But what of the sovereign which is necessary for preventing check, in order that they may not occur with such them in time; or that will establish some sort of facility.
But what can this be? I suppose that the politicians will plan the matter much better; but I say in the Lord that I do not find any more convenient way than to establish at this very time an ordinance which, with the royal authority, shall serve to prevent in time the principal difficulties, those which bring on the rest.
Here, my father, the governor takes away and establishes, gives, commands, unmakes and makes, more despotically than does the king himself; and more, in himself he would join in one the royal and the pontifical authority. Royal decrees are not sufficient; for either he hides them, or he does not fulfil them as he ought. The Audiencia does not serve [as a check] on him, for he suppresses and he establishes it, when and how he pleases; nor do other bodies, whether chapters or [religious] communities, whether military or civil; for he does the same thing [with them]. And never do there lack pretexts for doing thus, even though such bodies are appointed by the king; and with the pretext that account of the matter has already been rendered to Madrid, what he has begun remains permanently done, or else he proceeds to change it, as seems good to him.
Assuming this, [it would be best] to maintain here a council, which would be stable and permanent, and to whom, as being supreme, all the decrees and despatches of the king should come addressed, the council distributing these as might be required. No failure in the entire fulfilment of the despatches and decrees of the king should be allowed, save with the agreement of this council; and the governor should not be authorized to appoint or remove officials, or hinder them in the performance of their duties, whether civil or military; they should be appointed by the king, as now are the chief and principal ones, the auditors and fiscal. For the citizens there should be six or eight perpetual regidors, from whom should be elected, according to custom, their alcaldes-in-ordinary. [The king should also appoint] the royal officials who belong to the royal treasury; and, of military officers, the two wardens of the castle in this city and that at Cavite de la Punta, the master-of-camp of the Manila garrison, the sargento-mayor of the plaza, and the lieutenant-general or the general of the artillery. Even if the cause were, in the opinion of the governor, so pressing and evident that he demanded the arrest or suspension of any one of these whom I have mentioned, without waiting for the decision from Madrid, he should not do so without giving account to the said council, or without its consent; and if the case were so urgent that it should be necessary to arrest any one of those persons before giving account to the said council, such account should be furnished immediately afterward—by the governor, or, if he cannot do it, by the fiscal of his Majesty; and, if neither of them do it, the president of the said council, when he learns of the facts (in whatever manner he may obtain such knowledge), shall demand that he be given the motive and cause for the decision reached with the official who is imprisoned or banished, or deprived of the exercise of his office, in order that his council, when informed of the case, may take action. If the decision of the council is contrary to the resolution made by the governor, the official shall continue in the exercise of his functions until the final decision shall come from Madrid. And if perchance the governor disobey this rule, and do not render account of the motive and cause which has influenced him to take that course with the officer whom he is treating as a criminal, the president of the council, with its advice, is authorized to replace, and shall do so, the said official in the exercise of his office. In this particular, all the other officials of the king, and his soldiers, must obey this president, and not the governor, under such penalties as his Majesty shall see fit to impose upon them.
Item: If any one of these persons appointed by the king fail to act, by either death or any other accident, another person shall not be appointed in his place by the governor alone, but he shall do so jointly with the auditors and military officers above mentioned, if the ad interim appointment is to a military post; and if it is municipal, the electors shall be the governor, the auditors, and the other regidors. If the appointment is that of a royal treasury official, [he shall be chosen] by the remaining members of that body, with the governor and the auditors—among whom I include, for all the elections, the fiscal of his Majesty—and the person who receives the most votes shall be chosen; and in case the votes are divided among two or more, the lot shall decide. He who is thus elected shall remain as a substitute in the vacant post until the king shall appoint a proprietary incumbent, and shall possess the same privileges as the others have, besides that of continuing under the protection of the said royal council.
As for those who might compose this council, I cannot find any who would be better—in order that it might be durable, and most free from prejudice; and that its proceedings might be most prudent and reasonable, judicious and learned—than the following: for president, the archbishop of Manila, and in his absence the dean of the holy cathedral church of Manila; for its members, the dean, in case he is not president—and, if he act in that post, in his place shall come in the senior prebend, by vote of those in the council; and besides these, the doctoral prebend of the same church, and the rectors and prefects (or the regents) of the two universities, Santo Domingo and that of the Society, or those who shall take the place of all these. Those who occupy the chairs of Institutes[7] and laws in the university (which have been recently established) shall not have place in this council, for I do not know whether they will be permanent; and because, even if they are so, these professors must be included in the number of those who are under the protection of the said council, as being officials appointed by the king and subjects of the government here. The decision of the members of this council must go out in the name of the whole body, and will be that which shall receive the most votes from the six councilors; and in case of disagreement among them the decision will be that to which their president shall agree, out of those proposed in the council—each one of these councilors giving his opinion in writing, which opinion must be a decisive vote, and not merely consultory.
And because the chief mate [capitan maestre] of the galleon is the one who has charge of the royal mails, it would seem desirable, in order to make sure that this official conducts himself with entire fidelity in surrendering them to the said council, that he who is chosen for that post shall [not] be selected altogether by the governor, but must be approved by the council, as protector of the royal decrees and officials of Filipinas, which is the sole employment that the said council will have. Thus that official, once he is chosen and approved, must remain under the protection and jurisdiction of the said council until he has fulfilled his commission.
And because this council will remain entirely free from the possibility of being disturbed by the governor, and because the most scandalous controversies which have occurred in these islands have proceeded from the abuse of the royal prerogatives, the governor with the Audiencia seeking by force to deprive the archbishop and the ecclesiastical judges of the secular revenues—for sometimes they overstep the bounds in the essential part, and in other cases exceed the limits immoderately in their mode of procedure—it would be expedient and even necessary for his Majesty to forbid them to do so, and deprive them of authority to enforce that. They should be allowed only to ask for it, and, having given information of it to his Majesty, await his royal decision in order that that may be accomplished, in reality and in the mode of procedure, which always will be just and reasonable, and carried out to the letter, as his Majesty shall ordain for the service of God and for his own.
In this manner my poor mind has planned, having considered these matters in the Lord, in order that some means may be employed to make up for the distance [from Madrid], and to place some check on the despotic sway which, on account of the distance, the governors of these islands possess; for, as I said above, not only do they act more despotically than could the king and the pope if those rulers were at the same time united in one being, but also they are the whole [government] and all the offices, since every one must do and does only what the governor desires, with reference to the offices which the king entrusts to him.
It is clear that, for the object that is desired, that which will contribute most of all is the judicious choice of the governor and the other officials, [who should be] worthy, upright, unprejudiced, disinterested, having the fear of God, and zealous for His honor and the service of the king—as well as for their own honor, which is established by this very effort. But qui sunt hi, et laudavimus eos?[8] I see it, forsooth. On this I will only say that the governor in any case should be a soldier, honorable and experienced, to whom the government is given on account of his merits; and not one who may be a merchant or trader. Still less should he be one who has secured the post of governor with money, and not with merits. [In order to secure] for the other officials men worthy by their merits, fitted for their positions, having the fear of Cod, and honorable, an important means, without doubt, is care in their selection.