Conduct of the Government—Intelligence of the Prince’s arrival reaches Edinburgh—Contradictory reports—Preparations of Sir John Cope—Marches to the North—Resolves to march to Inverness—Prince Charles issues a proclamation—Leaves Glenfinnan and crosses Corriearrick—Flight of Cope to Inverness—The Prince marches South—Arrives at Perth—Joined by Lord George Murray and others—Preparations made by the Prince—Alarm in Edinburgh—Association of Volunteers formed—Municipal intrigues.
No event was less expected on the part of the government than the landing of Charles Edward. A flying report had, indeed, been spread in the Highlands in the beginning of summer, that the prince was to come over in the course of that season; but no person, not in the secret of his design, could have imagined that Charles had any intention to risk his person without being accompanied by a sufficient body of troops, and no disposition appeared on the part of France to assist him.
The report alluded to was first communicated in a letter from “a gentleman of consideration in the Highlands” to Lord President Forbes, who, on the 2d of July, showed it to Sir John Cope, the commander-in-chief in Scotland. Little credit was, however, attached to the report, either by the writer of the letter or by the president. Cope, though equally incredulous, considered it his duty to communicate the report to the Marquis of Tweeddale, the secretary of state for Scotland; and to provide against any contingency that might occur, he proposed that the forts of Scotland should be well provided, and that arms should be transmitted for the use of the well-affected clans. In an answer which the marquis wrote upon the 9th, he ordered Cope to keep a strict watch upon the north, but informed him, that, as the measures he proposed were considered by the lords of the regency acting in behalf of the king during his majesty’s absence in Hanover, as likely to create alarm, they had declined to enter into them.[843]
But the lords of the regency were soon aroused from their supineness by advices from abroad that the French court was meditating an invasion of Great Britain, and that the eldest son of the Pretender had left Nantes in a French man-of-war, and, according to some accounts, was actually landed in Scotland. On the 30th of July, the Marquis of Tweeddale wrote to Sir John Cope, communicating to him the news which had just been received, and despatched letters of the same date to Lord Milton, the Justice Clerk,[844] and to the Lord Advocate, with similar intelligence, and enjoining them to keep a strict look out,—to concert what was proper to be done in the event of a landing,—to give the necessary orders for making the strictest inquiry into the truth of the intelligence,—and to transmit to the marquis, from time to time, such information as they were able to collect. The Lords Justices, however, without waiting for a return to these letters, issued, on the 6th of August, a proclamation, commanding all his majesty’s officers, civil and military, and all other loving subjects of his majesty, to use their utmost endeavours to seize and secure the son of the Pretender, promising at the same time a reward of £30,000 to any one who should seize Prince Charles, and “bring him to justice.”
The express sent by the Marquis of Tweeddale reached Edinburgh on the 3d of August, but the advices which had been received in London had preceded it. The Lord President, in a letter written the day before to Mr. Pelham,[845] mentions the alarm which, in a state of profound tranquillity, these advices had created. The report, however, of the prince’s intended visit was discredited by the President, who considered the “young gentleman’s game” to be then “very desperate” in Scotland, the President believing that there was not “the least apparatus for his reception, even amongst the few Highlanders who were expected to be in his interest.” As, however, where there was so much at stake, the President wisely judged that no report respecting the prince’s movements, however improbable, was to be disregarded, he resolved to make his accustomed journey to the north a little earlier than usual, to the end that, though, as he himself observes, his “fighting days” were over, he might give countenance to the friends of government, and prevent the seduction of the unwary, should the report turn out well-founded. On the 8th of August, Forbes wrote the Marquis of Tweeddale, stating that the Lord Advocate and Sir John Cope had informed him of the advices which had been received from abroad, but expressing his disbelief of the report, which he considered “highly improbable.” “I consider the report as improbable,” he observes, “because I am confident that young man cannot with reason expect to be joined by any considerable force in the Highlands. Some loose lawless men of desperate fortunes may indeed resort to him; but I am persuaded that none of the Highland gentlemen, who have ought to lose, will, after the experience with which the year 1715 furnished them, think proper to risque their fortunes on an attempt which to them must appear desperate; especially as so many considerable families amongst themselves have lately uttered their sentiments; unless the undertaking is supported by an arm’d power from abroad, or seconded by an invasion on some other part of his majesty’s dominions.”[846] To provide against any emergency which might arise in the north, his lordship proposed first, that a sufficient number of arms should be lodged in the forts in the Highlands, with directions by whom, and to whom they might be delivered out,—a proposal the same in substance as that made by Sir John Cope; and secondly, that money or credit should be lodged in the hands of confidential persons in the north, for the use of the public service. This last-mentioned measure he considered the more necessary, as it could not be expected, as he observed, that private individuals would come forward with money, when they recollected that several gentlemen, who, in the year 1715, had advanced large sums out of their pockets for the public service, had not even been repaid, far less rewarded by the government.
The Lord President, though a man of sound judgment, and gifted with a considerable portion of political foresight, was in this instance deceived in his speculations; and Lord Tweeddale, perhaps misled by the President, on whose personal knowledge of the state of the Highlands he placed great reliance, adopted the same views. In an answer to the President’s letter, which the marquis wrote on the 17th of August, he thus expresses himself: “I own I have never been alarmed with the reports of the Pretender’s son’s landing in Scotland. I consider it as a rash and desperate attempt, that can have no other consequence than the ruin of those concerned in it.”[847]
On the same day, however, on which the President’s letter to Lord Tweeddale was written, all doubts of the arrival and landing of the prince were removed at Edinburgh. An express came from Lord Milton, the Justice Clerk, then at Roseneath, to Sir John Cope, with a letter dated the 5th, which he had received from Mr. Campbell of Stonefield, sheriff of Argyle, in which was contained a copy of a letter received by the latter from Mr. Campbell of Aird, factor to the Duke of Argyle in Mull and Morvern, announcing the landing of the prince in Arisaig, and stating that some of the Macdonalds were already up in arms, and that other Highlanders were preparing to follow their example. This news was confirmed next day, by another express from the laird of Macleod to the Lord President, dated the 3d of August.[848]
This intelligence, which at first was withheld from the public, was shortly followed by the arrival of the Gazette, containing the proclamation for the apprehension of the prince. Nothing was now talked of at Edinburgh but the threatened invasion. In the state of ignorance in which the public was still kept, the most contradictory reports were circulated. A rumour of the departure of Charles from France had indeed been inserted in the Edinburgh Courant a few days before, and the same paper had also, on the back of this report, stated, upon the alleged information of a foreign journal, that the prince had actually landed in the Highlands, and was to be supported by 30,000 men and 10 ships of war; but neither of these statements appears to have excited any sensation, being generally discredited.[849] Now, however, every person firmly believed that the prince had arrived. One day it was confidently asserted that he had landed in the western Highlands with 10,000 French troops. Next day it was affirmed with equal confidence that he had landed without troops; but that wherever he came the Highlanders to a man had joined him. On the other hand, the Jacobites, who were in the secret of the arrival, anxious to conceal the fact till Charles should be ready to take the field, industriously circulated a report that he was still in France, and had not the least intention of coming over. To divert the public attention, they had recourse to the weapons of ridicule. In their conversation they represented the preparations of the commander-in-chief in a ludicrous light; and to make him contemptible in the eyes of the public, sent him anonymous letters containing most absurd articles of intelligence, which they afterwards circulated with scurrilous comments.[850]
In the present crisis Sir John Cope acted with more wisdom than has been usually ascribed to him, and certainly with more energy than his superiors. Not wishing, however, to trust entirely to his own judgment, he consulted Lord President Forbes, and the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General, the law-officers of the crown, upon the course to be adopted under existing circumstances. No man was better acquainted with every thing appertaining to the Highlands than Forbes; and in fixing upon him as an adviser, Cope showed a laudable desire to avail himself of the best advice and information within his reach. At the period now in question, the insurrection was in a merely inceptive state; and, according to the opinions of those best qualified to judge, there was little probability that it would assume a formidable character. At all events, sound policy dictated that the threatened insurrection should be checked in its bud, and as its progress could only be stopped by the presence of a body of troops, Cope proposed, and his proposal received the approbation of the three public functionaries before named, to march to the Highlands with such troops as he could collect. The number of regular troops in Scotland did not, it is true, amount to 3,000 men, and some of them were newly raised; but there can be little doubt that, by a timely and judicious disposition of about two-thirds of this force in the disaffected districts, the embers of rebellion might have been extinguished. The unfortunate result of Cope’s expedition detracts in no respect from the design he thus formed, though the propriety of his subsequent measures may well indeed be questioned.