JAMES STUART.
THE CHEVALIER DE ST. GEORGE.
A. Fullarton & Co. London & Edinburgh.

On Monday the Chevalier made his public entry into Perth. He met, however, with a cold reception, and he himself felt evidently disappointed at the appearance of the camp. He had heard much of the Highland chiefs and the clans, and being desirous to see “those little kings (the chiefs,) with their armies,” a select body of Highlanders exhibited before him. Their appearance gave him great satisfaction, but when he ascertained the paucity of the number in the camp, he could not repress the chagrin and disappointment he felt. On the other hand, the friends of the Chevalier were equally disappointed. Neither his appearance nor demeanour on the present occasion tended in any shape to justify the exaggerated encomiums of Mar, and his lugubrious deportment while at Perth tended more to alienate the affections of his adherents, and depress their spirits, than even the disappointment of supplies from France. The following is an account, doubtfully attributed to the Master of Sinclair, of the appearance of the Chevalier on his arrival at Perth, his behaviour while there, and their consequent effects upon his followers.

“His person was tall and thin, seeming to incline to be lean rather than to fill as he grows in years. His countenance was pale, but perhaps looked more so than usual, by reason he had three fits of ague which took him two days after his coming on shore. Yet he seems to be sanguine in his constitution, and there is something of a vivacity in his eye that perhaps would have been more visible if he had not been under dejected circumstances, and surrounded with discouragement, which it must be acknowledged were sufficient to alter the complexion even of his soul as well as of his body. His speech was grave, and not very clearly expressive of his thoughts, nor over much to the purpose; but his words were few, and his behaviour and temper seemed always composed. What he was in his diversions we know not: here was no room for such things. It was no time for mirth. Neither can I say I ever saw him smile. Those who speak so positively of his being like King James VII. must excuse me for saying, that it seems to say they either never saw this person, or never saw King James VII.; and yet I must not conceal that when we saw the man whom they called our king, we found ourselves not at all animated by his presence; and if he was disappointed in us, we were tenfold more so in him. We saw nothing in him that looked like spirit. He never appeared with cheerfulness and vigour to animate us. Our men began to despise him; some asked if he could speak. His countenance looked extremely heavy. He cared not to come abroad amongst us soldiers, or to see us handle our arms or do our exercise. Some said the circumstances he found us in dejected him. I am sure the figure he made dejected us; and had he sent us but 5,000 men of good troops, and never himself come among us, we had done other things than we have now done. At the approach of that crisis when he was to defend his pretensions, and either lose his life or gain a crown, I think, as his affairs were situated, no man can say that his appearing grave and composed was a token of his want of thought, but rather of a significant anxiety grounded upon the prospect of his inevitable ruin, which he could not be so void of sense as not to see plainly before him, at least when he came to see how inconsistent his measures were, how unsteady the resolution of his guides, and how impossible it was to make them agree with one another.”[735]

The Chevalier returned to Scone in the evening, and notwithstanding the ominous symptoms of the day, proceeded to form a council preparatory to exercising the functions of royalty. From Scone he soon issued no less than six proclamations; one for a general thanksgiving for his safe arrival; another enjoining the ministers to pray for him in the churches; a third, establishing the currency of foreign coin; a fourth, ordering a meeting of the convention of estates; a fifth, commanding all fencible men from sixteen to sixty to repair to his standard; and a sixth, fixing the 23d of January for his coronation at Scone. These assumptions of sovereign authority were, however, of a very evanescent character, as they had scarcely been issued when the Chevalier and his principal friends resolved to abandon the contest as hopeless. Indeed, from the reduced state of the army, and its deficiency in arms and ammunition, a determination had been come to by his party, a month before he landed, to retire from Perth as soon as Argyle should march against it; but being ignorant of that resolution, and believing that the insurgents intended to defend Perth, Argyle delayed his advance till he should be joined by large reinforcements from England and Holland.

Though continued in the command of the army, Argyle, for some reason or other, was not a favourite at court. Of his fidelity there could be no suspicion, and his conduct had lately shown that he wanted neither zeal nor ability to perform the task which had been assigned him. It has been conjectured that the leniency which he was disposed to show towards his unfortunate countrymen was the cause of that hidden displeasure which ended in the dismissal of himself and of his brother, the Earl of Islay, from all their employments. The rejection of an application which he made to the government for extended powers to treat with the insurgents after the battle of Sheriffmuir, goes far to support the supposition. But whatever were his views, he appeared to be in no hurry to pursue the insurgents, probably from an idea that they would disperse of their own accord. By the arrival of a body of 6,000 Dutch auxiliaries, and other reinforcements from England, Argyle found himself, early in January, at the head of upwards of 10,000 men, besides a large train of artillery. Desirous of expelling the insurgents from Fife before advancing north, a detachment of Dutch and Scotch troops crossed the Frith of Forth by the duke’s orders, and under cover of some men-of-war, landed at Burntisland, of which they took possession. On receiving this intelligence the insurgents immediately abandoned all the towns on the north side of the Frith, a circumstance which was attended with serious consequences to their friends at Perth, who were in consequence entirely cut off from their supplies of coals, at an unusually inclement season.

About the end of January, Argyle was in full condition to march north, but the snow, which had fallen to a great depth, appeared to him to offer a formidable obstruction to the march of an army unaccustomed to a winter’s campaign; and which, from the insurgents having burnt and destroyed the villages on the road, would have to bivouac two or three nights in the open air, exposed to all the rigours of a northern winter. For these reasons Argyle urged, at a council of war, which was held at Stirling, a postponement of the march; but General Cadogan,[736] who had been sent down to Scotland to hasten the duke’s motions, insisting upon an immediate advance, and having openly accused Argyle of a want of zeal, his Grace made preparations for marching, and to facilitate the transport of his cannon and waggons, issued orders for assembling some thousands of the country people to clear away the snow.

Although the Jacobite leaders had come to the resolution of abandoning Perth as soon as the Duke of Argyle should advance upon it, they nevertheless gave indications as if they really meant to hold out. Pursuant to an order of a council, which was held on the 16th of January, the most strenuous exertions were made to fortify the town, and both officers and men vied with one another in hastening the completion of the works. What the motives of the leaders may have been in thus practising a deception upon the army it is impossible to conceive; perhaps the distant hope of being joined by the more remote clans, the chance of some fortunate, though unlooked for, occurrence in the chapter of accidents, or an idea that their men could not be otherwise kept together, may have been the inducing causes of these defensive preparations; but whatever their motives were, the apparent determination shown by the leading men to meet the enemy, had the most beneficial effect upon the army, which evinced a strong desire to engage. In this wish they thought they were to be gratified sooner than they expected, by the arrival of some country people at Perth who brought intelligence that Argyle was advancing with all his cavalry, and 4,000 foot mounted on horses. This news was, however, premature, and had originated in the appearance of a reconnoitring party of 200 dragoons, which Argyle had sent forward on the road to Perth, on the 21st of January, and which the fears of the people had magnified into an army.

All doubts, however, were removed in a few days, by the receipt of authentic intelligence at Perth, that Argyle having completed his arrangements, was to leave Stirling for Perth on the 29th of January, with his whole army. The councillors of the Chevalier were dismayed at this intelligence, but it had quite an opposite effect upon the mass of the army. Nothing was to be heard in the Jacobite camp but the voice of joy and rejoicing, and congratulations, on the expected happy result of an encounter with the enemy, were exchanged on all sides—between the officers and gentlemen volunteers, and the common soldiers and clansmen. While the former were pledging each other in their cups and drinking to “the good day,” so near at hand, as they thought, which was to crown the Chevalier’s arms with victory, the latter, amid the din of the warlike bagpipe, were to be seen giving each other a cordial shake of the hand as if fully assured of success.