"(h) If no rate could be increased without the approval of the commission after affirmative showing by the carrier, it might happen that many reductions now voluntarily accorded would not be made."
The nine reasons suggested by the commission why the original amendment offered to section 6 should not be adopted, fully sustain the committee in reporting the bill adversely, and to a great extent, fully justify the views which it has expressed in this report as influencing the actions of the committee in its adverse report upon the amendment proposed in the committee.
The committee is unable to appreciate the force of the suggestion of the modification proposed to the original amendment, as in any way changing the principle embodied in it, or the practical results which would flow from its adoption. If the power was conferred upon the commission, when a rate was advanced, upon complaint to suspend the going into effect of that rate until a final hearing, every objection urged by the commission to the adoption of the bill, but the first two, would be applicable to the modification proposed by the commission to the original amendment.
Under the modification suggested by the commission the burden imposed upon it would be greater, if possible, than under the original amendment. Under the original amendment, by force of the statute, the filing of the protest would suspend the advanced rate, and the hearing upon the merits would take place after the thirty days had expired. Under the suggestion of the commission conferring upon it the discretionary authority upon complaint to determine whether the rate should go into effect at the time prescribed by law or be suspended, there is imposed an official quasi judicial duty upon the commission, which it should not perform except upon proof that probably the rate sought to be advanced would ultimately be determined to be unreasonable. Remembering the large number of changes of rates daily, and the fact that under the law the complaint could be filed at any time within the thirty days, would it not be an impossible undertaking for the commission to hope to perform this official act with justice to the public or to the carrier? In the multiplicity of duties now demanding its most earnest attention, would not the practical operation of such a law compel it to enter a pro forma order of suspension until the final hearing, when the commission, upon an examination of the complaint, is satisfied that it presented a prima facie case of unreasonable advance?
An official tribunal charged with the duty of preventing an unreasonable advance in rates would be constrained, on the presentation of such a complaint, to issue the order of suspension. If the slightest doubt was raised in its mind as to the reasonableness of the advance, its official obligation would require it to enter the order of suspension. Is there any question that such a prima facie case could be made where the consideration of the protest would, of necessity, be ex parte?
The committee is not, therefore, able to draw a distinction between the original amendment and that proposed in committee. In the opinion of the committee the reasons stated in the letter of the chairman of the commission, and the reasons given in this report, not only justify it but compel an adverse report.
CONDITIONS CONFRONTING CONGRESS.
10. The act of June 29, 1906, took effect August 28, 1906. It has been operative only about twenty-eight months. During half of that period of time the country has experienced the effects of a severe commercial panic; business has been prostrated; transportation paralyzed; thousands of cars have been stored on the sidings, and hundreds of engines have been placed in the shops, awaiting the revival of business. From conditions existing today, we have a right to assume that before many months we shall be approaching normal conditions. The commission has not had sufficient time to interpret and construe the recent law and to promulgate its orders in reference to the action of the carriers under it. Many of the traffic questions involved, under the provisions of that law, are yet to be construed and put in force by orders of the commission. Is it wise, under these conditions, to begin amending that statute by introducing provisions inconsistent with the basis of the act? It has been shown that under the power conferred by that recent enactment, the commission is vested with the power to change an existing unreasonable rate and to fix for the future a reasonable rate. It has also the authority conferred upon it to award reparation to the extent of any injury resulting to a shipper, by reason of the existence of an unreasonable rate.
Attention has been called to the opinion of the commission, as expressed in its decisions, narrowing very greatly the right of the carrier to advance a rate that would meet with its approval upon hearing. The committee must assume, in considering this question, that both the shippers and traffic officials, with knowledge of the views entertained by the commission upon the question of an advance of rates, will in the one case be prompt to avail themselves of that attitude of the commission, and in the other that they will seek to so adjust their rates as to bring their schedules within the rulings of that tribunal. The committee believes the highest duty of the commission is to bring together shippers and carriers, to the end that each may see that neither can be permanently prosperous at the expense of the other. It further believes that in many instances this effort has been made by the commission, and successfully made. It cannot be accomplished by statutes causing rigidity of rates. The most sensitive spot in the great business dealings of the country is the railroad rate. This rate must be raised or lowered, not in obedience to a rigid statutory law, but in obedience to the varying conditions of trade and commerce.