[24] This proceeding took place at midnight on August 3, and the number arrested was 217 persons: these included Alimudin’s four sons, his brother and sister, four of his daughters, five brothers-in-law, a son-in-law; a Mahometan jaddí (“the second rank in that sect, equivalent to a bishop”) and five panditas; also two prominent chiefs, one hundred and sixty of the sultan’s vassals, and thirty-two concubines and female servants. (Montero y Vidal, Hist. de piratería, i, p. 298.) Cf. Concepción, xii, pp. 288, 289. [↑]
[25] Alimudin and his household arrived as prisoners at Manila in September, 1751. Soon afterward the Manila government declared war, with fire and sword, against the Joloans and all those Moro peoples who aided them; permitting the enslavement of all who should be captured, whether men, women or children; and giving all their property and possessions to their captors, free from all royal dues or imposts. See copy of this proclamation in Montero y Vidal’s Hist. de piratería, appendix, pp. 29–31. Concepción (xii, p. 344) regards this declaration of war as unjust; he adds that the Joloan captive princes, whose arrest was incited by ambition and greed, were so unfortunate as to lose their protector, Bishop Arrechedera, by death (November 12, 1751). In the same month died also Bishop Arevalo, of Nueva Caceres. [↑]
[26] Here, as most often elsewhere, “captives” are synonymous with “slaves.” Montero y Vidal (Hist. de piratería, i, p. 299) protests against this permission to enslave the Moros, as being contrary to the provisions of the laws of the Indias, which forbid slavery in Philipinas. [↑]
[27] Concepción says (xii, pp. 345–352) that the master-of-camp in command of the fleet (who was Antonio Ramón de Abad y Monterde) was undecided whether to attack Joló, but was persuaded to do so by the Jesuits, who told him that the very sight of the Spanish squadron would ensure the surrender of the Joloans. The attack was made at the beginning of June, 1752, and was unsuccessful; Abad was angry at the Jesuits, who had led him into this difficulty, and quarreled with them. They retorted by accusing him to the governor, of conduct (in modern phrase) “unworthy of an officer and a gentleman”—that is, of neglect of official duty, mismanagement of the campaign, unnecessary sacrifice of his men’s lives, and licentious behavior at Zamboanga. This was believed, until Abad was reported much more favorably by other officers of his fleet. See full account of his residencia (ut supra, xiii, pp. 36–85), in which he was acquitted from the charges made against him, but sentenced to pay the costs of the residencia. [↑]
[28] These hostilities broke out in 1752, and for several years scourged the unfortunate Visayans. Concepción records many of these attacks in considerable detail (Hist. de Philipinas, xiii, pp. 5–36); the missions of the Recollects, as also those of the Jesuits in Mindanao (except those under the shelter of the fort at Zamboanga) were the frontier outposts most exposed to the pirates, and it is these missions that Concepción chiefly mentions. The fort at Iligan, Mindanao, was besieged by two thousand Moros for two months; but a Spanish fleet was sent from Cebú, which obliged the enemy to raise the siege, after a great loss of men. This defense was conducted by the Jesuit in charge there, Father José Ducós, whose father had been an officer in the Spanish army; and this same priest rendered valiant service in other Moro raids in that region. Tagoloan and Yponan, in the province of Cagayan, Mindanao were besieged by the Moros; but the mountain Indians were called down to their aid by the Jesuit missionaries, and compelled the enemy to retreat. In Caraga, Surigao was attacked, and the Christian inhabitants, with their two Recollect missionaries, were compelled to take flight and seek refuge in the mountains; they were hunted there for weeks by the enemy—one of the priests being finally captured and taken to Lanao—all this time, enduring terrible hardships and suffering, which caused the other (Fray Roque de Santa Monica) to become hopelessly insane; he was afterward brought to Manila, but died there in a demented condition. “The district of Surigao, rich through its famous gold-mines, and now in most wretched condition,” was devastated and ruined. The enemy did the same in the island of Siargao, where the Recollect missionary, Fray Joseph de la Virgen de el Niño Perdido, was slain while endeavoring to lead his followers against the pirates. Nearly all the population—of Surigao, more than 2,000 souls; of Siargao, more than 1,600—were either slain or carried away captive. The district of Butuan was laid waste and some two hundred captives seized; the little military post at Linao, up the river, alone escaped, mainly through the difficulty of ascending the stream. The Moros attacked the island of Camiguin, which was so bravely defended by its natives that the pirates were repulsed—especially by “one of the villages, which consisted of people of Moro origin from the Lake of Malanao, from which they had withdrawn on account of domestic dissensions, and settled in this island. They are of excellent disposition, very good Christians, courageous, and have an irreconcilable hatred for those enemies.” Here they were led by their Recollect priest, Fray Marcelinc de el Espiritu Santo, “a robust native of La Mancha,” who with them fought so valiantly that the enemy could not make a landing. Romblon had so good a fort that it could repel the foe; Ticao was so poorly defended that the people, with their missionary, Fray Manuel de Santa Cathalina, could only take to flight—the priest being afterward captured, and finally ransomed for eight hundred pesos. In several places the missionaries were either slain or captured by the pirates; and these raids were extended, the boldness of the enemy increasing, even to the coasts of Luzón, in Batangas and Zambales. The government took what precautions it could, but these amounted to little save in the vicinity of Manila, Cebú, and Zamboanga; military and naval forces, and supplies of all sorts, were deficient, and there was much official apathy and corruption. [↑]
[29] “This unfortunate attempt cost the treasury 36,976 pesos, and a galley that was seized by the Moros” (Montero y Vidal, Hist. de piratería, i, p. 301). [↑]
[30] “In Manila the indignation against the disloyal Ali-Mudin knew no bounds. All clamored for the punishment of so ignoble a race, sorrowfully recalling the fact that the amount expended in courting him and in the expenses of his sojourn there was more than 20,000 pesos, without counting the 6,000 pesos and the military supplies sent to establish the Jesuits in Joló” (ut supra, p. 299). Later, the authorities at Manila hardly knew what to do with Alimudin; he would probably have been put to death, but it was feared that the Moros would retaliate by slaughtering their Christian captives, who numbered some 10,000. Fatima procured the return (in the summer of 1753) of fifty-one Christian captives, and negotiations were made for peace between Manila and Joló; and in June, 1754, Bantilan surrendered sixty-eight more captives, and a Spanish galley and champan. Faveau, who had carried on a brilliant campaign against the pirates with his little squadron, made a favorable report to the governor of the good intentions of both Bantilan and Alimudin; and stated that the return of the latter to Joló was desired by his subjects, and that Bantilan was willing to resign in his favor. Arandía sent most of the Joloan prisoners back to that island, retaining the sultan and his eldest son as hostages until the full accomplishment of the treaty; they remained there until the capture of the city by the English (1762), who afterward restored them to Joló (see VOL. XLIX). Ferrando (iv, pp. 541–543) considers that Alimudin was unjustly suspected and ill-treated, and defends him from accusations of disloyalty to the Spaniards and to the Christian religion. [↑]
[31] “The Sultanship in Sooloo is hereditary, but the government mixed. About fifteen Datoos, who may be called the nobility, make the greater part of the legislature. Their title is hereditary to the eldest son, and they sit in council with the Sultan. The Sultan has two votes in this assembly, and each Datoo has one. The heir-apparent (who, when I was there, was Datoo Alamoodine) if he sides with the Sultan, has two votes; but, if against him, only one. There are two representatives of the people, called Manteries, like the military tribunes of the Romans. The common people of Sooloo, called Tellimanhood, enjoy much real freedom, owing to the above representation; but the Tellimanhood, or vassals of the adjacent islands named Tappool, Seassee, Tawee-tawee, and others, being the estates of particular Datoos, are often used in a tyrannical manner by their chiefs. I have been told that their haughty lords visiting their estates, will sometimes with impunity demand and carry off young women, whom they happen to fancy, to swell the number of their Sandles (Concubines) at Sooloo.” (Forrest, Voyage, p. 326.) [↑]
[32] For detailed accounts of the events here briefly mentioned, the Moro wars, the imprisonment of Alimudin, the ravages committed in the islands by those pirates, etc., to the end of Ovando’s government, see Concepción’s Hist. de Philipinas, xii, pp. 230–419, and xiii, pp. 1–250. See also the account of the “Moro raids repulsed by Visayan natives,” ante; it is inserted mainly to represent more vividly, in the words of a probable eyewitness, a typical raid by Moro pirates on the peaceable Christian natives. [↑]
[33] To this name should be added, “Santisteban, Echeveria, y Alvero” (Concepción, xiii, p. 250); he was a knight of the Order of Calatrava. [↑]