During all this time, Mackay remained at Inverness, waiting for the arrival of Ramsay’s detachment from the south, which he had long and anxiously looked for. In conformity with Mackay’s orders, Colonel Balfour immediately put the troops under Colonel Ramsay in readiness to march, but just as they were about to pass across the Frith of Forth, from Leith to Burntisland, an alarm was created by the appearance of a large number of vessels at the mouth of the Frith, which were at once supposed to be a French fleet with troops on board for the purpose of making a descent upon the coast in support of Dundee. As the seizure of the capital, it was naturally supposed, would be the first object of the invaders, the embarkation of Ramsay’s detachment, which in such an event would be necessary for its defence, was countermanded; but in two or three days the fears of the government were dispelled, by having ascertained that the fleet in question consisted of a number of Dutch herring vessels which were proceeding on their annual voyage to the fishing stations on the northern coast. This delay occasioned great embarrassment to the operations of Mackay, and almost proved fatal to him, as Dundee was thereby enabled to throw himself with a large force between Mackay’s and Ramsay’s corps, and to threaten both with annihilation.
In terms of his instructions, Ramsay, after reaching Perth, proceeded through Athole, on his way to Inverness. Though the Athole-men, many of whom he found armed, offered no opposition to his march, yet as every thing around him assumed a warlike appearance, and as reports were continually brought to him that Dundee had placed himself between him and Mackay, with a very large force, he grew alarmed, and so strong had his fears become when within a dozen of miles of Ruthven in Badenoch, that he resolved to return to Perth. He had previously despatched a letter to Mackay, informing him of his advance, and appointing a meeting at Ruthven on a given day, but he neglected to send another express acquainting Mackay of his design to return to Perth. The retreat of Ramsay was disorderly, and some of his men deserted. The Athole-men, who kept hovering about him, were desirous of attacking him, but they were prevented, though with difficulty, by the gentlemen of the district. Mackay having received Ramsay’s despatch, was so anxious to form a speedy junction with the latter’s detachment, that he left Inverness the following (Sunday) morning, taking with him only two days’ provisions. When about half-way between Inverness and Ruthven, he received an express from the governor of the castle, informing him of Ramsay’s retreat, and that Dundee acting on information contained in an intercepted despatch of Mackay’s, had entered Badenoch on Sunday morning, (the morning of Mackay’s march from Inverness,) with an immense force, and was within a few miles of the castle.
The first person who had met Dundee in Lochaber on the appointed day was Glengary, who had with him a body of between 200 and 300 men. He was followed by Macdonald of Morer, at the head of nearly 200 of Clan Ranald’s men, and by Appin and Glencoe, with about the same number. Dundee had been subsequently joined by Lochiel (now 60 years of age), who had 600 men under him, and by Keppoch, at the head of 200; but Sir Alexander Maclean, who had promised also to attend, failed to appear.
The intelligence communicated by the commander of Ruthven castle was exceedingly perplexing to Mackay, who must have felt keenly the disappointment of Ramsay’s flight. He saw himself with a handful of men surrounded by a warlike and hostile population, and within a short march of a powerful force, which he could not singly resist—with few friends on whom he could place much reliance. He had, in the unfortunate situation in which he was placed, only a choice of evils before him. To have proceeded on his march with the view of cutting his way through the enemy, would have been, even if practicable, an imprudent and very dangerous step, and to have taken up a position in a district where he would have been exposed to be surrounded and cut off from his resources, would have been equally rash. He had, therefore, no alternative which he could prudently adopt, but either to fall back upon Inverness, or retire down the vale of the Spey. He preferred the latter course; for, although such a movement would leave Inverness quite exposed to Dundee’s army, that disadvantage would be more than counterbalanced by the protection which would be thereby afforded to the laird of Grant’s lands, near the borders of which Dundee was now hovering, and by the obstruction which the interposition of Mackay’s troops would present to any attempt on the part of Dundee to recruit his army in the Duke of Gordon’s country. Besides, by making Strathspey the scene of his operations, Mackay expected to be able to keep up a communication with the south through Angus and Aberdeenshire, and the adjoining parts of Moray, which he could not maintain if he returned to Inverness.
Accordingly, after despatching an express to Inverness, apprising the garrison of his intentions, and promising assistance, should Dundee venture to attack the town, Mackay began a rapid march towards Strathspey, which he continued during the night, and did not halt till he had descended a considerable way down that vale. Dundee, who had closely pursued him, afraid of exposing his men to the attacks of Mackay’s cavalry, did not follow him after he had gained the flatter part of the Strath, but kept aloof at the distance of some miles in a more elevated position where he encamped. Notwithstanding his inferiority in point of numbers, the revolutionary general determined to endeavour to allure Dundee from his stronghold by offering him battle, and having refreshed his men, wearied by a long march of twenty-four hours, he advanced next morning to within a mile of Dundee’s camp, and, after reconnoitring the position of the enemy, made preparations for receiving them; but Dundee, secure from danger, by the nature of the ground he occupied, showed no disposition to engage. It is probable that, in acting thus passively, he was influenced by the conduct of the Highlanders, who were averse to engage with cavalry, and some of whom (the Camerons, according to Mackay,) fled to the neighbouring hills on Mackay’s approach. Seeing no hope of drawing the viscount out of his trenches, Mackay returned in the evening to his camp, which he removed the following day to Colmnakill, about six miles lower down the Spey, where he considered himself more secure from any sudden surprise or attack, and where he was speedily joined by two troops of Livingston’s dragoons from Dundee. The ground occupied by Mackay was a spacious plain, bounded on the south by the Spey, which effectually protected his rear, whilst his front was covered by a wood and some marshes which skirted the plain on the north. The right of Mackay’s position was protected by a small river with a rough and stony bottom. The general himself took up his quarters at Belcastle, a summer-house in the neighbourhood belonging to the laird of Grant, whence he despatched ten or twelve of Grant’s tenants, selected by Grant himself as the most intelligent and trustworthy, to watch and bring him notice of Dundee’s motions. These scouts kept up a constant communication with Mackay, who received a report from one or other of them almost every alternate hour. In the meantime, he kept his whole army under arms, and to prevent surprise, small parties of horse and dragoons patrolled the neighbouring woods, and some foot were stationed along the banks of the little river on the right. But these precautions would probably have been unavailing, if the government general had not timeously been made acquainted with the fact, that there were enemies in his camp who were watching an opportunity to betray him.
For some time, a report had been current that Livingston’s regiment of dragoons was disaffected to the government; but as Mackay could not trace the rumour to any authentic source, he disbelieved it, and to mark his confidence in its fidelity, he had ordered the two troops which were stationed at Dundee to join him in the north. But two days after two deserters from Dundee’s camp informed Mackay that, with few exceptions, all the dragoon officers had entered into a conspiracy to betray him. They said that they had heard Dundee frequently assure the chiefs of the clans that he could depend upon the dragoons, and heard him inform the chiefs, that till he saw a favourable opportunity for requiring the services of the dragoons, he would allow them to remain in the enemy’s camp, where they might be useful to him. The deserters likewise informed Mackay that they had not left Dundee’s camp altogether of their own accord, but partly at the instigation of the lairds of Blair and Pollock, who had been carried about by Dundee as prisoners ever since their capture at Perth, and who were anxious to prevent Mackay from engaging, under these circumstances, with such a small party of troops as he then had.
This information, though calculated to shake the general’s confidence in the fidelity of these dragoons, was too vague and unsatisfactory to be relied upon. Mackay appears at first to have had some doubts of the truth of the statement; but his unwillingness to believe the accusation gave place to an opposite impression when, after ordering the deserters to be confined in Belcastle, and threatening them with exemplary punishment should it turn out that they were spies sent by Dundee, they expressed themselves quite satisfied to abide the result of any investigation he might institute.
Mackay, though now satisfied that there were traitors in his camp, took no steps to secure them, but continued to remain in his position waiting for the arrival of Barclay’s dragoons and Leslie’s foot from Forfar and Couper Angus. Mackay might have retreated down the river, but he was advised to remain at Colmnakill by Sir Thomas Livingston and the laird of Grant; because by retaining his ground, his expected succours would be every day drawing nearer to him, and every day thus spent would be lost to Dundee, who was prevented, by his presence, from communicating with those places in the low country from which he expected reinforcements, particularly in horse, of which he stood in most need. Besides, by retiring, Mackay considered that he might probably be forced to recross the Grampians before the two regiments could join him, in which case he would leave the whole of the north exposed to Dundee, who would probably avail himself of the opportunity to raise a force too formidable to be encountered.
In the meantime, Dundee sent a detachment of his army to lay siege to the old castle of Ruthven, in which Mackay, on his arrival at Inverness, had placed a garrison of about 60 of Grant’s Highlanders, under the command of John Forbes, brother to Culloden. The garrison being in want of provisions, capitulated on the condition that their lives should be spared, and that they should be allowed to return to their homes on their parole. While conducted through Dundee’s camp, Forbes observed all the horses saddled, and his army preparing as if for an immediate march. In proceeding towards Colmnakill, he met, at the distance of about a mile from Dundee’s lines, two men on horseback, one in a red, the other in a blue uniform. The latter immediately challenged him with the usual parole, “Qui vive?” on which Forbes returning the “Vive le Roi Guilleaume,” as indicative of his loyalty to the existing government, the man in red informed him that they had been despatched from Mackay’s camp to obtain intelligence of the enemy. Captain Forbes then cautioned the men of the risk they would run if they proceeded farther, but regardless of his advice, they rode forward in the direction of Dundee’s camp. Forbes having mentioned this occurrence to Mackay the same day, the latter immediately suspected that the officers of dragoons were in communication with Dundee, as he had given no such order as the man clothed in red had pretended. He, thereupon, desired inquiry to be made if any dragoons had been sent out, and by whom; and as blue was the uniform of Livingston’s men, he desired them to be instantly mustered to ascertain if any were absent; but the general had scarcely issued these instructions, when some of his scouts brought him intelligence that Dundee’s army was moving down the Strath towards Colmnakill. This movement, combined with the information which had been communicated to him by Forbes, left no doubt of the treachery of the dragoons.
Under these circumstances, Mackay had no alternative but an immediate retreat. Calling, therefore, his commanding officers together, he ordered them to put their men under arms, and to form them upon the plain in marching order. He next addressed himself to the laird of Grant, and after expressing his regret at the step he was about to take, by which Grant’s lands would be left for a short time exposed to the ravages of Dundee’s army, he requested him to order his tenants to drive their cattle down the country out of the reach of the enemy, who would probably overlook them in their anxiety to follow him in his retreat. Grant listened to this advice with becoming attention, but to show how little he regarded his own personal interest, as opposed to what he conceived his duty to his country, he observed, that though he might lose every thing by Dundee’s invasion of his country, he would not take one step prejudicial to the government.