In the next statement the salient facts in regard to the passenger traffic since the Commission began collecting the data is passed under review.
| Year | Passengers Carried (Millions) | Passengers Carried One Mile (Millions) | Mileage Passenger Trains (Millions) | Average Passengers in Train | Average Journey Miles | Passenger Revenue (Millions) | Average Receipts per Passenger Mile (Cents) |
| 1909 | 888 | 29,452 | 507 | 58 | 33 | 504 | 1.916 |
| 1908 | 890 | 29,082 | 500 | 59 | 33 | 566 | 1.937 |
| 1907 | 873 | 27,718 | 509 | 51 | 32 | 564 | 2.014 |
| 1906 | 797 | 25,167 | 479 | 49 | 31 | 510 | 2.003 |
| 1905 | 738 | 23,800 | 459 | 48 | 32 | 472 | 1.962 |
| 1904 | 715 | 21,923 | 440 | 46 | 31 | 444 | 2.006 |
| 1903 | 694 | 20,915 | 425 | 46 | 30 | 421 | 2.006 |
| 1902 | 649 | 19,689 | 405 | 45 | 30 | 392 | 1.986 |
| 1901 | 607 | 17,353 | 385 | 42 | 29 | 351 | 2.013 |
| 1900 | 576 | 16,038 | 363 | 41 | 28 | 323 | 2.003 |
| 1899 | 523 | 14,591 | 347 | 41 | 28 | 291 | 1.978 |
| 1898 | 501 | 13,379 | 334 | 39 | 27 | 267 | 1.973 |
| 1897 | 489 | 12,256 | 335 | 37 | 25 | 251 | 2.022 |
| 1896 | 511 | 13,049 | 332 | 39 | 26 | 266 | 2.019 |
| 1895 | 507 | 12,188 | 317 | 38 | 24 | 252 | 2.040 |
| 1894 | 540 | 14,289 | 326 | 44 | 26 | 285 | 1.986 |
| 1893 | 593 | 14,229 | 335 | 42 | 24 | 301 | 2.108 |
| 1892 | 560 | 13,362 | 317 | 42 | 24 | 286 | 2.126 |
| 1891 | 531 | 12,844 | 308 | 42 | 24 | 281 | 2.142 |
| 1890 | 492 | 11,847 | 285 | 41 | 24 | 260 | 2.167 |
| 1889 | 472 | 11,553 | 277 | 42 | 25 | 254 | 2.199 |
| 1888 | 412 | 10,101 | 252 | 40 | 24 | 237 | 2.349 |
| Increase | 115% | 191% | 101% | 45% | 38% | 138% | |
| 1888 to 1907 | |||||||
| Decrease | 18.4 | ||||||
The several increases shown in the first, second, third and sixth columns of the table reflect the general advancement in passenger traffic. That of 45% in the average passengers to a train marks the progress in density of that traffic which may eventually place it on a profitable basis. In Massachusetts, where this density yields an average of 79 passengers to a train there is no demand for a two-cent rate statute, for the conditions have made a rate of 1.64 cents profitable. In the group of states consisting of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota, where the density of traffic yields only 46 passengers by train, a statutory two-cent fare becomes confiscatory because it costs at least one dollar to operate a passenger train one mile and 46 times two cents is only 92 cents. Moreover the 46 passengers per train is only an average and there are as many trains that average less as more. The average has to be raised above 50 to yield any margin of profit on passenger traffic. If it were not for the density of traffic in the New England and North Atlantic group of states the average for the entire United States would be well below 46 passengers per train.
The steady increase in the distance traveled per passenger reflects the effect of trolley competition in diverting the short haul passenger traffic.
The most noteworthy feature of the seventh column is the decline of 98/1000ths of a cent in the average receipts per passenger mile between 1907 and 1909, making a new low record after hovering around the two cent mark for fourteen years. As noted above, this reduction in the average cost the railways nearly $29,000,000 on the passenger traffic of 1909.
In this connection it is interesting to recall that between 1888 and 1893 the Official Statistician, then as now Professor Adams, made the following computation of the average cost of carrying one passenger one mile for the whole United States:
| 1888 | 1889 | 1890 | 1891 | 1892 | 1893 | |
| Average cost of carrying a passenger one mile, cents | 2.042 | 1.993 | 1.917 | 1.910 | 1.939 | 1.955 |
It will be observed that the average receipts per passenger mile in 1909 are below the computed cost in every one of the years above named, except 1891. When the advance in the cost of everything necessary to the service—track, labor, equipment, conveniences, speed, terminal facilities—is considered, the practical coincidence of average cost and receipts leaves no margin for legitimate profits.