21. Besides this, it ought to be borne in mind that, from the first years of this conquest until the one in which we now are, nearly all the provinces have at various times rebelled and risen in arms; and not one of our authors doubts that for this kind of offense the Indians ought to be punished by an increase of their tributes, that this may serve them as a warning and example; for they [thus] lost the right to be treated with the mildness which their first voluntary submission deserved. If the Spaniards had proceeded after this fashion in these islands, it would have been an easy matter to increase the tributes, in order to save the situados. Moreover, with the examples in this war [i.e., with the English] we have most rightful cause for punishing, by some such means, the traitorous and revolted provinces, by [imposing] not only the two pesos of tribute, but much more, in order to make some distinction between the Indians who have continued faithful to our king and those who have rebelled and acted disloyally.
22. With these brief reflections the minds of those who have entertained some doubts or scruples in regard to the increase of tributes which I proposed in the preceding chapter would be convinced; but there would be other difficulties to overcome in this exceedingly delicate matter. People will tell me (as I have sometimes heard it said) that any person who proposes the increase of tributes commits mortal sin, and incurs the excommunication of the bull of the Cena. But I will reply with the upright and pious intention which has influenced me to write on this subject—on which, in my opinion, depends the preservation of these islands and their Christian churches; for they will certainly be lost in a few years unless they produce [means] for the expenses which they occasion, or unless his Majesty increase the royal situado; this is a difficult matter, and he is under no obligation to do so. And it is sufficient for me, in order not to incur the said excommunication, that the bull of the Cena is not received in España in regard to matters of temporal government (in which our sovereigns are absolute), but only in what concerns ecclesiastical discipline, and the purity of the faith and the Catholic religion, in which the Spaniards have always affirmed the blindest obedience to the supreme pontiff and vicar of Christ on earth.
23. Nevertheless, I regard with the most profound veneration and respect all that is contained in the aforesaid bull, and its provisions regarding government taxes and tributes make me hesitate; for, assuming (as a good Catholic) some influence of the Holy Ghost for the said pontifical declaration,[16] my mind would be full of remorse if at the same time when I defend the increase of tributes I did not oppose the malversation of their proceeds, the superfluous expenses, the lack of economy in those who administer them, and the numberless thefts from the royal revenues, which are the strongest objections that can be raised against my proposal.
24. It is certain that the vassals are under obligation to pay tribute to their kings, but it is likewise certain that they have the right, in equity, that what they pay as tribute be well employed, and that punishment be administered to those who steal, extravagantly spend, or misapply those funds; for in the honest administration of the royal revenues consists the greatest comfort of the vassals and the prosperity of the [respective] monarchies. The remark made by a celebrated French writer is [worthy] of note: that if the ministers of the king of España in the Indias were not so dishonest the royal incomes would amount to more than those of all the powers of Europa. The vassal complies with the obligation which rests on him, but the kings do not fulfil theirs; for they let go without punishment all the theft, all the robbery, all the iniquity committed by their ministers. I am well aware that there cannot be government among men without these defects and vices, which without exception are utterly incurable, and all the nations of the world have committed them from the time of Adam; but he who knows our general misgovernment of the Indias and the numberless robberies which are committed [therein] will be astounded to see that the criminals are not punished. [At the same time] he is certain that the royal revenues are in great part consumed by those who manage them, while if some exemplary punishments were inflicted the thefts would be greatly checked; that, by not curbing these, heavier burdens are laid upon the vassals; and that these protest against the tributes which are imposed upon them, [levied] not strictly for the maintenance of the dominions, but in order to enrich the officials, who (especially in the Indias) make enormous fortunes with what they obtain by defrauding the royal exchequer—or, to speak more correctly, by plundering those who pay tribute.
25. If in the collection, administration, and allotment of the royal revenues there were application, zeal, disinterestedness, and economy, it is evident that the vassals would not be compelled to contribute with so many imposts and taxes; for with what is plundered and misapplied in one year the expenses could be met for the half of the following year, and perhaps, instead of increasing the taxes, it would be possible to make some reductions of these to the vassals who should be considered most burdened.
26. I have not the slightest doubt that the tributes which have been hitherto paid in these islands are not sufficient for maintaining them in a condition so respectable as that which I have already proposed; and if for this chiefest reason I have defended the increase of tributes, I likewise retract this opinion in case our court do not apply the most effective remedies, in order to check the robberies and malversations which during my time I have seen, and that they may not be responsible before the stern tribunal of God for such hardships to the Indians, and for the robberies, which will be committed in greater number in proportion to the increase in the funds which will be handled. For, strict as is the obligation of the vassals to contribute to the expenses, or pay tribute, equally so is that of the sovereigns to make proper distribution of what is contributed, and to endeavor that it be not misapplied; and so long as kings do not fulfil this obligation, by appointing zealous and disinterested officials, and punishing with the greatest severity those who are not such, there will be few persons who will venture to express opinions in favor of increasing the tributes. But [when such measures are taken] I will be the first to withdraw from this statement of my opinion; for I have always believed that the aforesaid condition [of honest administration] was inseparable from such increase.
27. I will note other objections which have been made to me against increasing the tributes; but, before mentioning them, I protest my veneration and blind obedience to the royal decrees of my king and sovereign, whose upright conscience will consider what is most in accordance with its internal peace, the rectitude of his royal intentions and the comfort of his vassals, by mercilessly punishing those who defraud the royal treasury, and issuing such other commands as are expedient.
28. There are many who restrict the powers of the sovereign which I mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, and who say that the [various] countries, when they instituted kings, did not dispossess themselves of all the authority which the people of the nation possessed; but that the latter reserved something, especially in the matter of taxes, which were proposed and demanded by the kings, while the vassals granted or denied them—[the objectors] drawing conclusions from this ancient method, and (especially in our España) from the convocation of parliament [cortes]; that the power of the king to grind his vassals is not absolute, and that these do not depend in such matters on the will of their kings alone. I frankly state these objections, which, even though they be paltry (on account of the positive opinion of the sovereign, supreme, and absolute power of our kings, who recognize no superior on earth), it is expedient for those who ought to anticipate them not to overlook; for, in order to render a question clear, and to foresee all the difficulties in its decision and practical result, a knowledge of the replies and objections which may be made is always helpful. I content myself with pointing these out, and repeating my [assertion of] invariable obedience to the royal commands of my king and sovereign, as I stated in the preceding section.
29. [Some] persons will also raise objections against what I have stated in the fifth section, that in all nations imposts and taxes are increased, according to their necessities and exigencies, and that, when this time [of urgency] is ended, the vassals are set free from such burdens; but that in España there is no impost which may not be perpetual, as has generally been the case with all—and the “Man of San Quintin” demonstrates it in his memorial, attributing the ruin of the monarchy to [the imposts,] the millones and sisas especially.[17]
30. These and other objections I will answer briefly, by saying that the presumption of the law by which it is believed of all public officials that they conduct themselves conformably to justice, so long as quite the opposite is not evident, is stronger and more effective in favor of kings and their wise prime ministers—who, with more enlightenment, a profounder knowledge of the [affairs of] state, well-known zeal for the welfare of the monarchy, and the proper maintenance of their lofty honor and character, have decided and will decide these matters, in which we who are inferior and of more limited abilities ought to render subordinate our own opinions, and honor with the utmost respect their wise decisions, persuading ourselves, as is just, that in their councils they have borne in mind all the considerations which can produce the most advantageous judgment, before it is made known to the public. For however satisfied one may be with their reasoning, he would admit that he was convinced if it were possible for him to hear the substantial arguments which influence the royal proceedings of our sovereign—on account of which I, more than any other person, submit these productions of my dull intellect to the superior comprehension of his Majesty and his zealous ministers, protesting that I do not presume to furnish enlightenment on these subjects because I might think that they do not possess it, but in order to manifest my intense desire that what is understood to be beneficial to the state, to the glory of the nation, and to the welfare of all the vassals, may be carried into execution.