[1173] A Particular Account of the Battle of Culloden. In a letter from an officer (Lord George Murray) of the Highland army to his friend in London. London, 1749, p. 4. No. 42 of Appendix to Home. Jacobite Memoirs, p. 121.
[1174] Kirkconnel MS. Lockhart Papers, vol. ii. p. 518.
[1175] Particular Account of the Battle of Culloden, p. 6.
[1176] Idem, p. 9.
[1177] Particular Account, p. 10.
[1178] Lockhart Papers, vol. ii. p. 508.
[1179] Particular Account, p. 10.
[1180] Appendix to Home, No. 42.
[1181] Home, Appendix, No. 42. True Account, &c. p. 11.
[1182] In the letter which Lord George, under the signature of De Valignie, addressed to his friend Hamilton of Bangour, dated from Emerick, 5th August, 1749, he thus justifies himself for having ordered a retreat without the prince’s orders:—“They say, why return from Kilraick without the Prince’s positive orders? he was general, and without his immediate orders no person should have taken so much upon him. My answer to this is, (waiving what Mr. O’Sullivan said from the Prince,[1183]) that all the officers were unanimous;—that as it could not be done by surprise, and before day-break, as had been proposed and undertaken with no other view, it was impossible to have success; for it was never imagined by any one that it was to be attempted but by a surprise. Whatever may be the rules in a regular army, (and it is not to be supposed I was ignorant of them,) our practice had all along been, at critical junctures, that the commanding officers did every thing to their knowledge for the best. At Gladsmuir (the plan of which attack I had formed,) I was the last that passed the defile of the first line, and the first that attacked; and gained in going on a good part of the ground we had left betwixt us and the main ditch, by the front having, on account of the darkness, marched a little too far. When I came up with the enemy’s cannon, I did not stay to take them, but went on against both foot and dragoons, being very quickly followed by our right. I received no orders (nor did I wait for any, otherwise the opportunity would have been lost,) from the time I passed the defile till the battle was over. At Clifton, where I expected to have been supported by all our army, John Roy Stuart brought me orders from the Prince to retreat, for he had ordered the march for Carlisle, which was begun. The officers who were with me agreed in my opinion, that to retreat when the enemy were within less than musket-shot would be very dangerous, and we would probably be destroyed before we came up with the rest of our army. We had nothing for it but a brisk attack; and therefore, after receiving the enemy’s fire, we went sword in hand and dislodged them; after which we made our retreat in good order. I own I disobeyed orders; but what I did was the only safe and honourable measure I could take, and it succeeded. At the battle of Falkirk I never received an order or message from his Royal Highness after I passed the water at Dunipace till the battle was over. I could say much more on this subject; all I shall now add is, that at the time we returned from Kilravock there was no officer of any distinction with the prince, (except Sir Thomas Sheridan be reckoned one,) they being all in the van. Brigadier Stapleton was indeed in the rear, but he knew nothing of the ground there, and his people were only to have been a corps de reserve, and not in the attack.”