The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume 49 / Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and their peoples, their history and records of the catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the close of the nineteenth century

by Unknown

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, a message was received from the English commander-in-chief, who urgently demanded the head of the English officer which the Indians had taken: as well as the author of that deed, with the threat that if it were not done, he would send the heads of all the prisoners whom they had in their power, and especially those of two officers, who had been made prisoners aboard the little galley. That demand was completely satisfied, and we were exculpated from a deed in which we had no part, and the blame for which was to be attributed to the lack of civilized customs among the Indians, and especially to the Sepoys, who, as has been said, did not cease to continue hostilities by their constant fire. Our captain-general (the archbishop), mounted on horseback, and went to see the hostile camp, in order to appease the trouble that that affair had aroused, and in fact it did not go farther.

The bombardment continued without cessation, and from half-past five in the evening until seven the flagship and another ship fired on the city, but with very slight result, for the balls which were fired horizontally were all buried on the shore, and those to which they gave a slight elevation, nearly all passed over the city, and were lost on the other side.

That same day, two mortars were fixed and placed in a battery on the rampart of the foundry, with which many bombs were thrown into the hostile camp and into the trenches.

On the twenty-ninth,[15] at six in the morning, the flagship and another vessel commenced to cannonade the bastion of the foundry, and made a desperate fire, which continued until eight o’clock with the same activity. From that time until ten it was moderated. In the afternoon of that same day, two craft entered by way of the great strait (of Mariveles). Immediately two of the enemy’s squadron were detached, which having joined the two which were coming, anchored with them near Manila. It was learned afterward that those craft were two English frigates, which had become separated from the body of the squadron in a great storm; as was also the case with the “Namur,” which had lost its masts and had been forced to put in at Canton. Hence their total squadron numbered sixteen sail.

The thirtieth, the bombardment continued, and the vessels fired some shots from their cannons.[16] From the city four chaloupes were seen which had overturned; they were coming ashore with men and war supplies. The same accident happened to a champan which they had captured in the days preceding. This accident had happened through the violence of the west wind which had freshened. This was at four in the afternoon, and at six, a bomb-ketch made shore opposite the reduct of San Antonio Abad.

October first, the Indians of Passay reported that a raft had made the shore, which was built of large masts, small masts, and yards that had belonged to the bomb-ketch; that this raft had on it the moorings, and artillery of the above bomb-ketch. They reported that they had seen many people drowned on the beach. Upon this report, the native cavalry was detached in order that they might seize those effects. But when they arrived at the place, they were repulsed by the enemy’s musketry, who had hastened from their general quarter of Malate and from the powder factory in order to protect the raft and its load.

At daybreak of the second, the enemy placed in operation a battery of eight twenty-four pounders against the flanked angle of the bastion of the foundry, and against the face which looked upon their camp. That battery was so well served, that at ten in the morning, all the parapet of that part was on the ground. At the same time, they directed their mortars (nine in number and of various calibers) toward the bastion itself. The flagship and another vessel bombarded the same bastion on the side looking seaward, with such fury that along the shore and beyond the walls on the landside, more than four thousand twenty-four pound balls were collected. But what molested us still more was the musketry of the enemy, which was placed in the tower and church of Santiago, which they had arranged for that purpose by opening in all the roofs several windows so that they dominated us. They saw also all that occurred in the city, and although the greatest efforts and the most powerful attempts were made to batter down the church with our artillery, we were unable to do it, or to dislodge the enemy from that post. But it is incredible that our bastion being open without a parapet on either side, it is incredible, I say, that of the various officers who sustained it, and of all the musketeers and artillerymen who were obliged to fire in barbet, there were killed only two artillerymen, two musketeers, and three pioneers, in spite of a desperate fire which all those men suffered from five different parts. It is true that more than twenty wounded and maimed were taken out, among whom was a lieutenant belonging to the artillery who lost his right arm. The greater part of the officers were wounded and bruised from blows with stones, and had contusions, but that did not prevent them from sticking to their posts. The vessels ceased their fire at orisons. That of the camp continued all night with the same activity, so that the artillery of our bastion having been dismounted, they were obliged to abandon that post, leaving there only a few sentinels without shelter.

At the same time, various assemblies and parties of Indians from the provinces were formed to the number of five thousand more or less. But only two thousand five hundred Pampangos were found who were deemed capable of undertaking anything. Consequently, it was resolved to make a sortie.[17] It was to be undertaken at the close of the night of the third, as follows. The Pampangos were to form in three columns. The first column was to attack the church of Santiago on the side where the enemies had their batteries of cannons and mortars. The second was to hurl itself on Malate and Ermita where the general quarters were located. The third was to invest by the sea side. Those three columns were to be supported by two pickets of musketeers, commanded by the sargento-mayor of Cavite, two captains, and four subalterns. At the hour set, our Pampangos and pickets sallied out in the best order, but scarce had they set foot outside the Parián gate, when they began to utter loud cries in disorder and make a great racket. That allowed the camp of the enemy to get into readiness to receive them. In spite of that, the Pampango troops entered their camp, killed the advance sentinels, and caused great damage to the enemy. Those Indians themselves suffered no less from the hostile musketry. They would have suffered still more if confusion had not reigned there; for the enemy, in their fear of killing one another, did not dare to play some cannon loaded with grape, which they had prepared and posted in different places. The pickets seeing this disorder, halted before the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, whence they fired against the church of Santiago, thus protecting the retreat of the Pampangos, which took place at nine in the morning. The action was bloody on both sides. One soldier of the pickets was killed and eight wounded. The mortality among the Pampangos was heavy. It was learned afterward that the enemy having lost some of their officers, who were killed in the action, had had more than sixty Pampangos, whom they had captured and taken prisoners, hanged in their camp. That action so intimidated and disconcerted all the other Pampangos that they all retired to their respective villages, so that there remained very few of them who would return to Manila.

That action did not at all interrupt the fire of the battery against the bastion of the foundry, so that when daybreak came, it could be seen that an eighteen-pounder cannon had fallen into the ditch, and it could not be recovered. The greater part of the face and the terreplein of the same bastion had also fallen, and their ruins had dried up the ditch. But what caused the greatest anxiety was that the engineer recognized that the enemy was busy making a new battery for the purpose of dismounting the artillery, the collateral flanks of the bastions San Andrés and San Eugenio, which flanked and defended the entrance to the covered way and the approach to the breach. In fact, that battery began to play at noon with so great activity, that it dismounted the cannons of the flanks in two hours time, overthrew the parapets, and killed some fusileers and pioneers. Twice were other parapets made with beams and bags of sand, but each time they were in ruins the moment after. Consequently, the men were obliged to retire from those bastions. The bastion of San Andrés did not suffer so much, for it was stronger. However, it had one cannon of the caliber of eighteen, which was placed in the elevated flank, dismounted. We had no other hope than in another cannon of equal caliber, of the two which were in this flank, for while we still had two cannons of the caliber of four in the low place, the latter could be of but little service.

Our captain-general, having been informed of everything, called the council of war in the afternoon of the same day; and that council lasted until the night. The master-of-camp, the sargento-mayor of the city, the sargento-mayor of Cavite, the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment, those of the militia, and the deputies of the merchant body, of the city, and of the various ecclesiastic orders were present, all being introduced by the ordinary engineer. The latter, having reported the fatal condition of the place, advice or opinions were mutually given. All, with the exception of the military men, were of the opinion to continue the defense, by making use of the ordinary means for the repairs necessary to the bastions, and by making ditches, etc. The military men thought that we ought to capitulate.[18] But having asked them whether they thought that we ought to capitulate immediately, they answered no, and that they said it only because the breach had commenced, and that it would be practicable next day, and it would be difficult to make the ditches and repairs necessary to prevent the city from being taken by assault.