutch; the latter sent some armed vessels, which cannonaded the Spanish fort at Joló for three days, but finally were obliged to depart without having accomplished anything. This occurrence increased Fajardo’s anxiety in regard to the cost and danger incurred in attempting to maintain three forts in Joló; and he sent orders to Atienza, commandant at Zamboanga, to withdraw the garrisons from Joló and demolish those forts—an embarrassing command, since both Joloans and Dutch were then making raids among the northern islands. Both Fajardo and Atienza relied on the Jesuit Alejandro Lopez to bring about the pacification of both the Mindanaos and the Joloans, a task which he accomplished so successfully that on April 14, 1646, a treaty was signed, by Atienza and Lopez,[4] with Raya Bongso of Joló (the same who, with his wife Tuambaloca, was conquered by Corcuera’s troops in 1638) and the envoys of Corralat. Combés gives the full text of both this and the former treaty. A Dutch fleet attempted to make a landing near Zamboanga, but were repulsed by the Spaniards with much loss. Corralat and Moncay came to hostilities, and the former implored the aid of the Spaniards; Atienza sent an armed force to succor Corralat, and Moncay fled. Salicala of Joló and Panguian Cachilo of Guimba undertook (1648) to raid the Visayan Islands; but the latter was attacked and slain by a Spanish squadron, which so intimidated Salicala that he hastened back to Joló. Meanwhile, a notable event occurred in Mindanao, the conversion of Corralat’s military commander, Ugbu, to the Christian faith—which of course tended to strengthen the ties between Corralat and the Spaniards; and Ugbu afterward rendered them efficient service in the Palapag insurrection, which caused his death. Salicala died (1649) and his parents, Bongso and Tuambaloca, were thus able to maintain the peace which they had established with the Spaniards; that queen afterward left Joló, retiring to Basilan. Moncay also died, soon afterward, and was succeeded in Buhayen by Balatamay, a Manobo chief who had married Moncay’s daughter; he joined Corralat in alliance with the Spaniards. In January, 1649, Pedro Duran de Monforte went with an armed fleet to northeastern Borneo, to punish its people for aiding the Joloans in their raids; the Spaniards plundered several villages, burned three hundred caracoas, and carried away two hundred captives. The expedition was accompanied by Jesuits, who afterward opened successful missions in Borneo. The insurrection of 1649–50 spread to Joló and Mindanao, but was quelled by the Spaniards (see Vol. XXXVIII). (Combés, Hist. Mindanao, col. 269–348, 425–498; Murillo Velarde, Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 149–153. Cf. Concepción, Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 205–281; Montero y Vidal, Hist. piratería, i, pp. 182–189, 212–231.)]